Few phrases appear more frequently in contemporary foreign policy speeches than the “rules-based international order” (RBIO). Western leaders invoke it when condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when pushing back against Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, and when calling for multilateral cooperation on climate change. The phrase has become the defining slogan of Western foreign policy. Yet for a large part of the world — particularly across the Global South — the RBIO provokes not reassurance but deep scepticism. The question this article poses is a direct one: is the rules-based international order a genuinely universal framework, or is it a selective arrangement that primarily serves the interests of the powerful states that designed it?
This is not an argument that international rules, norms, and institutions are worthless. They matter enormously. The argument here is more precise: the RBIO as currently constructed and applied is riddled with structural inconsistencies, its champions routinely exempt themselves from its constraints, and its institutional architecture reflects a mid-twentieth century distribution of power that no longer maps onto today’s world. Understanding these contradictions is essential not only for scholars of international relations, but for anyone trying to make sense of why so much of the world is losing faith in the international system.
What Is the Rules-Based International Order?
Before evaluating whether the RBIO is a myth, it is worth clarifying what it actually is. The term itself is surprisingly recent. Analysts at the Lowy Institute have noted that the phrase “rules-based order” was coined after the Cold War, even though its champions typically date its origins to the post-World War II settlement (Lowy Institute, n.d.a). The older concept was the “liberal international order” (LIO), which described the institutions, norms, and economic arrangements established primarily by the United States and its allies after 1945: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and eventually the World Trade Organization (WTO).
In other words, the ultimate purpose behind such organizations had, ideally, always been one and the same: a world that is governed by norms, not power, and in which states settle their differences through peaceful means, while respect for the sovereignty of states prevails. However, the system that emerged turned out to be, on the one hand, “ambitious and universal” in its structure, but at the same time, “driven by the United States, which regarded itself as the unrivaled ruler of the emerging order.”
A Framework Built by the Powerful, for the Powerful
The RBIO institutional architecture was created during a specific period in history by certain states to serve certain preconceived purposes. According to the UN Security Council (UNSC), there are five permanent members that have the right to exercise veto power on the Council the US, the UK, France, Russia, and China and all it takes for any one of these powerful post-war states to frustrate the concerted efforts of the international community is to use its veto power. “When a permanent member acts as a belligerent or a supporter of a belligerent in a conflict, the Security Council does not protect international peace and security.
The direct impact of this arrangement is clear. Within 2024 itself, the United States used three vetoes regarding resolutions regarding the Gaza crisis, involving ceasing hostilities and the Palestine application for UN membership, while Russia and China made use of their veto powers with regard to the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern crises. According to a report issued by Oxfam in 2024, the collective consequence of these activities is that the P5 have been using their special voting and negotiating powers to promote their own interests, resulting in the suffering of more than 230 million individuals in humanitarian need due to 23 crises worldwide, including over a million deaths.
This is not only true about the Security Council, but also applies to organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank where there is a voting mechanism based on weight, in which money is directly related to influence, thus, the wealthier Western countries have the upper hand when it comes to defining rules in terms of international finance. Joseph Stiglitz, an economist for the World Bank and Nobel Laureate, argues that the policy recommendations of the IMF and World Bank in terms of austerity, deregulation, and privatization tend to increase rather than alleviate poverty and income inequality, thus, compromising the sovereignty of developing countries through imposition of a foreign economic model that does not fit local conditions. The structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s have been widely documented as reversing development gains and pushing millions into poverty across Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
The Selectivity Problem: Rules for Some, Not for Others
One of the major weaknesses of the RBIO as an institution may not necessarily be related to the nature of the system itself, but rather how it has been implemented. Some of the biggest proponents of the RBIO have also become some of the biggest breakers of its laws, something which has not gone unnoticed.
Perhaps the best example of this is the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which according to the report of the Davids Commission established by the Dutch government was a violation of international law. According to the report, “the interpretation of UN Security Council resolution 1441 cannot reasonably be interpreted as authorising individual member states to use military force”. In 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan described the invasion as illegal under international law, as did the UK’s Deputy Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, Elizabeth Wilmshurst who quit her job stating that the invasion was “a crime of aggression”
This contrast between the international response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with its fast sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and rhetoric of condemnation couched in the language of rule-making, and the responses of those in the Global South who have watched events unfold has been recognized. Matias Spektor asserts that there is room for developing countries to criticize the selectivity and inconsistency of Western rulemaking due to its reliance on the morality of decision-making. This criticism becomes possible owing to the fact that the US and its allies rely on moral values in explaining their decisions, something that countries like China or Russia fail to do when formulating their policies.
