I. Introduction

The US and Iran have officially signed a historic 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to end their 110-day war, lift the naval blockade, and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The interim deal, signed by US President Donald Trump at the Palace of Versailles and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Tehran, takes immediate effect and establishes a maximum 60-day window to negotiate a permanent, UN-endorsed peace treaty. [1]

The agreement was due to be signed at an official ceremony in Switzerland on June 19, 2026, but the White House and Iranian state media confirmed it had been signed early. Earlier on June 17, 2026, in a briefing with journalists, including the ABC, a senior US official read out the full text of the 14-point document.

Pakistan pulled off what many had considered an improbable task: brokering a deal to end more than three months of a US-Iran War that has killed thousands of people, mostly in Iran and Lebanon, and disrupted global energy markets. This turn of events raises a question for us: “Why was Pakistan so eager to end the US-Iran War?”

Based on this background, this paper aims to analyze why Pakistan so enthusiastically stepped forward to mediate the end of the US-Iran War. To this end, it first examines the history of Iran-Pakistan and US-Pakistan relations, and finally analyzes Pakistan’s economic, political, and diplomatic/security motives or reasons for its sincere mediation efforts to end the US-Iran War.

II. Iran-Pakistan Relations

Iran and Pakistan share deep historical and cultural ties, and these relations have recently been further strengthened by mutual geopolitical interests and regional stability. The relationship between the two countries encompasses extensive trade, energy cooperation, and joint security efforts against cross-border armed groups in the Balochistan region.

1. Diplomatic Relations and Security between the Two Countries

Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan as a state following its independence in 1947. Nowadays, both countries have actively worked to improve relations. But the Pakistan-Iran relationship has not always been congenial.

In January 2024, Iran launched missile attacks inside Pakistan’s Balochistan province, claiming to target the armed group Jaysh al-Adl. Pakistan retaliated within 48 hours, launching a series of attacks against hideouts of armed groups in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province. The two neighbors recalled their ambassadors, as the confrontation was described as one of the most serious military escalations between them in decades. However, both sides stepped back quickly. Iran’s then-foreign minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, traveled to Islamabad to de-escalate tensions, and diplomatic ties were gradually restored.

As a sign of recent improvements in bilateral relations, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Islamabad on June 23, 2026, to express gratitude for the mediation that ended the US-Iran War. Analysts assess that Pezeshkian’s visit will also contribute to elevating Pakistan’s diplomatic standing. Reza Khanzadeh, Iran expert, analyzed that by officially selecting Islamabad, Iran has elevated Pakistan’s role from a mere mediator to a recognized regional mediator. [2]

Officials said that since February 28, when the US and Israeli attacks on Iran began, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian have held at least seven phone calls, each lasting up to an hour.

Pakistan Army Chief of Staff Marshal Asim Munir visited Tehran at least twice, and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi also visited Iran several times as part of Pakistan’s mediation efforts.

These diplomatic efforts bore fruit on June 18 when President Trump and Foreign Minister Pezeshkian signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signing the document in his capacity as a mediator.

In terms of security cooperation, the two countries have worked closely together to combat drug trafficking and cross-border armed groups operating in the unstable Balochistan region.

2. Economic and Energy Cooperation

Trade Goals: Trade between the two countries continues to grow as the governments cooperate to formalize trade and establish regulated border markets to support local communities.

Energy Dependence: Pakistan relies heavily on energy from Iran, particularly electricity and petroleum products, to address its chronic energy shortages.

Energy Infrastructure: The Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, a long-discussed project, is a key strategic project designed to meet Pakistan’s energy needs and connect the two countries.

Key Cooperation Frameworks: Since 2006, the two countries have been operating preferential trade agreements aimed at tariff reductions and the promotion of bilateral trade.

3. External Powers and the Geopolitical Web

Layered on top of bilateral issues is the influence of external powers. China has become the most consequential external actor for both countries. For Pakistan, Beijing’s engagement in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has reshaped its infrastructure and energy landscape, making China Islamabad’s largest source of foreign direct investment and a key political partner. For Iran, which has suffered from US sanctions, Iranian oil purchases by Chinese oil firms have served as a crucial economic lifeline in recent years, though the 25-year strategic cooperation agreement signed in 2021 (valued at up to $400 billion) has yet to be fully realized.

