Just weeks before the first round, foreign policy ceased to be a secondary issue in Brazil’s presidential campaign and became one of its main axes. What is decided on October 4 is not only who will govern Latin America’s largest economy, but also on what terms Brazil will negotiate with the United States, China, and the rest of the Global South.
An Election Being Fought on Several Boards at Once
On October 4, 2026, approximately 158 million Brazilians will go to the polls to elect the president, the entire Chamber of Deputies, two-thirds of the Senate, all 27 governors, and the state assemblies. If no presidential candidate receives more than 50% of the valid votes, a second round will be held on October 25. The deadline for registering candidacies closed on August 15, and the official campaign began the following day.
There are thirteen names on the ballot, but the real contest is between two. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 80, is seeking a fourth non-consecutive term with the Workers’ Party. Opposing him is Flávio Bolsonaro, senator for Rio de Janeiro and candidate for the Liberal Party, the eldest son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who has been barred from office and imprisoned since September 2025 after being convicted of plotting a coup following his defeat in the 2022 elections. Behind them, with single-digit voting intentions, are former Goiás governor Ronaldo Caiado, Minas Gerais governor Romeu Zema, and activist Renan Santos of the Missão Party.
Polls in recent weeks show an incumbent advantage that has been narrowing. The Datafolha poll of August 21 places Lula at 39% and Flávio Bolsonaro at 33% in the first round, with 47% versus 43% in a runoff simulation. The BTG Pactual/Nexus poll from mid-August puts them at 41% versus 36% in the first round and 47% versus 44% in the second, a difference that, given the margin of error, amounts to a statistical tie. The gap between them has narrowed steadily since June.
The two leading candidates skipped the first presidential debate and announced that they would participate in debates held after the first round. The most widespread interpretation in the Brazilian press is that neither wanted to expose their vulnerabilities: Lula faces disapproval levels that exceed approval levels in some polls, while Flávio carries both the condemnation of his father and legal episodes that directly affect him. In the absence of the frontrunners, it was Renan Santos — with around 3% voting intention — who capitalized on the television exposure.
But the distinctive feature of this electoral cycle is not in the numbers. It is that, for the first time in decades, relations with the United States have become a central axis of the campaign.
Figure 1: First-round result trends, according to polls. (Source: UOL)
Figure 2: Second-round result trends, according to polls. (Source: UOL)
A Campaign with Two Capitals
In July 2025, Donald Trump announced a 50% tariff on Brazilian products and, in the letter in which he communicated the measure, described the trial against Jair Bolsonaro as a “witch hunt.” In February 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a large portion of those tariffs, although a global 10% tariff remained in effect.
The U.S. administration then rebuilt the pressure through another channel. In mid-July 2026, it confirmed a 25% tariff under Section 301 of the Trade Act, citing unfair trade practices, and at the end of the same month added another 12.5% as part of an action concerning forced labor. The combined result is a 37.5% tariff. Brasília responded by activating the formal procedure provided for under the Economic Reciprocity Law (Law No. 15,122/2025) and notifying Washington of its request for diplomatic consultations.
In the meantime, the trade dispute became increasingly intertwined with the electoral contest. On July 20, the United States granted permanent residency to Eduardo Bolsonaro, who had been convicted in Brazil of attempting to persuade U.S. officials to sanction Justice Alexandre de Moraes. The following day, Flávio Bolsonaro raised doubts about the electronic voting system before foreign ambassadors, a gesture that several observers compared to the meeting his father held with diplomats in 2022, which contributed to his disqualification from office. At the end of July, Itamaraty (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) denied visas to two State Department officials who intended to travel to Brasília to meet with authorities, religious leaders, and Flávio Bolsonaro himself to discuss electoral integrity; Washington described the visit as routine, but Brasília interpreted it as interference. On July 29, the Trump administration renewed the national emergency concerning Brazil through Executive Order 14323.
