On July 7-8, 2026, the 36th meeting of the heads of state and government of NATO member countries was held in Ankara. One of the main issues on the agenda was the definition and adoption of a new concept – NATO 3.0 – which would mark the beginning of a new stage in the organization’s development. Among the key tasks within the framework of this new concept is the need to adjust the mechanism for distributing the financial burden within the Alliance, taking into account changes in the European security system, continuing disagreements between the United States and the European Union, as well as the lack (and in some areas the complete absence) of trust among European countries. An important feature of the summit was the increased attention given to cooperation in the defense industry, with a separate forum dedicated to this issue as part of NATO’s official program.
For Türkiye, the event was highly significant both from the perspective of efforts to renew the Alliance and develop a new formula for the distribution of roles and responsibilities within it, as well as in terms of Ankara’s actively promoted concept of regional responsibility. Türkiye expected that the summit would allow it to demonstrate its competitive advantages not only in matters of regional geopolitics but also in the defense industry. This would, on the one hand, strengthen its military and political position within the European security system and, on the other, increase its share in European defense initiatives.
At one point, NATO’s first Secretary General, British General Hastings Lionel Ismay, stated that the Alliance’s main purpose was to “keep the Soviet Union out of Europe, keep the Americans in, and keep the Germans down.” With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and later the Soviet Union, the first part of this declared objective disappeared, but the other two remained: maintaining the American presence in Europe and preserving control over Germany. In the 1990s, NATO countries conducted their first joint military operations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia-Maritime Monitor,” “Deliberate Force,” “Allied Force,” and others. In 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks in the United States, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked for the first time in the history of the Alliance. In 2004, at NATO’s 17th summit in Istanbul, a new concept was adopted to reflect the transformation of the Alliance’s approach and the largest expansion in NATO’s history. This concept later became known as “NATO 2.0.”
The term “NATO 3.0” began to be used after the meeting of the foreign ministers of NATO member states held on May 21-22, 2026, in Helsingborg, Sweden. The meeting took place amid deteriorating relations between the United States and the European members of the Alliance, as well as speculation about a possible American withdrawal from the Alliance. At this meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, questioning the value of military bases that, under certain circumstances, could become unavailable to allies, proposed a discussion on the future nature of cooperation among Alliance members. The issue was related to Spain’s and Italy’s refusal to provide air bases for U.S. Air Force operations during strikes against Iran. The Helsingborg meeting became the starting point for the adoption of the “NATO 3.0” concept, which envisioned an equal distribution of costs among Alliance members and a reduction of the U.S. role in ensuring Europe’s security.
In June 2026, during the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels, Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth openly spoke about “NATO version 3.0.” According to him, the United States had “doubled down” on efforts to make NATO “a balanced alliance in which Europe plays a leading role in ensuring its own defense.” In order to implement the “NATO 3.0” concept, the U.S. Department of Defense began a six-month review process during which the configuration of American forces and bases in Europe would be analyzed. Like Marco Rubio, who accused many allies of having “failed the test” when the United States made corresponding requests and described this as a “disgrace,” Pete Hegseth stated that, from then on, annual U.S. contributions to NATO would depend on whether other Alliance members met defense spending targets. These targets apparently referred to the commitment to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP (3.5% directly for defense and an additional 1.5% for related areas), which was adopted at NATO’s 34th summit in The Hague.
Calling for increased defense spending, former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, in his analytical article prepared specifically for the Turkish Anadolu Agency ahead of the Ankara summit, revealed important details regarding the Alliance’s future plans. Defining global security as a “single and indivisible space,” the former Secretary General noted that NATO simultaneously has to deal with the ongoing War in Ukraine and an extremely complex situation in the Middle East, while also closely monitoring developments in China and the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, maintaining NATO’s deterrence capabilities and effectiveness is possible only if the European allies assume a “much greater share of overall responsibility, primarily in terms of defense financing.”
From this, it can be concluded that NATO is moving toward a more clearly defined expansion of its objectives: in the context of the conflict in Ukraine-against Russia; within the framework of military operations in the Middle East-against Iran; and amid strategic competition in the Asia-Pacific region-with regard to China and North Korea. The fact that NATO’s areas of focus are expanding can be inferred from the participation of representatives from partner countries invited to the Ankara summit – Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The fact that these countries have participated for several years indicates only a gradual, multi-stage process of involving them in various conflicts.
Clearly, expanding NATO’s objectives will require additional forces and resources. It is entirely possible that the deployment of new military units and formations could lead to a shift away from professional, contract-based recruitment and a return to conscription. Confrontation with countries whose combined populations exceed one billion people creates a need for the establishment of a mobilization reserve. In any case, the increase in financial costs required to maintain additional national armed forces will ultimately be passed on to European taxpayers.