This good relations between China and Iran/Pakistan creates overlapping opportunities: linking Iran’s Chabahar Port with Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and integrating infrastructure across both countries could create new trade corridors. Yet, these opportunities also tether both states more closely to China, limiting their flexibility in dealing with other major powers.

The US continues to shape the relationships with Pakistan and Iran, primarily through constraints. US’s sanctions have effectively frozen Iranian access to global markets and discouraged Pakistan from deepening energy ties with Iran, particularly through the gas pipeline. At the same time, Islamabad seeks to maintain a somewhat good working relationship with Washington, exemplified by high-level military contacts in 2025 — even as Pakistan strongly condemned US strikes on Iranian facilities.

India adds another dimension. Historically warm Iran-India relations have been anchored in energy trade and New Delhi’s investment in the Chabahar Port, which provides strategic access to Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan. This has potentially complicate Pakistan’s strategic calculus, reducing its economic transit monopoly, challenging China-Pakistan infrastructure hegemony, and diminishing its political influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Finally, Russia has emerged as a selective but increasingly active partner of both Iran and Pakistan. For Iran, the partnership has gained momentum amid international isolation, with Moscow supplying military hardware, collaborating on drone technology, and helping to bypass Western sanctions. Russia’s interest in Eurasian connectivity — particularly through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) — aligns with Tehran’s ambitions to become a regional transit hub. Meanwhile, Pakistan has cautiously sought to broaden its energy and trade ties with Russia. While the scope of Russia’s engagement remains limited by economic and geopolitical constraints, deepening ties with both countries reflect a shared interest in hedging against Western dominance and promoting multipolar alternatives in regional infrastructure and security.

III. US-Pakistan Relations

Since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, its leaders have sought external economic and military assistance as a means of maintaining national security and mitigating the country’s weak finances. The US, as a superpower with plenty of disposable cash, was an early target of Pakistani policymakers’ messaging that, for the right price, they could be its partner in South Asia. Pakistan’s view of itself as a “warrior nation” led to the belief that its military was a coveted potential partner for other countries.

The current Pakistani leaders, civilian as well as military, are selling President Trump the same argument that the country’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, made to US diplomats soon after Pakistan’s founding: The US needs Pakistan because of Pakistan’s location and large military. After each transactional embrace of the preferred geopolitical plans of various US administrations, Pakistan has found that the partnership was tactical on the US’s part and never resulted in a strategic convergence of interests.

It is true that, over the years, Pakistan has repeatedly secured US military equipment, some investment, and considerable economic assistance, as well as support at multilateral financial institutions. However, Pakistan’s desire for US support in securing advantage against India has always remained unfulfilled. The US has never stepped up to “resolve” the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan’s advantage or satisfaction either.

Having dealt with US administrations for almost eight decades, Pakistan has developed a playbook that works with most of them. This includes strong personal relations and public praise of American leaders and generals. President Trump is especially vulnerable to this playbook, which is why US-Pakistan relations seem to be on the upswing at present. Given the rollercoaster history of the relationship, however, it will not be sure how long its current high relations sustain.

The US’s military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 resulted in acrimony over Pakistan’s role in the Taliban’s return to power. Keen to move beyond then President Joe Biden administration’s policy of benign neglect of Pakistan, Islamabad worked hard to woo the incoming second Trump administration.

During his first term, President Donald Trump harbored grievances against Pakistan and accused the Pakistani government of being deceptive because it failed to fulfill US demands in Afghanistan. However, during President Trump’s second term, the long-standing ties between the US and Pakistan have been revived. At the heart of this resurgence lies the very element that once bound the two nations together: cooperation in the “War on Terror.”

Gaming the US president’s personality, Pakistan offered Trump an early win after his second inauguration. In March 2025, Pakistani authorities arrested and extradited Mohammad Sharifullah, charged in the US for his role in the 26 August 2021 Kabul airport bombing that killed 13 US service members and more than 160 civilians. This led to Trump naming and thanking Pakistan in his State of the Union address.