The escalation reached its highest point on August 4, when the State Department revoked the visa of Brazilian Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti — the first such measure in more than two centuries of bilateral relations — presenting it as a reciprocal response to Brazil’s delay in approving the designated U.S. ambassador. Days earlier, Javier Milei had attended the Liberal Party convention in São Paulo, where he criticized Lula and Moraes, prompting Brazil to withdraw its ambassador from Buenos Aires. Almost simultaneously, Xi Jinping spoke with Lula and publicly supported Brazilian sovereignty in the face of external interference.
On August 21, an hour-and-twenty-minute phone call between Lula and Trump opened a path toward de-escalation. Both agreed that their technical teams would meet again “as soon as possible” to discuss trade, organized crime, and the war in Ukraine. Lula maintained that the U.S. arguments used to justify the tariffs were unfounded. Trump, for his part, agreed on the importance of preserving strong trade ties. The call did not eliminate any tariffs, but it shifted part of the discussion from political statements to the negotiating table.
All of this is taking place within an explicit doctrinal framework. The U.S. National Security Strategy published in late 2025, together with the National Defense Strategy of January 2026, identifies the Western Hemisphere as a priority strategic perimeter and sets out what the administration itself calls a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, aimed at preventing extra-hemispheric powers — China above all — from controlling assets considered vital. The capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces in early 2026 and the “Shield of the Americas” summit with a dozen right-wing leaders from the region gave this doctrine an operational expression. Brazil is not part of that circle.
Brazilian public opinion, meanwhile, moved in the opposite direction to that expected by Washington. A PoderData poll conducted in late July found that a majority of Brazilians preferred closer trade ties with China — now its main trading partner — and that 42% believed Trump’s support would harm a presidential candidate. Lula turned this perception into a campaign slogan: “Brazil belongs to Brazilians” (“O Brasil é dos brasileiros”).
The Starting Point: Active Non-Alignment
To understand what is really at stake, it is useful to recall where Brazil starts from. As analyzed here, Lula’s foreign policy during this term has been organized around what Latin American thinkers Carlos Fortin, Jorge Heine, and Carlos Ominami have called active non-alignment: not passive neutrality between blocs, but a strategy of maneuvering that consists of engaging with different powers for different objectives and refusing to allow an external actor to define the limits of the national strategy.
This doctrine rests on a concrete material foundation: Brazil’s dominance in niobium, some of the world’s largest rare-earth reserves, decisive weight in soybeans, coffee, beef, and sugar, oil and ethanol capacity, its own aerospace industry through Embraer, a trade architecture distributed across China, the European Union, the United States, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, and leadership within the BRICS. These assets — not rhetoric — explain why the tariff pressure of 2025 did not produce the result Washington expected.
The question raised by October 4 is whether this approach is a policy of the state or a policy of the government. In other words: whether it will survive a change in power.
Scenario I: Lula’s Reelection
From Brasília, a Lula victory would mean declared continuity. His program proposes deepening ties with the BRICS and G20, expanding Brazil’s presence in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, consolidating Mercosur as a platform for South American integration, and advancing infrastructure connecting Brazil with the Pacific and the Caribbean. On tariffs, the logic would be the one already practiced: negotiating without changing the course of its other relationships — its ties with China and its role in the BRICS —, keeping the Reciprocity Law active as an instrument of pressure, and seeking in the World Trade Organization and multilateral forums a counterweight to unilateralism.
The constraint, however, is fiscal rather than diplomatic. General government gross debt reached 81.9% of GDP in June — equivalent to 10.8 trillion reais —, the accumulated nominal deficit reached 9.99% of GDP, and the Selic rate remains at 14% annually, with inflation projected by the Focus report at around 5% for 2026, above the 3% target. The market clearly distinguishes between a reelection accompanied by a credible fiscal signal — limits on mandatory spending, a review of tax benefits, and a verifiable path toward primary surpluses — and a reelection without consolidation, which would prolong the upward trajectory of debt. In addition, a fragmented Congress, in which conservative forces retain veto power, constrains both paths.
