In June 2026, the United States designated the Brazilian criminal groups Comando Vermelho (CV) and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). A year and a half earlier, the six largest Mexican cartels — the Sinaloa Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), Gulf Cartel, Northeast Cartel, New Michoacán Family, and the United Cartels — as well as the transnational organizations Tren de Aragua and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), received the same designations. Executive Order 14157 states that its objective is to eliminate the presence of these organizations on American soil, deprive them of the ability to threaten U.S. national security through their extraterritorial structures, and protect the American people and the territorial integrity of the United States.
At first glance, this decision appears to represent a tightening of efforts to combat the drug threat. However, it carries far-reaching military and political implications for Latin America as a whole. The United States had never previously designated criminal organizations as terrorist entities. This reclassification blurs the legal distinction between financially motivated organized crime and politically motivated terrorism. In effect, the “terrorist” designation of drug cartels serves as a pretext for reviving the Monroe Doctrine and justifying the use of force in the affairs of states throughout the Western Hemisphere. The designation of Brazilian groups as terrorist organizations in 2026 confirmed that the new U.S. strategy is not limited to Mexico but is instead systematic and region-wide.
Legal Aspects
The legal basis for designating drug cartels as FTOs is Section 219 of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes the Secretary of State to designate an organization if three criteria are met: it is foreign, engages in terrorist activity, and poses a threat to the security of the United States. U.S. law establishes three principal consequences of such designation:
- The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions to freeze any assets belonging to entities designated as FTOs.
- Any foreign national who is a member of a designated terrorist organization or has participated in terrorist activity is considered inadmissible to the United States. Section 237(a)(4)(B) further provides for the removal of such individuals if they are already present in the country.
- Providing material support to organizations designated as FTOs is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for up to 20 years under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. The statute defines “material support” broadly, encompassing not only financial assistance but also services, training, expert advice, housing, shelter, false documentation, communications equipment, other equipment, weapons, and transportation.
A particularly significant provision is the law’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, established under subsection (d) of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. U.S. authorities may prosecute individuals for providing material support to cartels even when the alleged conduct occurred entirely outside the United States. In addition, financial sanctions imposed on SDGT-designated entities expose foreign financial institutions to the risk of secondary sanctions if they conduct transactions on behalf of blocked entities. Consequently, not only U.S. banks but also foreign banks may face liability for engaging in business with SDGT-designated organizations.
Securitization of Drug Cartels
Executive Order 14157 represents a clear example of the securitization of drug trafficking. It defines “international cartels” as a national security threat that extends beyond organized crime. The order describes them as organizations cooperating with hostile foreign actors, employing adaptive structures characteristic of insurgent groups, infiltrating governments across the Western Hemisphere, and controlling illicit trafficking along the southern border of the United States. This framing has enabled the United States to apply counterterrorism legislation to drug cartels.
Securitization has several important consequences. A report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) suggests that Congress may consider legislation authorizing the use of military force against designated organizations. As scholars writing in the American Journal of International Law argue, the new designations “lay the groundwork for cross-border military action.” Moreover, participants in cross-border trade between the United States and Mexico have become vulnerable to allegations of providing material support to FTOs.
According to The New York Times, Donald Trump signed a directive authorizing the Department of Defense to begin using military force against the cartels. This shifts the primary focus of counter-cartel efforts from law enforcement to military operations. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed that “all options are on the table if we deal with so-called foreign terrorist organizations that specifically target Americans at our border.”
Finally, securitization creates a narrative in which opposition to U.S. measures can be portrayed as support for terrorist organizations. This places additional pressure on Latin American governments and enables the United States to expand its military and political presence throughout the region.
Revival of the Monroe Doctrine
The Monroe Doctrine, articulated by President James Monroe in 1823, has long served as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Under the doctrine, the Western Hemisphere was declared closed to further European colonization, while the United States pledged not to interfere in European affairs. In practice, however, the doctrine established the foundation for U.S. predominance in the Americas. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt expanded this framework through the Roosevelt Corollary, under which the United States asserted the right to intervene unilaterally in Latin American countries. This principle later became known as the Big Stick Policy and was invoked to justify interventions in Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.
In November 2025, the White House published a new National Security Strategy (NSS), which identified the Western Hemisphere as a strategic priority. The document proclaimed a return to the Monroe Doctrine through what it termed the “Trump Corollary,” explicitly referencing Roosevelt’s Corollary. Following the capture of Nicolás Maduro, the American president declared that the United States had “transcended the Monroe Doctrine” and described his approach as a renewed version of the doctrine.