In particular, US-Pakistan relations under the second Trump administration have recently seen a significant upswing, driven by Pakistan’s role as a strategic mediator and economic partner. Bilateral ties have strengthened through Islamabad’s mediation efforts between the US and Iran, collaboration on critical mineral extraction, and mutual support for a regional ceasefire. The current trajectory of this geopolitical dynamic involves several key areas:

• Mediation & Geopolitics: Pakistan has emerged as an indispensable backchannel intermediary for the US with Iran. Islamabad’s diplomatic efforts in helping manage regional tensions — including the Middle East and a landmark India-Pakistan ceasefire — have drawn public praise from Washington.
• Economic & Trade Revisions: Following early tariff frictions, the US and Pakistan reached an agreement to boost bilateral trade. Pakistan committed to increasing imports of US products (such as crude oil) and opening up investment opportunities in technology and mining.
• Critical Minerals & Tech: The US Strategic Metals company signed a $500 million memorandum with the Pakistani military’s engineering unit to extract critical minerals in Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan entered into agreements with US entities to develop emerging digital payment architectures.

IV. What motivated Pakistan to actively engage in mediating the end of US-Iran war

1. Overview

Pakistan’s active pursuit of a central role as a mediator in the war between the US and Iran is an inevitable choice to protect its national security and economic interests. Geopolitically, the border between Pakistan and Iran stretches for approximately 1,000 kilometers. An all-out war between the United States and Iran would undermine the stability of Pakistan’s border regions and threaten national security. In particular, Pakistan has already faced a resilient insurgency by Baloch separatists on its western flank. A wider conflict in Iran would almost certainly embolden militant groups across the frontier, further destabilizing Pakistan’s already fragile security environment. [3]

Economically, the stakes are even starker. In terms of energy security, Pakistan relies heavily on oil imports from the Middle East, and its reserves of crude and refined oil are extremely limited. Therefore, disruptions to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz could cause serious setbacks to Pakistan’s energy supply chain. The recent escalation in the war between the US and Iran has sent fuel prices soaring, dealing severe economic and energy shocks to the country.

Moreover, about 5 million Pakistani citizens work in the Gulf region, and their remittances constitute a significant source of foreign exchange revenue for Pakistan. If the war is prolonged, these remittances will decrease significantly, leading to mass unemployment and an increase in the number of people returning home.

Beyond security and economics, successful mediation offers Pakistan a chance to rebrand itself globally. A successful deal, analysts believe, would strengthen its ties with Washington, Tehran and Arab Gulf states alike, while elevating its standing among South Asian nations. For these reasons, Pakistan has been so enthusiastic about mediating the end of the US-Iran War.

In fact, Pakistan is one of the few countries that has maintained diplomatic ties with both the US and Iran for decades. In particular, Pakistan shares close ties with Iran, rooted in history, religious bonds and border cooperation. It is home to the world’s second-largest Shiite population, giving it cultural and sectarian credibility in Iran. Unlike Qatar and Oman, it has no US military bases on its soil, earning it trust as a relatively neutral third party from Iran. China also supports Pakistan’s mediation. Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently stated in a briefing, “We support Pakistan’s role in promoting peace through fair and balanced mediation.” [4]

Furthermore, the fact that Pakistan has received widespread international support has also significantly influenced its active role as a mediator to end the US-Iran War.

On March 29, 2026, Pakistan hosted a quadrilateral meeting with the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt, who expressed full support for Pakistan’s initiative to host peace talks between the United States and Iran in Islamabad.

Just two days later, Chinese and Pakistani foreign ministers met in Beijing and issued a joint five-point proposal regarding the Middle East conflict, urging an immediate cessation of hostilities between the US and Iran, the start of peace talks as soon as possible and the security of nonmilitary targets, a diplomatic push that has helped build global momentum for de-escalation.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China supports and looks forward to Pakistan playing a unique and important role in easing the situation and resuming peace talks. This process is no easy task, and Pakistan’s mediation efforts are in line with the common interests of all parties, Wang added.

According to a statement attributable to the spokesperson for United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, the secretary-general underscores that an end to hostilities is urgently needed to protect civilian lives and alleviate human suffering. He expressed sincere appreciation for the efforts of Pakistan and other countries involved in facilitating the ceasefire.

