Abstract
This essay argues that Asian and U.S. interest in Latin American metals, including those in Mexico, is not a temporary phenomenon. It is the re-edition of a three-century-old pattern: powers competing for access to a territory rich in metals, while a fragmented region negotiates from a divided position. It argues that portraying Latin America as a cultural extension of Spain is analytically false and strategically costly. It proposes presenting the region as a collection of sovereign jurisdictions, each with its own mineral regimes and peoples who hold rights recognized under international law.
Keywords.
Latin America, critical minerals, lithium, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, Indigenous and tribal peoples, Inter-American Court, militarization, regionalism.
1. A Misleading Image Comes at a Cost.
For a large part of Asian public opinion, Latin America is an extension of the Iberian Peninsula: the same language, the same religion, and the same imperial past. This image is convenient, but it comes at a cost. Those who see linguistic heritage, culture, tourism, and consumption fail to see sovereign states with strategically important subsoil resources. This image determines the kind of relationship being offered: cultural exchange, or supply agreements and industrial cooperation between equals.
My thesis is that the region must stop presenting itself through the lens of its colonial origins and instead present itself in terms of its structural position. This position has three dimensions. It is geology: the subsoil on which global electrification depends. It is a legal order: constitutions that declare the nation’s original ownership of its natural resources. And it is plurality: Indigenous and tribal peoples with rights of their own. Spain is present in none of these three dimensions.
2. Three Centuries of Metal: The Frontier as a Space for Negotiation.
History dismantles the narrative of Iberian heritage. Gloria Kok studies the frontiers of South America in the seventeenth century, where the Mbayá-Guaicurú and Payaguá groups moved between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. The gold of Cuiabá and silver attracted both powers toward the rivers of Paraguay and the Pantanal region. Kok shows that these peoples did not passively accept European culture. They took advantage of the ambiguities of the Iberian frontiers, negotiated alliances, and traded captives, horses, and colonial goods with both powers. They were political actors who maneuvered between two rival empires. New identities emerged from this process, in what Jonathan Hill calls ethnogenesis.
The same source reveals the other side of the story. The crowns responded with military outposts, forts, and punitive expeditions, some of which were ordered to show no mercy to the defeated. Territories containing metal resources were secured through military force. This is a direct historical precedent for today’s question: who controls the subsoil, and under what rules?
The connection with Asia is even older. American silver fueled the economy of Imperial China through transpacific trade. Spain was an intermediary and an extractor in this chain, not Asia’s negotiating counterpart. That intermediary role has disappeared. Today, Latin American states negotiate directly with Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, and presenting the region as the “Hispanic world” erases the real protagonist.
3. From the Washington Consensus to the Lithium Illusion.
In 2003, José Antonio Sanahuja analyzed the region’s relationship with the United States and the European Union. Sanahuja cites an expression used by Ricardo Hausmann, then chief economist of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB): a “crisis of hope.” The Washington Consensus reforms achieved macroeconomic stability and attracted capital, but social indicators barely improved, while economic liberalization increased external vulnerability. Mexico was the first victim, with the peso crisis, and instability subsequently spread to Asia and South America. Sanahuja concludes that the problem was not solely one of domestic policies. The international financial architecture had structural flaws that a national approach could not correct.
His text records another asymmetry. Washington and Brussels advocated economic openness while protecting their own agricultural sectors through subsidies, the 2002 Farm Bill, and the Common Agricultural Policy. Sanahuja refers to this as a “double standard.” He also describes a region caught between two powers competing for its market: the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) on one side and European association agreements with Mexico and Chile on the other, while individual countries negotiated separately and at their own pace. His final warning was that the region needed to look toward the future “on firmer foundations,” without the neoliberal illusion.
The protagonists have changed, but the structure remains the same. Two decades ago, the promise was that opening the economy and exporting would bring development. Today, the promise is that possessing lithium and copper will bring prosperity. Washington now conditions its industrial incentives on the origin of minerals while simultaneously demanding access to them. It is the same double standard applied to a different resource. Those who ignore this historical precedent risk repeating the illusion.