It is possible that, after the announcement of new objectives, doctrinal changes will follow to justify the expanded use of NATO armed forces. Speaking at the June meeting of defense ministers, Secretary General Mark Rutte agreed with U.S. demands, acknowledging that Washington’s assessment is primarily aimed at planning and ensuring the most effective use of resources to counter various threats. Later, after meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House and attempting to ease disagreements that had emerged over the Iran issue, Mark Rutte stated that “Iran must under no circumstances possess nuclear capabilities.”
The existing disagreements within NATO were explained by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Responding to journalists’ questions, he divided all NATO countries into three groups: the United States, EU member states, and all other countries. However, when assessing the attitude of some European NATO countries toward the United States, it should be noted that there is no complete unity even among the key European members. For example, in June 2026, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron decided to terminate the joint Future Combat Air System (FCAS) sixth-generation fighter project, launched in 2017 to replace the Rafale aircraft operated by France and the Eurofighter aircraft used by Germany and Spain. The project had been under development for nine years and was one of the main symbols of “European defense sovereignty” and “Franco-German friendship.” In this context, one can also recall German-Polish disagreements concerning reparations and energy issues (Russian pipeline gas versus American LNG, etc.).
Nevertheless, despite existing disagreements among member states, NATO as a military-political organization continues to maintain its importance as a key instrument for ensuring the security of the collective West. Beyond shared military and political objectives, the Alliance also relies on common standards regarding military equipment and ammunition. It can be assumed that Mark Rutte’s statement that “in NATO, no ally stands alone” was primarily intended to emphasize unity within the Alliance.
Following the Ankara summit, a six-point declaration was adopted. The first point reaffirmed the provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, while the second point identified Russia as a long-term threat, against which, in addition to the $139 billion spent in 2025, an additional $50 billion will be allocated. The third point addresses the principle of battlefield superiority and the means of achieving it through the expansion of high-technology weapons capabilities, including in space. Support for Ukraine is mentioned in the fourth point, with €70 billion planned for this purpose. The fifth point is particularly noteworthy, as it provides definitions of concepts such as “strategic competition,” “pervasive instability,” and “hybrid threats.” Iran is prohibited from possessing nuclear weapons, and the declaration calls for respect for freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Thus, the declaration formalizes an increase in military spending and NATO’s de facto involvement in military conflicts, which at a minimum represents a return to conditions reminiscent of the Cold War era. It is generally accepted that one of the main reasons the Cold War did not escalate into a full-scale conflict was that the leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries had personally experienced World War II and fully understood the consequences of armed confrontation. Whether today’s leaders of NATO member states possess the same understanding remains an open question.
The Significance of the Summit for Türkiye
One week before the meeting of Alliance leaders in Ankara, another NATO-related event took place in Istanbul, Türkiye: the session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. At the opening of the event, Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye Numan Kurtulmuş drew attention to the fact that some members of the bloc continue to impose defense industry embargoes against their allies-actions he described as “extremely unilateral, meaningless, and inconsistent with the spirit of the Alliance.” The Turkish parliamentary speaker also stated that Türkiye was ready to share the achievements of its own defense industry with other NATO countries. In this context, he expressed hope that Ankara’s determination to reach the 5% of GDP defense spending target agreed upon in The Hague would receive support from all members of the Alliance. He emphasized that the development of Türkiye’s defense industry could reach an even higher level through cooperation with other member states. After the Parliamentary Assembly meeting, senior representatives of NATO member states’ legislative bodies were given a tour of the National Technology Center of Baykar, the flagship company of Türkiye’s defense-industrial complex in the field of unmanned aerial vehicle development and production.
One of the key challenges facing Ankara in its interaction with NATO military-political partners is related to sanctions imposed on Türkiye. Türkiye has made particular efforts to achieve the lifting of U.S. sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The Turkish side is primarily seeking to return to the fifth-generation fighter development program, as well as to unblock deliveries of F-35 aircraft and General Electric F110-GE-129 aircraft engines. The second issue concerns securing contracts for Türkiye’s defense industry to promote its products among NATO member states, as well as creating joint high-technology projects, primarily in the aerospace sector.
Türkiye’s defense industry has also achieved significant success in the naval sphere. Since 2023, the Turkish Navy has operated the multipurpose amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu, built at the Turkish shipyard Sedef Tersanesi. The same shipyard has been constructing the TCG Trakya vessel since January 2025 as part of the MUGEM project (Milli Uçak Gemisi – National Aircraft Carrier). For the first time, a corvette-Contraamiral August Roman-has been built and delivered for a NATO country (Romania).