2. Economic Motives or Reasons

The motive behind Pakistan’s active mediation to end the US-Iran War is clear. This is because Pakistan relies heavily on Gulf States for almost all of its energy imports. Pakistan imports over 90% of its crude oil and nearly all of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and neighboring Gulf countries.

As energy exports from the Gulf region came to a near halt due to the US-Iran War and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the Pakistani government was forced to implement massive austerity measures to conserve energy, such as introducing a four-day workweek for civil servants and closing schools. Although some restrictions have since been eased, concerns remain that the Pakistani economy, on the brink of bankruptcy, could collapse without international bailout funds. [5]

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are Pakistan’s major crude oil suppliers. These two countries consistently account for over 90% of Pakistan’s crude oil imports. [6]

Pakistan is the world’s 25th largest crude oil importer. Most of the imported crude oil is supplied by Gulf states.

• Saudi Arabia: The largest supplier of crude oil to Pakistan, exporting approximately $3.22 billion worth of crude oil. Saudi Arabia accounts for more than half of Pakistan’s total crude oil imports.
• United Arab Emirates: The second largest supplier, providing approximately $2.37 billion worth of crude oil to Pakistan.
• Others: Qatar, the United States, Russia, and São Tomé and Príncipe are important suppliers of crude oil to Pakistan, although on a smaller scale. Pakistan has also begun importing crude oil from Russia and the United States to diversify its energy mix. Pakistani refineries are increasing crude oil imports from Russia and the US to take advantage of discounted crude oil prices and alternative transportation methods.

Due to limited domestic refining capacity, Pakistan imports a significant amount of refined and processed petroleum products. Major sources of refined oil are as follows:

• United Arab Emirates: The largest supplier, providing over $2 billion worth of refined petroleum products.
• Kuwait: The second-largest supplier.
• Oman and Singapore: Major regional hubs supplying significant volumes to Pakistan.

As such, Pakistan relies heavily on oil imported from the Gulf region, with most of it imported via the Strait of Hormuz.

Consequently, as Michael Kugelman, Senior Fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council, noted in an interview with the BBC, “Pakistan is a country with a tremendous interest in ending the war between the United States and Iran.” As a result, “Pakistan has a very strong interest in doing everything it can to contribute to de-escalating efforts between the US and Iran.”

In particular, because Pakistan holds almost no emergency oil reserves, the shift from an oil supply surplus to a shortage occurred almost overnight.

Furthermore, Pakistan meets its gas demand from three major sources. The majority of this — approximately 2.7 billion cubic feet per day — is produced from domestic gas fields that have been slowly depleting over the years. [7]

The remainder consists of LNG imported under a long-term contract with Qatar, which can secure approximately 600 million cubic feet per day if shipments proceed smoothly. The third supply source is LPG. Pakistan imports over 60% of its LPG from Iran, but this supply is also facing disruptions due to the US-Iran conflict.

Pakistan began importing LNG in 2015 when domestic gas production failed to meet demand. Currently, imported LNG supplies about a quarter of Pakistan’s electricity, with the power sector being the largest consumer.

According to the energy analysis firm Kpler, Qatar and the UAE account for 99% of Pakistan’s LNG imports.

Monthly cargo data from OGRA, Pakistan’s energy regulator, clearly demonstrates the impact of the US-Iran War. Pakistan was scheduled to import 8 to 12 LNG shipments per month through 2025 and early 2026, and 12 ships arrived in January of this year alone. However, in March, when the war between the US and Iran began, only two shipments arrived.

The US-Iran war also impacted gas prices. According to data compiled by Manjur Ahmed, a researcher at the Institute for Fair Development Policy (PRIED), on February 13, Pakistan’s state-owned oil company (PSO) and Pakistan LNG Limited (PLL) purchased a total of eight LNG shipments at an average price of $10.47 per MMBtu, raising a total of $257.1 million.

However, the price of the two LNG shipments that arrived on March 12 rose to $12.49 per MMBtu, a 19% increase in just one month. This demonstrated that an international supply shortage was already occurring even before the full impact of the US-Iran War became apparent. As a result, Pakistan reduced its gas consumption.

