The events of early autumn 2026 in Yemen have elevated the prolonged Middle Eastern conflict to the level of a macro-regional crisis. The seizure of the strategic port of Mocha by supporters of the Shiite movement “Ansar Allah” (Houthis) and the advance of their ground forces toward the islands of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait have de facto altered not only the balance of power within Yemen itself, but also the security architecture of key maritime communications in the Middle East. It can be noted that the demonstration of military power by the forces of Sana’a echoes Iran’s doctrine of “Forward Defense.” In 2026, the Yemeni foothold has ultimately transformed from a peripheral center of resistance into a key element of macro-regional asymmetric deterrence [1]. Thus, Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, congratulated the Houthis on their “stunning victory,” while Houthi representative Mohammed Abdulsalam stated that “the group’s operations are defensive in nature and will cease as soon as the attacks on Yemen cease.”
Regional Context
The escalation of the situation around the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is developing in parallel with instability in the area of the Strait of Hormuz, which has a major impact on the global energy market. Traditional hydrocarbon export routes from the Persian Gulf were virtually paralyzed with the outbreak of the war in Iran, and therefore the importance of Red Sea terminals and the East–West Oil Pipeline has increased substantially. The loss of Mocha to the Yemeni loyalists has placed Riyadh’s alternative logistical routes at risk: Saudi tankers departing from the loading port of Yanbu are now within the direct range of attack. This immediately affected global markets: according to Bloomberg, the price of Brent crude promptly exceeded $105 per barrel, while Saudi Arabia’s daily oil production, due to security risks, was adjusted to its lowest levels since the 1990s, at 6.2 million barrels [2]. On September 11, 2026, the Houthis took control of the city of Dhubab, as reported by Ansar Allah Politburo member Huzam al-Asad, while the previous day they had reached Hanish Island in the Red Sea.
Positions of External Actors
The escalation of the conflict has revealed serious disagreements within the camp opposing “Ansar Allah.” Thus, despite the tough rhetoric of CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper, the Donald Trump administration is in fact refusing to become involved in a large-scale campaign on the eve of the midterm elections to the U.S. Congress. Patrols by U.S. Air Force forces and targeted airstrikes are incapable of changing the dynamics of the fighting on the ground. In turn, Saudi Arabia has found itself facing a difficult geopolitical choice: the inter-Arab coalition has been weakened by internal contradictions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, while attempts by the Yemeni government to organize a counteroffensive along the Taiz-Mocha line have so far failed to stabilize the front.
Capitalizing on the fact that the opponent’s disagreements are delaying its decision-making, Sana’a is using the factor of time, conducting an active information campaign through its foreign-policy channels, in particular through statements by Houthi Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein al-Ezzi. Interestingly, the U.S. representative at the meeting, Jennifer Nidhart de Ortiz, accused the Houthis of acting as “agents and instruments of Iran.” No evidence, however, was presented; moreover, the same article quotes a senior Iranian official as saying: “Iran does not control the Houthis,” which is corroborated by a number of facts, in particular the Houthis’ own domestic agenda and local objectives in Yemen, as well as the fact that “Ansar Allah” operates with strategic and tactical autonomy. It is also true, however, that for Iran the Houthis have become an ideal instrument through which it can achieve desired outcomes while remaining removed from direct confrontation with the United States and preserving room for diplomatic maneuver.
Strategic Objectives
An analysis of the offensive actions of the Sana’a forces could theoretically reveal a logical sequence of short-term objectives. The first is to shift the economics and tactics of warfare toward approaches that are more advantageous for the Houthis. In the narrowest part of the Strait (approximately 29 km), ballistic missiles are unnecessary: control over the coastline makes it possible to use cheaper coastal anti-ship missile systems and unmanned surface vessels (USVs). Ultimately, the objective of controlling the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is not the destruction of shipping, but rather the acquisition of a powerful bargaining chip for negotiations.
In addition to oil, the Houthis now control critical infrastructure, including the main internet cables running along the seabed of the Strait, damage to which could threaten a total digital blackout between Asia and Europe. This substantially raises Sana’a’s stakes in future negotiations, the objective of which, one might assume, is to force Riyadh and Washington to agree to the lifting of the blockade of Yemen. On a global scale, this step is also advantageous to Iran: by turning Bab-el-Mandeb into a controlled zone, Tehran gains a powerful bargaining chip in negotiations over its nuclear agenda and the lifting of sanctions.
Implications for Russia
For Russian foreign policy, the Yemeni crisis presents a complex challenge requiring delicate balancing. On the one hand, the destabilization of maritime routes stimulates interest in continental routes, in particular the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and supports high energy prices. At the same time, Moscow has consistently advocated freedom of civilian navigation and the inadmissibility of conflict escalation. The Russian approach should be based on an understanding that the “Ansar Allah” movement has definitively outgrown the status of an isolated rebel group and is not an Iranian “proxy.” Any future security configurations in the Middle East will prove unviable if Sana’a’s interests and the depth of its strategic alliance with Tehran are not incorporated into the formula of the regional balance of power.
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