While the fragile ceasefire between Iran and the United States, the U.S. naval blockade of Iran, and Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz continue, based on the Iran-Pakistan agreement on international transport of passengers and goods by road, concluded on June 29, 2008, the Iran-Pakistan Transit Corridor was officially inaugurated on April 13, 2026. During the official opening ceremony, Sanaullah Abro, along with Muhammad Rashid, Director of the Transit Department at Pakistan Customs, symbolically and formally issued the order to dispatch the first shipment.

Sanaullah Abro, Director of Transit Trade at Pakistan Customs, told The Express Tribune that the inaugural shipment, consisting of frozen meat, was sent to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, via refrigerated trucks. He explained that under the new arrangement, goods from Pakistan will be transported through Gwadar, cross into Iran, and then continue toward Central Asian destinations. According to the Directorate of Transit Trade, the corridor operates under the TIR (‘Transports Internationaux Routiers’) system. To support this, authorities have streamlined TIR procedures and activated key border points, including Taftan, Rimdan, Sost, and Gwadar.

Iran’s Wider Access to Pakistani Ports

The two countries share four official border crossings: Taftan-Mirjaveh, Gabd-Rimdan, Mand-Pishin, and Chagai. In May 2024, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Iran, Muhammad Mudassir Tipu, announced that the Taftan and Gabd border crossings would remain open 24/7 to foster trade between the neighboring countries. In 2024, the total trade volume between Iran and Pakistan reached $3 billion. Iran’s exports to Pakistan amounted to $1.2 billion. The key exports from Iran to Pakistan included Petroleum Gas ($687 million), Refined Petroleum ($122 million), and Dried Legumes ($67.1 million). On the other hand, Pakistan’s main exports to Iran consisted of Cellulose Fibers Paper ($3.78 million), Air Pumps ($278,000), and Raw Plastic Sheeting ($195,000).

In addition, Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province has five border markets shared with Pakistan: Mirjaveh in Zahedan, Pishian in Sarbaz, Kohak and Jalaq in Saravan, and Rimdan in Chabahar. These cross-border markets play a crucial role in boosting trade and commerce between the two neighboring countries, as well as in fostering the prosperity and development of the impoverished and underdeveloped border regions on both sides. However, several security challenges hinder economic and trade relations between Iran and Pakistan. These include terrorist activities by separatist groups in the border areas, particularly in Baluchistan, drug trafficking, and the failure to implement the gas pipeline project due to U.S. economic sanctions imposed on Iran.

Despite all the aforementioned challenges, and while the U.S. naval blockade of Iran has imposed severe and widespread restrictions on access to Iran’s major ports in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman — particularly Imam Khomeini Port, Bushehr Port, Bandar Abbas, and Chabahar Port — the new transit corridor between Iran and Pakistan offers Iran a potential alternative route for greater access to Pakistan’s ports.

The recent announcement by the Government of Pakistan has introduced six specific corridors intended to facilitate the movement of goods and connect Pakistan’s major ports to Iran’s border crossings. These six routes are as follows: the first route is “Gwadar to Gabd”; the second route is “Karachi and Port Qasim to Gabd” via the coastal highway, passing through Lyari, Ormara, and Pasni; the third route is “Karachi to Taftan,” which passes through Khuzdar and Dalbandin; the fourth route is “Gwadar to Taftan” via an internal route connecting Turbat and Quetta; the fifth is a combined route that connects “Gwadar to Taftan” while simultaneously passing through sections of both the coastal and internal routes, including Lyari and Khuzdar; and finally, the sixth is a direct commercial route from “Karachi to Gabd,” designed to facilitate and accelerate the flow of goods. According to observers, collectively, these corridors connect three of Pakistan’s major ports — Gwadar, Karachi, and Port Qasim — to the Taftan and Gabd border crossings with Iran. The significance of this network becomes even clearer when considering that Pakistan shares more than 900 kilometers of border with Iran, a factor that allows these overland routes to serve as a practical and reliable alternative to maritime routes.

Therefore, Pakistani ports could help alleviate some of the pressures and restrictions imposed by the maritime blockade, facilitating both export and import processes for Iran. This transit corridor could also benefit Iraq, whose ships have faced significant challenges and restrictions in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman due to Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz and the U.S. naval blockade of Iran.

Iran’s Wider Access to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

The Iran-Pakistan transit corridor is not limited to facilitating bilateral trade between the two countries or providing Iran with greater access to Pakistani ports. It also offers increased access to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a 3,000 km Chinese infrastructure project currently under construction in Pakistan. This sea-and-land-based corridor aims to secure and shorten the route for China’s energy imports from the Middle East, bypassing the current maritime routes through the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, and the Indian Ocean.

