Abstract

U.S.–Cuba relations have entered their most confrontational phase in years, marked by a shift from sanctions-management to coercive geopolitical pressure. Since mid-2025, Washington has re-centered Cuba policy around national security, hemispheric control, energy interdiction, sanctions enforcement, and legal escalation. A clear example of this shift was seen in the National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM-5), reissuance in June 2025, in which a hardline framework that prioritizes restricting Cuban state revenue, supporting the embargo, limiting travel and financial channels, and treating engagement with Havana as conditional on U.S. strategic interests was restored. In addition, an executive order from January 29th, 2026, declared Cuba an “unusual and extraordinary threat”, transforming the policy by threatening tariffs against foreign countries that supply oil to Cuba, thereby converting Cuba’s energy dependence into a regional enforcement mechanism.

To sum up, the latest developments — Raúl Castro’s May 2026 indictment, an executive order with new sanctions on May 1st, the June 2026 OFAC designations of Cuban leaders and institutions, and a rare U.S.–Cuban military contact near Guantánamo Bay — suggest that Cuba is no longer treated only as a bilateral problem. It is now being folded into a wider U.S. strategy toward the Caribbean, Venezuela, Russia, China, Iran, and the hemispheric security. On one hand, Washington’s pressure campaign aims to reduce Havana’s strategic room for maneuver, deter third-country support, and raise the cost of Cuban alignment with U.S. adversaries. While on the other hand, Havana frames the campaign as a sovereignty issue and a pretext for a possible intervention on the island.

With all this in mind, there are three areas with an important geopolitical weight. First, the United States is using sanctions and energy restrictions not merely to punish Cuba but to reshape regional alignments. Second, the Caribbean is becoming an area of great-power denial, where Washington seeks to prevent Russia, China, Iran, and allied networks from using Cuba (or any other state in the region) as an intelligence, military, or diplomatic platform. Finally, the escalation could carry risks for both sides: it could trigger Cuban counter-alignment, deepen regional opposition to U.S. interventionism, strain relations with partners affected by extraterritorial sanctions, and elevate Guantánamo from a dormant sovereignty dispute into an operational flashpoint.

Preview (3/13)

Download WANWJ Report