From the perspective of Mexican diplomacy, Jorge Pinto Mazal, then Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, described the historical response in the mid-1990s. He presented sovereignty as Mexico’s most important bastion in its foreign policy. He advocated regional coordination through the Rio Group, the Group of Three, and the Contadora Group to increase the region’s room for maneuver. He also defended the principle of non-intervention, arguing that democracy cannot be imposed from outside. His text represented the official voice of the Salinas government, with its optimism, and is used here as testimony to a doctrine rather than as an assessment of its results. That doctrine, however, is the legal foundation upon which lithium is now declared a strategic resource.
4. Why Asia and the United States Are Looking Beneath the Surface.
Four long-term forces sustain current interest, and none of them depends on the headline of the week.
- Geology. The lithium triangle between Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile contains between slightly more than half and nearly two-thirds of the world’s identified lithium resources. The figures vary because they depend on the distinction between resources and reserves, as well as revisions by the U.S. Geological Survey. With that caveat, identified resources are estimated at around 21 million metric tons in Bolivia, close to 20 million in Argentina, and between 10 and 11 million in Chile, while Chile stands out in terms of economically exploitable reserves. The word “triangle” is misleading because it suggests a homogeneous region: Chile and Argentina produce lithium, whereas Bolivia, despite its substantial endowment, has barely developed pilot projects. Added to this are copper in Chile and Peru, iron and niobium in Brazil, and silver and lithium potential in Mexico. The resource endowment is permanent. The capacity to exploit it is not.
- Industrial concentration. The critical issue is not only where the mineral is located, but also who refines it and turns it into batteries. Over two decades, China has built a dominant position in these stages. Securing upstream access through financing, equity stakes, and long-term contracts is a matter of industrial security policy for Asian economies.
- Asian insecurity. Here, the analysis must be structural. Leon-Manriquez, Tzili Apango, and Cardenas-Barajas describe a continent with enormous strategic density: nuclear powers and unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and Kashmir. They recall that more than one-third of global trade passes through the South China Sea, a potential flashpoint. Such a vulnerable region pushes its economies to diversify access to resources beyond its immediate surroundings. Mei Zhaorong articulated this approach in 2001 from the perspective of Chinese diplomacy: independence, sovereignty, non-intervention, multipolarity, and a “new just economic order,” accompanied by a discourse of mutual benefit and common development directed at developing countries. This discourse resonates in a region that has experienced double standards.
- The defensive logic of the United States. Washington perceives a dependence on a supply chain controlled by its main competitor. Its response involves industrial incentives conditioned on the origin of minerals and the relocation of production to countries considered reliable. It is the old hemispheric logic with new vocabulary. Mexico, with its shared border, trade agreement, and Asian manufacturing capital, is precisely where the two spheres of influence meet. Chile and Peru look toward the Pacific. The region is the intersection of two rivals, and that is both its greatest opportunity and its greatest risk.
5. International Law: Sovereignty and Its Counterweight.
The legal foundation of the Latin American position is the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The UN General Assembly established this principle in Resolution 1803 (XVII), adopted on December 14, 1962, by 87 votes in favor, 2 against, and 12 abstentions. The two 1966 Covenants reaffirmed it in their common Article 1. The resolution itself establishes that this right must be exercised in the interests of national development and the well-being of the people of the state concerned. This is not a matter of diplomatic courtesy: it is the foundation of the reforms that designate minerals as strategic resources.
Mexico is the most visible case. On April 20, 2022, an amendment to the Mining Law recognizing lithium as the property of the nation was published in the Official Gazette. It reserves lithium exploration and exploitation for the benefit of the people, prohibits the granting of concessions, and designates areas containing lithium deposits as mining reserve zones. On August 23, 2022, a decree established the state entity ‘Litio para México’ (Litio MX). Precision is important here: under Article 27 of the Constitution, minerals in the subsoil were already the property of the nation. Therefore, “nationalization” was more of a political label than a change in ownership. What changed was the exploitation regime, and some legal analysts warned that the framework left room for private participation in certain activities.