From Washington’s perspective, meanwhile, a second Lula administration would prolong the friction, although not necessarily at the current level. The 37.5% tariffs are, for the White House, a negotiating instrument whose maintenance carries domestic costs: Brazil is a significant supplier of coffee and beef to the U.S. market, and pressure on Brazilian exports is passed through to consumer prices in the United States. The August 21 call suggests that this calculation is already operating. At the same time, a Brazil that continues to lead the BRICS and deepen its relationship with Beijing comes into direct conflict with the stated objective of the National Security Strategy to reduce China’s presence in the hemisphere.
Finally, from the Global South, for countries observing from outside the transatlantic axis, a Lula reelection means that Latin America’s largest economy maintains its role as a hinge: within the BRICS, within the G20, within discussions on financing in local currencies, the New Development Bank, and the gradual reduction of dependence on the dollar. None of this amounts to a break with the international financial system — Brazil’s position has consistently been cautious — but it does preserve a negotiating space that other middle powers make use of.
Scenario II: Flávio Bolsonaro’s Victory
From Brasília. The Liberal Party candidate’s platform emphasizes trade openness, Brazil’s integration into global value chains, and the restoration of relationships that, according to his diagnosis, deteriorated under the current administration. The document states that ties with Argentina, the United States, and Israel were pushed to the brink of rupture and that this situation must be reversed. It also proposes resuming Brazil’s accession process to the OECD and attracting foreign investment to sectors such as the energy transition.
It is useful to read this platform carefully, because it does not propose what is often attributed to it. It does not propose abandoning the BRICS or breaking with China; instead, it proposes “negotiating with all those who are of interest to Brazil,” explicitly mentioning China, the European Union, the United States, and Asian markets, while emphasizing the need to avoid excessive dependence in strategic areas such as technology. The real difference between the two projects does not lie in whether Brazil maintains economic relations with the major powers, but in the strategic framework through which it conducts them.
Domestically, Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign has been organized around security. At his first rally, in Copacabana, he proposed designating the First Capital Command and the Red Command as terrorist organizations. On fiscal policy, he has proposed linking real expenditure growth to the level of indebtedness and reviewing tax exemptions.
From Washington’s perspective, this is the scenario that would most rapidly de-escalate the bilateral relationship. It is reasonable to expect a review or suspension of the Section 301 tariffs, the closure of the case opened under Executive Order 14323, and the normalization of the exchange of ambassadors. Convergence would be particularly visible in security: the designation of Brazilian criminal factions as terrorist organizations is a demand that Flávio Bolsonaro personally brought to the White House in May 2026 and that fits within the “Trump Corollary” framework on counternarcotics.
That alignment, however, has material limits. China has been Brazil’s main trading partner since 2009, and the volume of that trade comfortably exceeds trade with the United States; the agribusiness sector, which constitutes a large part of the Bolsonaro camp’s electoral base, is precisely the sector most exposed to Chinese demand. A government that attempted to abruptly redirect that architecture would incur an economic cost that would be difficult to sustain. Moreover, a campaign promise is not equivalent to an approved reform: implementation capacity will depend on the elected Congress, the economic team, and the transition.
From the Global South perspective, meanwhile, a Flávio Bolsonaro victory would complete a regional map that has already shifted: José Antonio Kast won Chile’s runoff in December 2025, Abelardo de la Espriella prevailed in Colombia in June 2026 by an extremely narrow margin, and Milei, Noboa, and Bukele were already part of the picture. The effect on the BRICS would not necessarily be a formal withdrawal, but rather less ambitious participation: without Brazil’s momentum, initiatives for financing in local currencies and reforming global governance would lose one of their main promoters. For countries that view active non-alignment as a replicable model, the Brazilian result will serve as a test of its durability.