The recent forty-day conflict between the United States and Israel, along with Iran’s blockade and control of the Strait of Hormuz, and the U.S. naval blockade of Iran, have further highlighted the importance of CPEC as an alternative route. One of the key objectives of the U.S. naval blockade on Iran is to reduce, weaken, and, if possible, sever the flow of exports and imports between Iran and China. While the CPEC route cannot entirely replace the maritime route between Iran and China, it can help mitigate some of the damage caused by the blockade. Additionally, Iran has the opportunity to expand transit and trade volumes through land and rail routes in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Unlike the sea routes in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Sea of Oman, and the Indian Ocean, which are under U.S. blockade, control, and surveillance, the land and rail routes offer different conditions. Iran has used these land-based routes over the past two decades to circumvent sanctions and alleviate the economic, trade, and transit pressures it faces.

Alternative Route for Pakistan-Central Asia Transit

The Iran-Pakistan transit corridor, which saw its first shipment — frozen meat exports to Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan — reflects Islamabad’s efforts to establish and expand an alternative transit route to Central Asia, alongside the traditional Afghan route. The ongoing tensions and military conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan clearly highlight the current cold and adversarial relationship between these two once-close allies.

These circumstances have driven both countries to seek alternative transit routes. In recent years, the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has expressed significant interest in utilizing the Chabahar transit port in southeastern Iran, near the Sea of Oman, in order to reduce Afghanistan’s reliance on Pakistan for transit. Meanwhile, Pakistan is working to decrease its dependence on the Afghan route for trade and transit with Central Asia, through the development of a new transit corridor connecting Iran and Central Asia.

Iran-Pakistan-Central Asia Railway Corridor

In recent years, Iran has been constructing a 628-kilometer railway project designed to connect Chabahar Port to Zahedan, the capital city of southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan Province. Approximately 80 percent of the railway line has already been completed, and Iran expects to finish the project in the near future, likely by the end of spring 2026. The location of Chabahar Port is shown on the map below.

The 628-kilometer railway project between the Chabahar port to Zahedan (Source: Valdai Club)

The 628-kilometer railway project connecting Chabahar Port to Zahedan is a key part of Iran’s broader plan to develop and expand its railway network in the eastern region. This project forms a segment of the 1,350-kilometer “Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad-Sarkhs” railway corridor, which links the far southeast of Iran to its northeastern border with Turkmenistan. The location of the Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad-Sarkhs railway axis is illustrated on the map below.

The 1350-km “Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad-Sarkhs.” Railway Axis in Eastern Iran (Source: Valdai Club)

This railway route will complete the eastern section of the North-South Corridor, linking Iran, Central Asia, and Russia. As a result, it will enable faster transit and a higher volume of trade, which could provide Pakistan with a viable alternative to the Afghan route.

Iran’s Geographical Advantages

While the opening of a transit corridor between two neighboring countries might typically be considered a routine event, the establishment of a fragile ceasefire, coupled with the U.S. naval blockade of Iran following the forty-day conflict between Israel and the United States with Iran, has drawn significant attention from observers. The Iran-Pakistan transit corridor has once again highlighted Iran’s strategic geographical advantages. A vast country with 1,800 kilometers of coastline along the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Sea of Oman, as well as 820 kilometers along the Caspian Sea, Iran shares both land and sea borders with 15 countries.

Thus, although the U.S. naval blockade could severely impact Iran’s import and export processes, the country can still fulfill many of its essential needs through land, rail, and sea routes (via the Caspian Sea) across Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Turkey, Iraq, and especially Russia and China. By leveraging its geographical position, Iran has managed to withstand economic sanctions over the past two decades. Now, Iran is working to mitigate the negative effects of the U.S. naval blockade by utilizing its strategic location, its numerous neighboring countries, and its land, rail, and sea transit routes.

Furthermore, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which came into effect in May 2025, adds another significant advantage. In addition to the benefit of enhanced transit routes, a substantial portion of trade between Iran and Russia is conducted in national currencies, primarily the Ruble and Rial.

Conclusion

The Iran-Pakistan Transit Corridor, amidst the ongoing fragile ceasefire between Iran and Pakistan, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the naval blockade of Iran, represents another example of Pakistan’s pragmatic approach and multilateral diplomacy. Pakistan strongly condemned Israel’s military attack on Iran in June 2025 and has played a key role as a mediator between Iran and the United States during the recent conflict. Additionally, Pakistan’s close relations with the Arab countries of the southern Persian Gulf have positioned it to replace traditional mediators like Oman and Qatar.

Thus, the Iran-Pakistan Transit Corridor, still in its early stages and in need of infrastructure development — particularly along railway routes — is a significant step toward strengthening mutual trust between the two countries amid the current complex and fragile situation. On one hand, this corridor provides Iran with expanded access to Pakistani ports as well as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). On the other hand, it offers Pakistan an alternative route for transit and trade with Central Asia, bypassing Afghanistan. Therefore, this corridor brings mutual benefits and advantages to both countries.