Chile chose a different path. In April 2023, the National Lithium Strategy was presented, assigning Codelco the task of negotiating with the operators of the Atacama Salt Flat. In December 2023, Codelco and SQM agreed on a public-private partnership, with a majority state participation of 50.01%, to operate the salt flat from 2025 until 2060. According to some analysts, the idea of establishing a national lithium company was consequently called into question. Argentina, by contrast, assigns ownership of natural resources to its provinces, and this fragmentation weakens its negotiating position vis-à-vis global investors.
Sovereignty has a less frequently discussed counterweight, and it is found in the text of Resolution 1803 itself: freely negotiated foreign investment agreements entered into by sovereign states must be observed in good faith. Added to this is the network of investment treaties that provide for investor-state arbitration. A state that reserves a resource or changes its regulatory framework may face lawsuits based on an investor’s legitimate expectations. Sovereignty proclaimed in a constitution becomes costly if it is not supported by a coherent contractual framework. Much is debated about how much lithium exists, but very little about what contractual clauses govern it. Here, Sanahuja’s lesson reappears: the problems of globalization cannot be resolved through a purely national approach; they require intervention in the design of the system within which negotiations take place.
6. Human Rights: Water, Consultation, and Indigenous Peoples.
Lithium brine is extracted from arid ecosystems where water is scarce and sustains Indigenous and tribal communities. The human rights question is therefore at the core of the legitimacy of any project, not an appendix to corporate social responsibility. The regulatory framework has three layers.
The first is ILO Convention 169, adopted on June 27, 1989, and in force in Mexico since its promulgation in the Official Gazette on January 24, 1991. It applies to Indigenous and tribal peoples, and Article 6 requires governments to consult them through appropriate procedures whenever measures that may directly affect them are being considered. The second is the Escazú Agreement, adopted on March 4, 2018, and in force since April 22, 2021, which requires guarantees of access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters. Mexico and Argentina deposited their instruments of ratification on January 22, 2021, completing the number required for its entry into force, and Bolivia and Ecuador are also States Parties. Peru’s Congress, by contrast, decided not to ratify it in October 2020.
The third layer, and the most demanding, is the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, developed through four landmark steps.
The first is Saramaka v. Suriname (November 28, 2007). The Court held that any development or investment plan within traditional territory requires consultation, and that when a project may have a profound impact on a people’s property rights over a substantial part of their territory, the State must also obtain their free, prior, and informed consent. The case concerned a tribal people, not Indigenous to the region where they live, to whom the Court applied the jurisprudence developed for Indigenous peoples. The consequence for large-scale extractive projects is direct: beyond a certain impact threshold, consultation alone is insufficient.
The second is Sarayaku v. Ecuador (June 27, 2012). The Court unanimously declared Ecuador responsible for violating the rights to consultation, Indigenous communal property, and cultural identity by allowing a private oil company to conduct exploration in Kichwa territory from the late 1990s onward without prior consultation. It ordered Ecuador to consult the people in advance and in an appropriate and effective manner, and to regulate consultation under domestic law. The case also illustrates a limitation: in 2023, the people’s representatives alleged that Ecuador had granted concessions covering more than 91% of their territory without consultation. This is a claim made by the representatives, not a finding by the Court, but it illustrates that a favorable judgment does not necessarily mean compliance.
The third is Lhaka Honhat v. Argentina (judgment of February 6, 2020), the most relevant case for those exploiting salt flats. For the first time in a contentious case, the Court independently examined the rights to a healthy environment, adequate food, water, and cultural identity under Article 26 of the American Convention. Water ceased to be merely an input for a project and became an enforceable right held by communities. The Court also found that Argentina had failed to guarantee prior consultation regarding an infrastructure project in the territory.
The fourth is Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 on the climate emergency, adopted on May 29, 2025, and notified on July 3, at the request of Chile and Colombia, two states with direct mining interests. The Court recognized the human right to a healthy climate, required enhanced due diligence in prevention, and established standards for access to information, participation, and justice in climate matters. The electrification that justifies lithium demand does not exempt states from these obligations. It reinforces them.