The modern “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” is explicitly offensive in orientation. According to the NSC, it seeks to expel Russia, China, and other extra-regional competitors from Latin America; prevent foreign control over strategic assets ranging from the Panama Canal to Venezuela’s energy resources; revise the U.S. military posture in the region; deploy troops to combat cartels; and authorize the use of lethal force. The law enforcement-based strategy pursued over recent decades is described as exhausted. The doctrine’s offensive character is also supported ideologically: the NSC argues that although America’s founders expressed a preference for non-intervention, strict adherence to that principle is unrealistic for a country whose interests are as extensive and diverse as those of the United States.
Updated Doctrine in Practice
Washington is already deploying military force in the Western Hemisphere under the pretext of combating drug trafficking. By mid-2025, the presence of approximately 10,000 troops had been reported along the U.S. southern border — a signal to Mexico of the possibility of military intervention.
On November 13, 2025, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced Operation Southern Spear. The operation was led by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), whose area of responsibility includes Central and South America and the Caribbean. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that the United States would continue using military force to combat drug trafficking in the Caribbean.
According to The Washington Post, a substantial U.S. naval force was deployed off the coast of Venezuela, including the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, destroyers, a nuclear-powered submarine, amphibious assault ships, B-52 strategic bombers, and F-35 fighter aircraft. Over the course of several months, U.S. forces reportedly destroyed approximately 20 vessels and killed nearly 80 people. Colombian President Gustavo Petro stated that one of the strikes killed a fisherman rather than a drug trafficker, suggesting that the military campaign resulted in civilian casualties.
The Southern Spear campaign culminated in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, during Operation Absolute Resolve. The U.S. Senate praised the operation for its effectiveness in addressing regional instability in Latin America. The United States justified its actions by accusing Maduro of “narco-terrorism” and of maintaining ties to the Cartel de los Soles, which Washington designated as an SDGT in July 2025 and as an FTO in November of the same year.
However, the allegations of “narco-terrorism” against Maduro raise serious questions. The central element of the accusation — the Cartel de los Soles, allegedly led by Venezuelan officials — is not presented as an identifiable organization but rather as a term commonly used to refer to elements of the Venezuelan military. Moreover, conducting a military operation on Venezuelan territory without authorization from the UN Security Council constitutes a direct violation of the UN Charter.
Equally revealing was Donald Trump’s pardon of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who had been convicted in the United States of cocaine trafficking and sentenced to 45 years in prison. Against the backdrop of the security operation in Venezuela, this suggests that the war on drugs is being applied not as a consistent principle but as a selective instrument of political pressure.
The central objective of U.S. policy toward Venezuela is control over the world’s largest proven oil reserves. Donald Trump effectively acknowledged this by stating that oil seized in Venezuela could become an asset for Washington. This echoes his earlier statements advocating the seizure of oil resources in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, reflecting the view that U.S. power entitles it to control foreign resources or exploit them for its own benefit. The administration also unveiled Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s proposal to assume indefinite control over Venezuelan oil exports. Trump argued that the United States would use the resulting revenues to rebuild Venezuela itself. In this context, the “terrorist” designation applied to drug cartels appears to function as a pretext for the use of force in pursuit of strategic resource control.
Mexico as the Main Opponent of the New Policy
If Venezuela became an example of military intervention, Mexico became an example of political resistance to the new U.S. strategy. Claudia Sheinbaum’s government responded decisively, demonstrating its willingness to defend national sovereignty. On February 20, 2025, draft amendments to Articles 40 and 19 of the Constitution were introduced. By April 1, 2025, the reform had been adopted. Article 40 was supplemented with a provision stating that “the Mexican people will not, under any circumstances, accept interventions, interference, or any foreign action that undermines the integrity, independence, or sovereignty of the nation.” Investigations and criminal prosecutions conducted on Mexican territory without the authorization of the Mexican authorities were prohibited. Article 19 was also amended to establish the harshest possible penalties for arms trafficking.
Sheinbaum emphasized that the United States was free to designate criminal organizations however it wished, but Mexico would not tolerate interference in its internal affairs and would engage only in cooperation. At the same time, the Mexican government continued its campaign against American firearms manufacturers. Up to 70% of the weapons seized from drug cartels originate in the United States. This illustrates the contradiction in U.S. policy: while Washington declares the fight against drug cartels to be a national priority, it simultaneously remains their principal source of firearms.
