Abstract
This study examines the effectiveness of European Union sanctions imposed on Russia in response to its aggression against Ukraine. It explores the strategic rationale for sanctions as instruments of coercive diplomacy to impose economic pressure without military intervention.
The EU sanctions target Russia’s economic base, energy exports, military-industrial complex, and political elite to curtail its war capabilities and compel compliance with international law. While official EU assessments highlight significant economic and strategic impacts, including reduced energy revenues and restricted access to technology and finance, Russian adaptations through import substitution and trade redirection have mitigated these effects.
The analysis underscores the complex, conditional nature of sanctions’ success, noting that despite some measurable results, the primary objective of ending Russian military operations remains unfulfilled. The study concludes that sanctions’ overall effectiveness is mixed and contingent on evolving geopolitical dynamics and enforcement measures.
Key Words: EU Sanctions, Russia, Economic Pressure, Hybrid Threats, War Economy
Introduction
On March 14, 2026, the EU Council extended individual restrictive measures (targeting people and entities linked to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine’s territorial integrity) for another six months, until September 15, 2026. This affects approximately 2,600 individuals and entities through measures such as asset freezes, travel bans, and prohibitions on the availability of funds. The extension required unanimous agreement among the 27 member states; two names were removed to secure it, and some deceased persons were also deleted from the list.[1]
Two days later, on March 16, the Council added nine individuals responsible for the Bucha massacre to the sanctions list under the Ukrainian aggression regime. They now face asset freezing and funding bans. Separately, four individuals were added to the list of Russia’s hybrid threats, specifically foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) against the EU and partners. This brings the total under the hybrid threat regime to 69 individuals and 17 entities.
The questionable effectiveness of sanctions, according to scholars
Economic sanctions have emerged as a central instrument of statecraft in contemporary international relations, representing a middle ground between diplomatic protest and military intervention. This section examines the theoretical and strategic logic underlying the use of non-military sanctions, drawing on the extensive academic literature. The analysis reveals that sanctions serve multiple functions — coercion, signalling, deterrence, and norm enforcement — although their effectiveness remains contested. While policymakers increasingly favour sanctions as a “humane” alternative to force, scholarly evidence suggests that their success depends critically on design features, target characteristics, and the political context of sender-target relations.
The use of economic sanctions as instruments of foreign policy has proliferated dramatically since the end of the Cold War. From United Nations Security Council measures to unilateral state actions, sanctions have become, as Baldwin describes, an “off-the-shelf” tool of diplomacy.[2]
The theoretical rationale for economic sanctions rests on several interconnected logics. First, sanctions represent a form of coercive diplomacy designed to impose costs on target states sufficient to alter their behaviour.[3] Unlike military force, sanctions operate through economic pain rather than physical destruction, making them appear more proportionate and ethically defensible.[4] Second, sanctions serve important signalling functions, demonstrating the sender’s commitment to international norms and willingness to bear costs to uphold them.[5] Third, sanctions can serve as deterrents, warning potential violators of international law that transgressions will trigger economic consequences.[6]
Scholars argue that evaluating sanctions requires understanding them as instruments of statecraft comparable to other policy tools.[7] The choice to employ sanctions reflects a calculation that they offer superior cost-benefit ratios compared to alternatives, particularly military intervention, in specific contexts. This logic explains why sanctions have become increasingly attractive to democratic states, where domestic political constraints make military action costly in terms of both resources and political capital.[8]
States employ sanctions for multiple strategic purposes beyond simple coercion. Experts have identified a paradoxical pattern in which adversaries frequently impose sanctions but rarely secure concessions, while allies use coercion reluctantly but achieve greater success when they do.[9] This paradox reflects the role of conflict expectations in shaping sanctions outcomes. When future conflict seems likely, targets have little incentive to concede, as compliance signals weakness. Conversely, when the sender and target share long-term cooperative interests, sanctions can effectively communicate dissatisfaction and motivate policy adjustments.