Qatar’s LNG shipments to Pakistan were almost completely halted after March 2. Of the eight shipments scheduled for that month, only two arrived.

As shown in Figure 1, due to the energy crisis caused by the war, Pakistan’s inflation surged to 11.7% year-over-year in May 2026, up from 10.9% in April, well exceeding the Central Bank of Pakistan’s 2026 target of 5–7% and reaching its highest level since June 2024.

Figure 1: Pakistan Inflation rate, May 2025 – May 2026 (source: Trading Economics)

Aside from inflation, agriculture is a sector that has become highly vulnerable due to this energy crisis caused by the US-Iran War. Agriculture accounts for the fifth-largest share of Pakistan’s GDP and is the primary means of livelihood for nearly 40% of the population. However, approximately 46% of the global urea supply relies on the Gulf route. Urea is the most widely used nitrogen fertilizer in the world, accounting for more than 50% of global nitrogen fertilizer consumption.

Due to disruptions in maritime transport through the Strait of Hormuz, the price of urea has risen by about 50%. Currently, Pakistan is not facing an immediate shortage of urea fertilizer, as domestic production has protected the market from global price shocks. However, if the war continues and natural gas supplies decline, reliance on imports will become necessary; with liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports already facing disruptions, rising gas prices used for fertilizer production could impose an additional price burden on Pakistani farmers, particularly during the peak harvest season. [8]

Another economic pressure factor that the US-Iran War exerts on Pakistan is remittances, a key pillar of the Pakistani economy. In the 2025-2026 fiscal year, Pakistan received approximately $30 billion in remittances, with nearly 54% originating from the Gulf region. Approximately 800,000 Pakistanis migrate to the Middle East annually for work. However, if the US-Iran War persists, the resulting financial fallout could lead Pakistani workers already in the Middle East to return home. This scenario poses multifaceted threats, including reduced remittances, increased unemployment, and the economic burden associated with the reintegration of returning workers. Risks are mounting as the World Bank has lowered its forecast for real GDP growth in the Middle East to 1.8% by 2026; a slowdown in the Gulf economy could reduce demand for migrant labor, including Pakistanis, and exert downward pressure on remittances to Pakistan. Conversely, if the war with Iran ends, the demand for Pakistani workers will increase significantly, particularly in the construction and medical sectors. Therefore, for the Pakistani government, ending the war and easing tensions has become not merely a diplomatic goal, but an essential task for the Pakistani economy. [9]

3. Political Motives or Reasons

Pakistan has actively courted the Trump administration, President Donald Trump personally, and his family in order to expand its influence in Washington. During the first Trump administration, Pakistan was treated as a mere bystander by the United States. President Trump even posted negative tweets about Pakistan. However, these courtships by Pakistan began to bear fruit during the second Trump administration. This is because the foundation for cooperation between the United States and Pakistan has been laid under the administration.

Above all, the primary reason Pakistan was able to play the role of a credible mediator in negotiations to end the US-Iran War, and why it tried so hard to do so, can be attributed to the close personal relationship between President Trump and Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff, Asim Munir.

Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff, Munir, highly praised President Trump’s efforts in mediating a ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan in May 2025. The following month, in June, Pakistan officially nominated President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.

While it is unclear how much Chief of Staff Munir personally contributed to this recommendation, it is evident that as a central figure of de facto power in Pakistan, he maintains a close relationship with President Trump and received special treatment from him.

Chief of Staff Munir visited the United States in June 2025 at the invitation of President Trump and held a private luncheon at the White House. In September, he was invited to the Oval Office along with Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif to discuss US investment plans in Pakistan’s critical mineral sector. This news came just weeks after General Munir attended the retirement ceremony of US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Michael Kurilla in August. Commander Kurilla had previously praised Pakistan as an “outstanding” partner in the field of counter-terrorism, and particularly valued General Munir’s role in significantly contributing to the extradition to the United States of the suspect who carried out the terrorist attack at Kabul Airport during the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.

General Munir’s significant role in strengthening the partnership between Pakistan and the United States in the so-called “3C” sectors – cryptocurrency, critical minerals, and counter-terrorism – served as a crucial foundation for Pakistan to act as a peace mediator in the Iran-US War.