Mexico has long sought to combat the illicit flow of weapons from the United States. In 2021, it successfully promoted the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2616, aimed at combating illicit arms trafficking. Mexico also appealed to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, arguing that the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) is inconsistent with international law. However, the Mexican government’s lawsuit before the U.S. Supreme Court was dismissed in June 2025. The Court ruled that the PLCAA grants immunity to firearms manufacturers and that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the companies had knowingly facilitated illegal arms trafficking.
Regional Reactions
Latin American countries responded differently to the U.S. decision to designate the cartels as FTOs and SDGTs. Right-wing governments generally supported Washington, while most left-wing administrations condemned the possibility of foreign military intervention. This divergence exposed deep political divisions within the region.
Brazil adopted the most principled position. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government rejected the designation of the Brazilian criminal organizations Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV) as terrorist organizations. Its principal argument was that such a designation could provide the United States with a pretext for interfering in Brazil’s internal affairs under the guise of counterterrorism. Moreover, Brazilian law (Law No. 13.260/2016) requires terrorism to be motivated by political, ideological, or religious objectives — criteria that financially motivated criminal organizations do not meet.
The U.S. designation of Brazilian groups as FTOs represented a diplomatic setback for the Lula administration. The decision was announced one day after Flávio Bolsonaro met with Donald Trump in Washington. Bolsonaro and his political allies had publicly advocated this designation for more than a year, portraying Lula’s opposition as evidence of the Workers’ Party’s (PT) alleged links to organized crime.
Colombian President Gustavo Petro also sharply criticized the U.S. actions, stating that his government “rejects any unilateral military action that could put civilians at risk.” Donald Trump, in turn, described Colombia as “as sick a country as Venezuela” and warned Petro that he could face the same fate as Maduro.
In January 2026, six countries — Brazil, Mexico, Spain, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay —issued a joint statement condemning the U.S. military operation in Venezuela and warning that unilateral military action constituted a dangerous precedent. They reaffirmed their commitment to preserving Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace founded on the principle of non-intervention.
By mid-2026, however, the regional landscape had shifted considerably. A broader rightward political shift resulted in changes of government in Chile and Colombia, where the new administrations adopted a policy of closer alignment with the United States. Consequently, of the five Latin American countries (excluding Spain) that had opposed the intervention, only Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay remained.
Argentina, Paraguay, and several other right-wing governments in the region maintained consistently pro-American positions. President Javier Milei’s administration welcomed the capture of Nicolás Maduro, describing it as “a decisive step forward.” Paraguayan President Santiago Peña likewise called Maduro’s downfall “good news.” Both governments had previously designated PCC and CV as terrorist organizations.
Conclusion
The decision to designate Latin American drug cartels as FTOs marked a turning point in U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere. Formally, the designation imposes financial and immigration-related sanctions. In practice, however, it has become a tool of securitization that enables the United States to justify an expanded military presence, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and direct interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.
A central element of this new strategy is the revival of the Monroe Doctrine in its most assertive form — the “Trump Corollary.” It returns the United States to a policy of unilateral military intervention, albeit through new legal mechanisms. By designating drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, Washington creates a legal framework for extraterritorial operations, while counterterrorism legislation serves as the legal justification for an expanded military presence. From the principle of “America for Americans” proclaimed in 1823, through the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, the doctrine has evolved into a concept in which unilateral military action is justified not only by military power but also by increasingly flexible legal arguments.
The operation in Venezuela provides a particularly striking example of this approach: the capture of a sitting president in violation of the UN Charter. Likewise, Donald Trump’s pardon of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who had been convicted of drug trafficking, demonstrates that the war on drugs can function as a selective instrument of political pressure rather than as a consistently applied principle.
For Russia, these developments create both risks and opportunities. The strengthening of the U.S. position in Latin America and the region’s broader rightward political shift threaten Russian interests and projects. At the same time, resistance from countries such as Mexico and Brazil, together with concerns over violations of international law in Venezuela, provides Moscow with an opportunity to criticize U.S. policy in international forums and present itself as a defender of a multipolar international order.
The future of Latin America will depend on the region’s ability to formulate a unified response to external interference. At present, however, such unity appears increasingly unlikely. The number of right-wing governments seeking closer cooperation with the United States continues to grow, while the number of governments willing to openly challenge Washington is steadily declining.