Comparing aid suspensions to traditional sanctions, the research shows that aid suspensions achieve a success rate of 44%, compared to 26% for economic sanctions.[10] Aid suspensions prove more effective because they directly affect government budgets, avoid market-force undermining, and generate fewer adverse behavioural reactions. This finding suggests that the logic of sanctions effectiveness depends critically on mechanism design and the economic relationship between the sender and target.
Despite their widespread use, the effectiveness of sanctions remains controversial. On the one hand, experts argue that economic sanctions rarely achieve their stated objectives, particularly when those objectives involve regime changes or major policy reversals.[11] Consequently, sanctions fail because modern states can withstand economic pressure through import substitution, black markets, and nationalist rallying. However, others counter that pessimism reflects flawed evaluation criteria. Sanctions should not be judged solely on whether they achieve their stated goals, but on whether they outperform available alternatives and generate positive progress toward objectives.[12]
The recognition of the humanitarian costs of comprehensive sanctions has driven the evolution toward “smart” or targeted sanctions. In this regard, some scholars have defended this evolution, arguing that targeted measures — including asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes — can achieve coercive effects while minimising civilian suffering.[13] Consequently, scholars have provided comparative evidence that targeted sanctions are more humane and potentially more effective than general trade embargoes, although implementation challenges remain significant.[14]
In conclusion, the logic of using non-military sanctions in international relations reflects multiple strategic calculations. Sanctions offer states a middle-ground policy instrument that can impose costs, signal commitment, deter violations, and satisfy domestic political demands for action without resorting to military force. While scholarly debate continues regarding their effectiveness, the evidence suggests that sanctions can work when properly designed, multilaterally supported, and deployed with realistic objectives. The key question is not whether sanctions work in general, but rather when and under what conditions they prove effective. Understanding this conditional logic remains essential for both scholars and policymakers navigating the complex landscape of contemporary international relations.[15]
EU sanctions against Russia
Since March 2014, the European Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures (sanctions) against Russia, initially in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol and the deliberate destabilisation of Ukraine. On February 23, 2022, the EU expanded the sanctions in response to the recognition of the non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘oblasts’ of Ukraine and the deployment of Russian armed forces into those areas. After February 24, 2022, in response to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, the EU massively expanded the sanctions.[16]
Reportedly, the measures are designed to achieve the EU policy objective of ending Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine by maximising pressure on Russia and using all available tools to diminish Russia’s ability to wage its illegal war of aggression.[17] This primary goal has guided the adoption of 19 packages of sanctions to date, with economic measures extended until at least 31 July 2026. The sanctions seek to compel Russia to cease its unlawful actions, withdraw its forces from Ukraine, and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally recognised borders, in line with the UN Charter and international law.[18]
According to the EU, the sanctions are carefully targeted, proportionate, and temporary. This means that they are regularly reviewed and that the EU can calibrate, ease, or end them if the EU’s objectives, or meaningful steps toward them, are achieved. The review process ensures flexibility: sanctions serve as a tool of the Common Foreign and Security Policy to support conflict resolution and uphold the rules-based international order, and not as permanent punishment.[19]
A central economic objective is to weaken Russia’s economic base to reduce the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war. The measures aim to “weaken Russia’s economic base, deprive it of critical technologies and markets, and significantly curtail its ability to wage war.” [20] By targeting energy exports — the primary source of war revenues — sanctions seek to deprive the Russian state budget of funds that were previously used for military operations. Complementary financial restrictions isolate major Russian banks and immobilise Central Bank assets held in the EU, thereby directly limiting access to international capital and markets.[21]
Another key goal is to deprive Russia of advanced technologies and components essential for its military-industrial complex. Export bans on dual-use goods, electronics, machinery, and items supporting defence production aim to degrade Russia’s capacity to produce, maintain, and modernise weapons systems. These restrictions specifically target sectors that fuel the invasion, including energy, finance, and the military-industrial complex, thereby diminishing Russia’s long-term ability to sustain aggression.[22]
Politically, sanctions impose clear economic and political costs on Russia’s political elite and those responsible for the aggression. Individual listings, asset freezes, and travel bans target decision-makers, oligarchs, military commanders, and propagandists to erode internal support for the regime and ensure accountability for human rights violations and hybrid threats. Later packages have extended these aims to counter circumvention efforts, such as the shadow fleet of oil tankers, and to address support from third countries, as well as Russia’s hybrid campaigns and human rights abuses.