Despite Türkiye’s notable achievements in developing and producing its own defense technologies, certain difficulties remain, primarily due to limited experience in engine manufacturing. For example, the national Kaan fighter aircraft, which has been under development since 2016, is nearly complete and conducted its first flight in February 2024. However, the TF35000 turbofan engine, being developed specifically for this aircraft by TUSAŞ Motor Sanayii A.Ş. (TAI), is not yet ready.
In the winter of 2026, the Bayraktar TB3 carrier-based reconnaissance and strike unmanned aerial vehicle was demonstrated during the Steadfast Dart 2026 exercises in the Baltic Sea. In 2025, the first operational testing of the jet-powered Bayraktar Kızılelma unmanned aerial vehicle, also produced by Baykar, took place. At the same time, all of these systems, as subsonic aircraft, are not entirely suitable for providing full-scale air defense capabilities.
Within the framework of the Defense Industry Forum held during the summit, new contracts worth more than $50 billion were announced. These agreements are focused on joint production, weapons standardization, and the development of the industrial capacities of NATO member states. Particular attention will be given to the development of unmanned systems: over the next five years, the North Atlantic Alliance plans to invest $40 billion in the development of strike and counter-drone technologies, as well as expand the training of drone operators.
Türkiye’s political objectives in the context of the NATO summit were outlined by Hakan Fidan. First, from Ankara’s perspective, relations with the United States are considered highly important. According to the Turkish foreign minister, these relations contain both permanent and variable components. For example, “the fact that the two countries stand shoulder to shoulder within the framework of the same security alliance” represents a permanent element, while “changes in the interests of the parties in the region and the world” are factors that vary from one government to another and depend on the prevailing circumstances. During the Ankara summit, U.S. President Donald Trump once again promised to lift the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Türkiye.
Second, Türkiye seeks to increase its role in issues such as Ukraine, Gaza, Syria, Iran, the Persian Gulf, energy routes, and regional connectivity. On these matters, Ankara is attempting to secure support from the United States and other Alliance members. During the Ankara summit, for example, the American president met, at Türkiye’s initiative, with Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa. It can be assumed that the concept of regional responsibility, which Turkish authorities have increasingly emphasized in recent times, involves Ankara’s active participation in resolving these issues.
To this end, Türkiye is developing dialogue not only with Western countries but also with regional states, both bilaterally and through multilateral formats. Speaking at a press conference following the summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once again confirmed Ankara’s readiness to organize negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, emphasizing that “in a just peace, there are no losers.” Turkish authorities periodically declare their balanced position regarding the Ukrainian conflict, but at the same time Ankara remains one of NATO’s leading participants in activities related to Ukraine.
For example, starting in August 2026, Turkish F-16 fighter jets will be deployed to Estonia as part of the Alliance’s air-policing mission. It should also be noted that Ankara will command the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) until September 2026, and in 2028-2029 it is scheduled to lead NATO’s rapid reaction forces. As a result, Türkiye will gain greater influence over decisions regarding the use of military force, which ultimately affects political decisions in the region.
During the NATO summit in Ankara, Türkiye achieved a certain breakthrough in addressing military-technical issues by advancing discussions on lifting sanctions against companies within its defense-industrial complex, reaching agreements with other Alliance members on the creation of joint high-technology projects, and securing major contracts to meet some of the defense needs of its partners within the bloc. However, in military-political and geopolitical terms, Ankara’s achievements were rather modest. This may have been the result of the actual division within NATO that Hakan Fidan referred to: the European Union continues to view Türkiye with distrust, seeing it as a competitor seeking a more influential role in Europe, while Ankara also faces highly complex problems with Washington, some of which have already entered a chronic phase with periodic escalations.
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The last time a NATO summit was held in Türkiye, in Istanbul in 2004, Alliance countries actively discussed the American concept of the “Greater Middle East,” within which Ankara was assigned a “special” role, despite its refusal to participate in the 2003 Iraq campaign. At that time, the European Union also treated Türkiye relatively favorably and even launched official negotiations on its accession to the European bloc. However, as the following two decades demonstrated, this “special” role essentially meant unconditional alignment with Western interests. Türkiye gradually began to move away from this approach, asserting its sovereignty and its own interests regarding its “near abroad,” first within the framework of the geopolitical concept of “strategic depth” and later in the context of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine. As a result, it faced sanctions, political pressure, and an attempted military coup.
Today, Ankara promotes its own concept of regional responsibility, which clearly conflicts with regional plans pursued by the United States and especially the European Union. It is evident that, in return, Ankara will be pressured to adjust its regional policies in accordance with Western interests, potentially at the expense of its own national priorities. Future actions by Washington and Brussels toward Türkiye will depend on how Ankara responds to these demands, and it remains uncertain whether Türkiye will be able to preserve its foreign-policy independence.