Scenario III: A Narrow Result and Institutional Risk
There is a third scenario that does not depend on who wins, but on how the victory is achieved. The markets have already identified it: a very close second round, legal challenges, or a lack of clarity regarding the governing coalition would create an environment of maximum uncertainty, with effects appearing not only in the exchange rate but also in implied volatility, dollar futures, and long-term interest rates.
The precedents are on the table. Flávio Bolsonaro raised objections to the electronic voting system before foreign ambassadors, and several parties considered legal action over the matter. On August 13, two days before the registration deadline closed, the senator’s candidacy was temporarily blocked because the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) system showed him as affiliated with the Missão Party rather than the Liberal Party. The TSE clarified that there had been no cyberattack, but rather misuse of credentials by someone authorized to register affiliations with that party, and ordered an investigation to be opened. It also temporarily suspended the processing of new affiliations after detecting an attempted — though unsuccessful — alteration of Lula’s affiliation as well. The candidacy was registered without further obstacles, but the episode established a language of fraud before a single vote had been cast.
Added to this is the situation in Rio de Janeiro, the political cradle of the Bolsonaro family, where the clan’s allied governor was declared ineligible, his institutional successor has been imprisoned since December 2025, and the state was left temporarily in the hands of the president of the state Court of Justice. In São Paulo — the country’s largest electoral college, with 34 million voters — Tarcísio de Freitas starts with a wide lead over Fernando Haddad, which would give the center-right control of the country’s most important state regardless of who wins the presidency.
In this scenario, the external variable ceases to be a contextual factor and becomes an actor. A disputed result in which Washington took sides — or simply appeared to do so — would turn a Brazilian electoral crisis into a bilateral crisis. The events of July and August suggest that this possibility is not remote, and also that it provokes reactions within the United States: on July 28, Democratic senators on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accused the administration of promoting conspiracy theories about Brazil’s electoral process.
What Will Survive After October 25
- Tariffs: whoever wins will inherit an open negotiation, not a blank slate. The difference will lie in the political price of the agreement: a Lula government would negotiate from the standpoint of reciprocity and multilateral dispute; a Flávio Bolsonaro government, from the standpoint of convergence. In both cases, the structure of Brazilian trade — a projected trade surplus of around $78 billion for 2026 and foreign direct investment inflows of a similar magnitude — limits how much tariff pressure can actually extract.
- BRICS. Here the difference between the scenarios is clearer. Brazilian leadership within the bloc is a political decision, not a structural necessity, and can be reversed. What cannot be reversed as easily is China’s centrality to Brazilian trade.
- Amazon. This is the area where the electoral result has the most direct and least reversible consequences. Conservation depends on domestic regulation, enforcement capacity, and the demarcation of Indigenous territories, not on trade agreements. It should be noted that tensions also exist within the current government: Brazil advocated the gradual abandonment of fossil fuels during COP30, held in Pará, while at the same time promoting new oil investments. In Congress, initiatives to restrict satellite tools for monitoring deforestation are advancing.
- Security cooperation. This is the most likely area of convergence and also the most sensitive. During the August 21 call, Lula reaffirmed Brazil’s interest in cooperating with the United States against organized crime, while clarifying that Brazil has its own instruments. The distance between “cooperating” and “accepting designations and operations defined in Washington” is precisely the distance separating the two projects in dispute.
What Is Really Being Voted On
Brazil enters October 4 with bargaining power that does not depend on who occupies the Planalto. Niobium, rare earths, agriculture, energy, Embraer, and a genuinely multipolar trade architecture will still be there on October 26. What is decided at the polls is not whether Brazil has room for maneuver, but how it uses it: whether it employs that room to expand simultaneous options or turns it into the currency of a preferred alignment.
That is also why the entire region is watching. At a time when Washington has explicitly declared its intention to restore hemispheric preeminence, and when much of Latin America has already chosen, the Brazilian election serves as the last continental-scale test of whether a middle power can sustain autonomy in the face of a great power that has decided not to tolerate it.
Most likely, the answer will come in two rounds. However, the effects are expected to last considerably longer.
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