Through these interconnected objectives — ending the war, maximising pressure, weakening the war economy, curtailing military capabilities, and holding elites accountable — the EU sanctions regime represents a more or less unified and proportionate response. The measures complement broader EU support for Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction while remaining open to adjustment based on Russian actions.[23]
In essence, the measures aim to end Russia’s military actions against Ukraine and ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty, weaken Russia’s economic foundation by targeting energy exports, isolating banks, and restricting technologies. The sanctions target the energy, finance, and military sectors, as well as decision-makers, oligarchs, and commanders, while also countering circumvention efforts.
What has been achieved?
According to official EU assessments, sanctions have allegedly delivered measurable strategic and economic results. They have sharply eroded Russia’s economic base, curtailed its capacity to finance and sustain the war, and imposed direct costs on the political and military elite. The European Commission states that the sanctions “are eroding Russia’s economic base sharply, slashing any prospect to modernise it” while “damaging Russia’s industrial and economic ability to wage war, manufacture more weapons, and repair existing weapons systems.” [24]
Consequently, according to the EU, a core achievement is the degradation of Russia’s energy revenues, which traditionally funded a large share of the federal budget. EU import bans on crude oil (effective December 2022) and refined products, combined with the G7 oil price cap (lowered to USD 47.6 per barrel in July 2025), have resulted in structural losses. Russia’s oil and gas revenues have fallen by almost 80% compared with pre-war levels.[25] The EU has decoupled almost entirely from Russian pipeline gas (90% ban), while LNG imports remain limited. These steps have prevented billions of dollars in revenue from reaching the Kremlin’s war chest.[26]
Trade sanctions delivered further contraction. The EU–Russia trade volume shrank by 75%, with bans preventing over €48 billion in EU exports to Russia and €91.2 billion in imports from Russia, relative to 2021 levels. Russia’s overall trade in goods and services fell significantly in 2022, according to the World Bank and IMF estimates referenced by the Council. Imports dropped 7% – 15.01%, and exports 8.7% – 9.6% that year. GDP contracted by 2.1% in 2022, with forecasts of continued pressure in subsequent years.[27] Many industrial sectors remain below pre-invasion output levels, and high inflation (9.5% in December 2024), coupled with a key interest rate of 21%, has constrained non-military activity.[28]
Financial and technological restrictions have reportedly permanently impaired Russia’s military-industrial base. Over 2,600 individuals and entities, including President Putin and key oligarchs, face asset freezes and travel bans. Approximately €210 billion of Russian Central Bank reserves and €24.9 billion of private assets are immobilised, with extraordinary revenues from these assets now financing EU loans and military support for Ukraine.[29] Export controls on dual-use goods, semiconductors, aviation parts, and advanced machinery have raised production and repair costs for Russian weapons systems and grounded a significant portion of the civil air fleet. The 15th and subsequent packages extended these bans to third-country circumvention networks.[30]
Officially, these measures have achieved three strategic objectives articulated in an analysis by the European Parliament: a strong signal of Western resolve and unity to the Kremlin, the permanent degradation of Russia’s military capabilities through technology denial, and the long-term asphyxiation of Russia’s energy and economic base.[31] The Council emphasises that sanctions “are yielding results,” as evidenced by declines in trade, energy revenues, and war-financing capacity.[32]
Enforcement has been strengthened by a 2024 European Union (EU) directive criminalising sanctions violations and circumvention, with penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment and corporate fines. Anti-circumvention tools, shadow-fleet restrictions (affecting nearly 600 vessels), and “no-Russia” clauses in contracts have closed loopholes.[33]
The limitations of sanctions and Russia’s response