In 2023, General Munir established the Special Investment Promotion Commission (SIFC), chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by himself as the Army Chief of Staff, thereby expanding its authority to oversee Pakistan’s trade and foreign investment attraction. [10]

Although Pakistan fell significantly short of its initial goal of attracting $25 billion in investment, there are indications that the country is attempting to achieve this target by leveraging its close relationship with the Trump administration.

In September 2025, the US Strategic Metals Corporation (USSM) signed a $500 million Memorandum of Understanding with the Pakistan Army’s Frontier Works Organization (FWO) and its subsidiary National Logistics Corporation (NLC) to pursue critical mineral mining and extraction projects within Pakistan. In January of this year, through a memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad under the chairmanship of General Munir, Pakistan and an affiliate of the US cryptocurrency company World Liberty Financial formalized an agreement to promote “dialogue and technical understanding regarding emerging digital payment systems.” [11]

World Liberty Financial, established in 2024, is backed by the Trump family. Among the founders is Jack Witkoff, the son of Steve Witkoff, whose father, Steve Witkoff, served as one of the US negotiators at the second Iran-US peace talks held in Islamabad.

Pakistan’s declaration of “open combat” against Afghanistan in February of this year, citing the reason that Afghanistan was harboring militants affiliated with the Pakistani Taliban, and its subsequent intensification of offensives in March, including attacks on Bagram Air Base, have sparked speculation that Pakistan is attempting to align its counter-terrorism efforts with President Trump’s priorities. This is because President Trump has expressed his intention to retake Bagram Air Base, a base for US and NATO forces, by September 2025.

In conclusion, as explained above, Pakistan’s active courtship of President Trump and the close personal bond between Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff General Munir and President Trump appear to have significantly contributed to Pakistan’s efforts to end the US-Iran War.

Furthermore, the close relationship between Pakistani and Iranian political leaders also played a significant role in prompting Pakistan to actively step forward to end the US-Iran War. Officials reported that since February 28 of this year, when the US and Israeli attacks on Iran began, Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif and Iranian President Pezeshkian have held at least seven phone calls, each lasting up to an hour.

Pakistan Army Chief of Staff General Asim Munir also visited Tehran at least twice, and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi visited Iran several times, solidifying friendly relations between the leaders of the two countries. Iranian President Pezeshkian also visited Pakistan again on June 23 of this year for the second time since taking office, solidifying friendly relations between the two countries.

4. Diplomatic/Security Motives or Reasons

Pakistan’s active role in bridging the gap in dialogue between the United States and Iran in 2026 is not merely a one-off, isolated diplomatic event that occurred this year, but rather a reflection of Pakistan’s historical experience of leveraging its geopolitical strategic location to act as a “mediator” in relations between major powers. In particular, Pakistan has frequently demonstrated its ability to maintain good relations between various strategically opposing blocs.

Pakistan’s active role as a “mediator” in relations between major powers dates back as far as July 1971. Henry Kissinger, then US National Security Advisor under Nixon, completed a historic visit during his visit to Pakistan by secretly flying from Islamabad to Beijing, which overturned the Cold War landscape. Kissinger’s move opened up US-China relations, which had been strained for 22 years, paving the way for President Nixon’s visit to China the following year and fundamentally reshaping the global strategic map. In this historic diplomatic feat, then-Pakistani President Yahya Khan played an irreplaceable role as a messenger and mediator between the United States and China. His consistent delivery of messages between Washington and Beijing played a decisive role in building trust between the two nations. Nixon explicitly stated in his memoirs that without Pakistan’s support, the improvement of US-China relations would have been significantly delayed, and Kissinger also acknowledged Islamabad’s role as “irreplaceable.” [12]

Furthermore, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80, Pakistan served as a key conduit for US aid to the Afghan resistance while maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and actively participated in the UN-led Geneva Negotiations. When the United States and the Afghan Taliban regime signed the Doha Agreement in 2020, Pakistan again faithfully played a behind-the-scenes mediating role, earning widespread recognition in the international community for its mediating prowess.