In this context, the Chinese discourse of “mutual benefit” must be examined with the same rigor applied to that of any other power. Cooperation between states does not replace consultation with communities, and state sovereignty does not exhaust the rights held by peoples. The strategic implication is counterintuitive: respecting these standards does not hinder investment; it stabilizes it. Projects without social license are the ones that get suspended, become subject to litigation, and generate political costs.
7. The Risk of Military Protection.
Rut Diamint documents a regional phenomenon: armed forces are returning to public security tasks without any corresponding change in their doctrines or training. She calls them “multifunctional militaries.” Citing Pion Berlin, she points out that, without modifying these doctrines, armed forces may engage interchangeably in pursuing organized crime, protecting the extraction of natural resources, or carrying out peacekeeping missions. The author warns that this accumulation of functions erodes civilian control and democratic quality, and that resorting to the military often substitutes for police reform. She uses the case of Mexico as an example of the consequences for human rights and institutional integrity.
Diamint does not discuss lithium, and the connection with mining is my own. However, the inference is compelling in light of Kok’s work: since the seventeenth century, territories containing metals have been secured through force. If strategic subsoil resources are managed through a security logic rather than a rights-based approach, those who live above them will be the first to bear the cost. This logic also contradicts the broader concept of security defended by Mexican diplomacy at the 1994 Tlatelolco Assembly, according to Pinto Mazal, where continental security included economic and social problems.
8. Institutions: The Legal Framework as a Strategic Asset
An industrial buyer does not negotiate with a cultural heritage. It negotiates with institutions. Francisco Olguín Uribe documents that political parties entered Latin American constitutional law in stages, beginning with Uruguay in 1934, and that today all 18 democracies holding regular elections regulate them by law. They establish rules on matters such as public financing, free access to the media, and oversight bodies. This is an elaborate legal framework, shaped by European influences but with its own distinct trajectory.
The same text identifies its limitations, which are particularly relevant to this argument. Indigenous peoples represent, on average, approximately 8% of the regional population and more than 40% in Bolivia and Guatemala, yet no country has adopted quotas for them. Only a few have introduced limited provisions. Olguín also acknowledges a gap between legal standards and actual practice, as well as low levels of public trust in political parties. His conclusion is that the solution is not to eliminate them, but to strengthen them.
For this article, this means that legal predictability and political inclusion are part of what the region offers to the world. A state with weak institutions negotiates its resources from a weaker position, and a lost arbitration case or a poorly managed social conflict can cost more than any royalty payment.
Institutions do not sustain themselves. The standards of consultation, transparency, and civilian oversight advocated in this essay require actors capable of monitoring them, documenting their implementation, and translating them into public policy decisions. Sanahuja’s lesson about fragmented negotiations also applies here: a region with communities, universities, and organizations capable of examining contracts, measuring impacts, and demanding information negotiates better than one that delegates everything to its governments.
9. How to Present Latin America to Asia
The preceding analysis leads to a five-point positioning proposal:
- Present jurisdictions, not culture. Focus on mining regimes, constitutional frameworks, and institutional capacity.
- Make the Indigenous and territorial dimension visible. The lithium map is also a map of Indigenous peoples, and acknowledging this anticipates an agenda that serious investors must address.
- Remember that ties with Asia predate the republics. American silver flowed toward Asia through transpacific trade, making it possible to discuss historical continuity without going through Madrid.
- Offer added value, not just minerals. This avoids repeating the poorly diversified export model that Sanahuja identifies as part of the historical problem.
- Speak with a coordinated voice. Countries that negotiated separately in the 1990s achieved unequal results, while a minimum level of coordination on standards and contractual conditions increases their bargaining power vis-à-vis concentrated buyers.
Conclusion
Lithium is not the solution to Latin American development, just as it was not during the Washington Consensus era. What determines whether the region becomes a setting or an actor is not its subsoil, but the law and politics governing it. Without sovereignty backed by solid contracts, without human rights as a condition of legitimacy, without civilian oversight of territorial protection, and without a common value-added strategy, the region will experience another cycle of hope followed by another crisis. The difference from the seventeenth century is that today the legal instruments to prevent this already exist. What is lacking is the political will to use them.