Official EU sources acknowledge the limitations of sanction packages. They note that Russia has adapted through war-economy mobilisation, parallel imports, and trade redirection via third countries, sustaining military output at a higher fiscal cost. Sanctions have not yet forced an end to the aggression, prompting successive upgrades to packages. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect continues to raise the Kremlin’s costs, constrain modernisation, and support Ukraine through asset revenues and reduced Russian revenues.[34]
The Russian Federation’s official position, articulated by President Vladimir Putin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the government, evaluates the Union’s sanctions — Introduced in 2014 and expanded through 19 packages since February 2022 — as illegal, unilateral, and illegitimate acts of economic coercion that violate international law. These measures are described as an instrument of hybrid warfare intended to achieve Russia’s ‘strategic defeat’,” isolate the country, collapse its economy, and force a reversal of policy on Ukraine.[35]
Russian authorities assert that the sanctions have comprehensively failed to achieve any of these objectives. MFA briefings state unequivocally that “eighteen packages of sanctions have failed to achieve the goals set by the EU, nor could they. Or perhaps they achieved precisely the opposite.” Further assessments confirm that “sanctions have not broken the Russian economy” and that “the so-called isolation of Russia has failed.”[36] President Putin has repeatedly declared the collapse of the Western “economic blitzkrieg,” noting that attempts to demoralise society and destroy the country through sanctions proved ineffective from the outset.
Official evaluations emphasise Russia’s rapid and successful adaptation. In the Government’s annual report to the State Duma, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin acknowledged an unprecedented “sanctions blow” but stressed resilience: the predicted double-digit GDP fall proved moderate, and “we managed to bring the economy back to the growth trajectory.”[37] Through import substitution, parallel imports, national payment infrastructure, and redirection of trade to Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and BRICS partners, Russia has normalised banking operations, maintained financial stability, and accelerated technological self-sufficiency. The military-industrial complex has not only sustained output but also expanded, while domestic production and new supply chains have mitigated external pressure.
Russian sources further highlight the boomerang effect on the EU. Sanctions are portrayed as counterproductive, inflicting greater self-harm on Europe via energy crises, inflation, de-industrialisation, and massive corporate losses. MFA documents quantify EU damages in hundreds of billions of euros, arguing that the policy disrupted global supply chains and even harmed third countries.[38]
Officials maintain that sanctions have consolidated Russian society, strengthened sovereignty, and fostered long-term independence from Western markets. Moscow anticipates that the restrictions may persist for decades but views them as a catalyst for greater multipolar cooperation rather than a strategic threat. Counter-measures have been implemented, and Russia continues to reject any linkage between sanctions relief and its core security interests.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the overall situation appears to be a combination of successes that remain to be confirmed later and failures. The primary objective, that of halting Russian military operations, has not been accomplished. Furthermore, the recently initiated conflict with Iran has already led to higher oil and gas prices, which are likely to generate additional revenue for Russia. Consequently, the effectiveness of the European Union’s economic sanctions against Russia is expected to further decline.
Recently, the Belgian Prime Minister, Bart De Wever, has attracted significant attention with his strong remarks regarding Russia. In an interview with the Belgian newspaper L’ Echo in mid-March 2026, he advocated for the European Union to negotiate an agreement with Russia to end the war in Ukraine, explicitly stating that Europe should “normalise relations with Russia and regain access to cheap energy. That is common sense.” He reportedly asserted that Europe cannot compel Putin to retreat solely through the provision of weapons to Ukraine or through sanctions, particularly without full support from the United States. The only viable option remaining, he suggested, is “making a deal.” He also claimed that many European leaders privately concur with his perspective but are reluctant to express it publicly.[39]
References