Beyond its long-standing role as a diplomatic mediator, Pakistan’s active involvement in mediating the US-Iran War stems from its deep concern over the widespread security consequences that could result from Iran’s long-term instability. Pakistan shares borders with four countries — India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China – and currently maintains hostile relations with two of them: India and Afghanistan. Pakistan is currently conducting military operations in Afghanistan and has a long history of conflict with India, having even engaged in combat in 2025. Furthermore, with an internal rebellion in Balochistan province, Pakistan is embroiled in multiple conflicts.

Under these circumstances, Pakistan does not wish for the war with Iran to continue, as Iran’s instability could spread to Pakistan. Iran shares a 900-kilometer border with Pakistan’s Balochistan province, which is engulfed in a violent separatist rebellion. Balochistan is already a region vulnerable to instability, as armed groups are causing violence and conflict across the border between the two nations. Violence by armed groups based on both borders has repeatedly occurred.

Balochistan Province is also a critical region for Pakistan’s economic future. Gwadar, a major port city in Balochistan, is considered a key hub of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and plays a pivotal role in Pakistan’s plans to strengthen connectivity. Furthermore, Balochistan is home to the Lekodik mine, a large-scale project holding massive gold and copper reserves estimated to be worth over $60 billion. Moreover, prospects for Gulf-linked energy investments, such as the $10 billion Gwadar refinery project supported by Saudi Aramco, are further elevated Pakistan’s interests in ending the US-Iran War. The strategic value of Balochistan Province has been further enhanced by Pakistan’s recent decision to allow the passage of goods from third countries through its territory. Under the new transit agreement, goods imported through Gwadar, Karachi, and Fort Qasim head toward Iran; in the process, they pass through inland routes via the major cities of Balochistan province, Quzdar and Dalbandin, before crossing border checkpoints such as Ghabd and Taftan. Consequently, the instability in Iran caused by the ongoing war poses a threat not only to Pakistan’s security but also to its overall national economic plans. [13]

Furthermore, long-term instability in Iran could not only increase the movement of refugees across the Pakistan-Iran border but also exacerbate sectarian conflict within Pakistan. Pakistan has the world’s second-largest Shia population, numbering approximately 20 to 36 million, following Iran. A recent example illustrating the significant impact the Iranian war situation can have on Pakistan’s domestic affairs is the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which sparked nationwide protests and resulted in 21 deaths.

Pakistan’s geographical location is both a vulnerability and a diplomatic asset that motivates the country to act proactively as a mediator. Situated between South Asia, West Asia, China, and the Arabian Sea, Pakistan plays a crucial role in connecting various strategic regions. While this geographical advantage alone does not automatically make Pakistan a mediator, it signifies that it is too exposed to ignore conflicts and too critical to overlook them.

On top of that, Pakistan has earned a reputation for performing the role of a mediator effectively, despite lacking coercive means. Pakistan is all the more suitable as a mediator because, while it possesses influence, it lacks the power to impose coercive conditions on Washington or Tehran. Pakistan’s comparative advantage lies not in coercive power, but in accessibility, strategic understanding, and the ability to convey difficult truths to all parties. In particular, it should be noted that Pakistan’s importance as a mediator stems from the rare advantage of accessibility. Pakistan maintains smooth communication channels not only with Washington and Tehran, but also with Beijing and Gulf states.

Regarding relations with Iran, despite periodic tensions, Pakistan has maintained smooth channels with the Iranian leadership. These channels were further strengthened when Pakistan publicly supported its neighbor, Iran, during the 12-day War between Israel and Iran in June 2025, a fact acknowledged by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during his visit to Pakistan in August 2025. This public support helped raise Pakistan’s credibility in Iran and position it as a mediator acceptable to the Iranian leadership.

The fact that Pakistan has not hosted US military bases on its territory, despite maintaining active communication channels with the United States, also contributed to increasing its credibility as a mediator. Furthermore, following the US and Israeli attacks on Iran on February 28 of this year, Pakistan was the only country in the region to condemn the aggression against Iran, a move that earned it trust and attention from Iran.