The issue goes beyond a historical grudge. The Gaza dispute, which began in October 2023, has prompted another outpouring of skepticism. The Global South players, from the Non-Aligned Movement to countries like South Africa, Namibia, and The Gambia, have resorted to legal processes, especially the International Court of Justice, in their criticism of what they see as selective enforcement of international law. The March 2024 UN Security Council ceasefire resolution 2728, which followed a series of vetoed resolutions, has convinced many that the outputs of the Council are dictated more by the interests of the great powers than any overarching principle.
Global South’s Challenge to the Order
The frustrations over the double standards exhibited by the RBIO have led to a major reevaluation of the steps taken in terms of foreign policy across many countries in the Global South. In fact, the lack of condemnation against the Russian aggression in Ukraine and the unwillingness to join the West in imposing sanctions on the country has been perceived by many Western nations as a sign of the breakdown in unity. However, this attitude can simply be seen as a logical reaction after years of being treated unfairly under the RBIO framework.
In the 2024 Munich Security Conference, the president of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, pointed out an inherent instability in a global order where the Global South always finds itself in a disadvantaged position. Also, at the G77 and China summit in September 2023, the president of Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel, declared, “After so many years the North organized the world according to its own interests; now it is the turn of the South to set the rules of the game”. These remarks are not isolated statements; they are a collective expression of grievance by countries forming the larger part of humanity’s nations.
The formation of more countries as members of BRICS including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates is an example of such dissatisfaction despite continuing conflicts within the organization. While this group may not offer an alternative to the existing world order, it is worth mentioning that its increasing numbers demonstrate that more countries do not want to have a system based on Western domination. It is especially interesting how India behaves in this regard as it supports the RBIO framework on some occasions but refuses to accept the image of Ukraine created by the Western world as a threat to the same order
Does This Mean the RBIO Is Simply a Myth?
It should be noted that this argument does not imply that the RBIO is an entirely fictitious entity or lacks all forms of significance. The international organizations have played a crucial role in managing conflicts, coordinating humanitarian relief efforts, regulating trade relations, and establishing norms for almost eight decades now. It would be intellectually flawed to discredit the entire existence of the RBIO based solely on the assumption that it portrays itself accurately.
What needs to be stated is that the RBIO represents an incomplete order. This means that it has worked relatively well for those states which have helped shape its structure, wield considerable institutional power in the system, and exercise selective rule-making in accordance with their own interests. For the vast majority of the world’s nations, the RBIO has often been a source of constraint rather than security.
What Reform Would Actually Require
Not recognizing the shortcomings of the RBIO system should not mean abandoning the idea of international order completely. The key challenge lies in recognizing the valid aspects of the project: the rule-based order, where sovereignty is valued and where great powers are not above the law as separate from the institution-specific mechanisms that perpetuated inequality throughout history.
A reform of the system must comprise, at least, three main parts. First, there is a need to update the structure of the UNSC in terms of power and demographic considerations, implying an increase in the number of permanent members as well as reconsidering the veto right. No amendment reform options have been considered by researchers at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who identified reforms that can be carried out without amending the Charter despite the impossible requirement of unanimity among the P5 nations. A recent proposal made by France and Mexico to suspend the veto on mass atrocities crimes, backed by more than 100 countries, is a good example of the discussed no amendment approach.
The second step entails reforming the international financial institutions to create a genuine democratization of decision making within them. The current system where voting rights are relatively proportional to GDP means that states most likely to be subject to conditionality have the least say in its construction. A more credible International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one that includes the borrowing states in the process of governance rather than merely having an advisory role.
The third and most essential step involves ensuring that the Rules-Based International Order (RBIO) can only gain legitimacy if its powerful members acknowledge that they are equally obliged to its norms. The loss of legitimacy for international law following the Iraq War, the selective enforcement of humanitarian laws, and the frequent use of veto powers to protect allies from sanctions adds up. Every instance of hypocrisy makes it harder to appeal to RBIO’s norms when needed.
Conclusion
The rules-based international order must not be understood as an outright fiction, but in many ways, it certainly qualifies as a myth, in the sense that it serves as a legitimizing story—a story told by powerful nations about a system which, in reality, operates to maintain their dominance. The growing unwillingness of the Global South to swallow such stories without question is neither illogical nor reckless; rather, it is a rational reaction to years of observing rules that are enforced selectively based on who makes the claims.
For the rules-based international order (RBIO), the problem lies in its lack of credibility, which cannot be solved through mere repetition of its ideals. Solving the problem demands a reform that ensures universality, increasing representation, applying rules consistently, and being upfront about the discrepancy between its lofty goals and its concrete realities. The central issue of international governance is now whether the powers that are in the existing order have the political resolve to make those changes. To date, the answer remains discouraging.
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