Two events led to the renewed emphasis on Pakistan’s importance as a mediator in Washington. The first was the arrest and extradition to the United States of Mohammad Sharifoulah, who is suspected of planning a deadly bombing at Kabul Airport in August 2021. As US President Trump publicly praised these actions by Pakistan, the country re-emerged in Washington’s security calculations as a useful partner. [14] A second turning point that contributed to this shift in US perception came following the conflict between Pakistan and India in May 2025. Pakistan emerged as a responsible actor capable of exercising restraint from its position as a major power while demonstrating military readiness, thereby contributing to mitigating a crisis that could have escalated into a serious situation. This shift in US perception was clearly evident in high-level meetings between the two sides, including the historic White House luncheon between Pakistan Army Chief of Staff Asim Munir and US President Trump. Above all, Pakistan’s assistance in mediating a ceasefire between the US and Iran after President Trump threatened to destroy the entire Iranian civilization symbolically demonstrates the close personal relationships President Trump has forged with the Pakistani leadership, particularly Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Marshal Munir.

Another reason Pakistan was able to actively mediate in the US-Iran War was its ability to garner broad regional support. In particular, Pakistan is able to communicate frankly with Gulf states. The recent US-Iran War clearly demonstrated a reality that Gulf states could not ignore: their prosperity depends on oil and gas infrastructure located under Iran’s influence and geographically adjacent to the country.

Pakistan’s mediation efforts were not conducted in isolation but took place within a broader regional context, as evidenced by the foreign ministers’ meeting attended by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt in Islamabad on March 29, and the senior officials’ meeting on April 14. These meetings demonstrated that Pakistan was operating within a regional framework of cooperation. Since these nations have direct interests in the US-Iran War, particularly regarding energy exports and maritime access, their participation added substantial significance and legitimacy to Pakistan’s mediation efforts. This was crucial, given that Pakistan needed to maintain relations with both Washington and Tehran while simultaneously responding to calls for de-escalation at a broader regional level.

The reason Pakistan sought and was able to actively play the role of a mediator in the US-Iran War was due to China’s support. China was by no means a peripheral bystander in the US-Iran War. As more than half of China’s energy imports come from the Middle East, instability in the Gulf region and disruptions in energy export flows through the Strait of Hormuz have a direct adverse effect on China. Immediately after the war in March 2026, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishak Dhar visited Beijing to explain the regional situation to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and coordinate positions. As a result, a joint Pakistan-China Five-Point Initiative was formulated to restore peace and stability in the Gulf and Middle East regions; this initiative called for an immediate cessation of hostilities between the US and Iran, the prompt holding of peace talks, and respect for sovereignty and international law. China’s open support for Pakistan added significant strategic depth to Pakistan’s mediation efforts and granted them international legitimacy. This not only demonstrated that Pakistan does not operate solely within the framework of the West but also further strengthened the justification for its mediation efforts regarding Iran.

V. Conclusion

This paper analyzed why Pakistan so zealously stepped forward to mediate the end of the US-Iran War. To this end, the paper first examined the past relations between Iran and Pakistan, as well as between the United States and Pakistan. Finally, it analyzed why Pakistan so sincerely engaged in mediation to end the US-Iran War by presenting Pakistan’s economic, political, and diplomatic/security motives.

This paper demonstrated that Pakistan’s active participation as a mediator to end the US-Iran war was an inevitable choice to protect its national security and economic interests. Geopolitically, the border between Pakistan and Iran spans approximately 1,000 km. An all-out war between the US and Iran would undermine the stability of Pakistan’s border regions and threaten national security. Moreover, from Pakistan’s perspective, as it imports over 90% of its crude oil and gas from the Gulf region where the war is taking place, the country had to be eager to mediate the war’s end because the opening of the Strait of Hormuz would be necessary to enable energy imports into the country.

Furthermore, this paper pointed out that the close personal relationship between Pakistani leaders, particularly Army Chief of Staff General Munir and President Trump, played a significant role in Pakistan’s active role as a mediator in ending the US-Iran War. It was also noted that the close relationship and cooperation between Pakistani and Iranian leaders played a role.

In addition, this paper argued that Pakistan’s active role as a mediator demonstrated Pakistan’s historical experience of leveraging its advantage as a strategic geopolitical location to play the role of a “mediator” in relations with major powers.