Shifting balance and the response of regional actors
In Northeast Asia, where attention has somewhat waned amid dramatic events elsewhere, the geopolitical game continues to unfold. A new, powerful move was Xi Jinping’s first visit to North Korea since the pandemic. It followed immediately after the Chinese leader’s reception in Beijing for Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, allowing Xi to exploit the new positions of the leaders of the major powers. It should be remembered that North Korea is Beijing’s only official ally, which, according to a 1961 treaty, is obligated to provide assistance with all available means in the event of aggression. Did this visit demonstrate that Beijing does not intend to leave Pyongyang in Russia’s orbit and seeks to secure a key role in shaping the security architecture of Northeast Asia? This, at least, is the interpretation of many Western and South Korean analysts. The results of the visit allow us to conclude that Beijing confirmed its role as the “first violin” in the Korean suite, but this does not mean that it was trying to “push aside” Russia or increase pressure on the DPRK.
In fact, the two sides have sent a strong signal of shared positions on key global political issues. The current geopolitical conflict has clearly demonstrated that North Korea is no longer an insignificant peripheral player in the interactions between great powers. Pyongyang has become a powerful player, for whose influence and attention major capitals must now compete. The United States is unable to secure Kim Jong-un’s agreement to dialogue, Kim Jong-un is demonstratively ignoring the Republic of Korea, Southeast Asian countries are interested in Pyongyang’s position, and Europe is considering how to build bridges with North Korea.
In recent years, Kim Jong-un has significantly strengthened his position both domestically and internationally. Following the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in February 2026, he has positioned himself in the DPRK not simply as the heir to the state’s founder and his successor — he has finally emerged from the shadow of his ancestors. Today, he is an independent figure, a leading theorist and practitioner, who has managed to overcome a severe economic crisis and is capable of communicating on equal terms with recognized world leaders. First, he has proposed a new course of social development (“people first,” in contrast to his father’s “military first” and his grandfather’s “Juche”). Second, the North Korean leader has redefined the DPRK’s international status — not as a “temporary project” aimed at Korean unification, which was deemed impossible in 2023, but as an “eternal,” responsible state with nuclear parity with the world’s major powers.
Xi’s visit can be seen as an acknowledgement of this reality. Accordingly, the security architecture in Northeast Asia will be built not around the already-recognized unrealistic denuclearization and prospect of Korean unification, but by finding a military-political balance between the China-Russia-DPRK trio on the one hand, and the US-Japan-ROK bloc on the other. The main result of the visit is that the DPRK has effectively been cemented as a recognized element of the new balance of power in Northeast Asia. Previously, during UN discussions and even during votes on sanctions resolutions, Beijing and Moscow tacitly acknowledged Pyongyang as a problem for global security, primarily strategic stability. Today, China, following Russia, is demonstrating a willingness to include the DPRK in the emerging system of regional strategic balance alongside Russia, the US, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
This is extremely bad news for the Republic of Korea and Japan. Their geopolitical influence in the region and ability to achieve their own goals are weakening. Seoul will have to remove the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization from its agenda if it is ever to resume dialogue with the North. Now, Pyongyang’s consent to contacts will have to be earned, and the main condition for any conversation will be Seoul’s official renunciation of the idea of Korean unification (i.e., the absorption of the DPRK), which is currently enshrined in the South Korean constitution. No external powers — including European ones, whose favor the South Korean president unsuccessfully tried to win over in June 2026 on the basis of anti-Russian sentiment — will help here. Increasing bilateral cooperation with Washington and strengthening the trilateral US-Japan-South Korea bloc are also unlikely to make North Korea and its allies more accommodating.
Similarly, for Japan, the most likely response will be another round of militarization and increased cooperation with the United States on missile defense and missile warning systems. However, these steps are unlikely to enhance Tokyo’s real security or reduce hostility in its relations with China.
Rachel Minyoung Lee, writing on the renowned website 38 North, notes that before the visit, North Korea deliberately sent a double message to Beijing. On the one hand, Pyongyang supported China’s position on Taiwan and Japan, but on the other, it publicly and firmly declared the irreversibility of its nuclear status. In essence, North Korea preemptively outlined its own “red lines” for China, demonstrating that it no longer acts as a junior partner asking for help, but is attempting to impose its own agenda.
A New Era of Cooperation
During their talks, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un proclaimed the dawn of a new stage in Chinese-North Korean cooperation. The Chinese leader emphasized that the friendship between Beijing and Pyongyang remains unchanged regardless of the international situation and reaffirmed China’s readiness to continue supporting North Korea’s socialist course. For Pyongyang, this is a significant achievement, especially given its simultaneous alliance with Russia, regarding which Beijing, according to private exchanges with Chinese experts, no longer displays the concerns it had in 2024–2025.
Pyongyang’s main diplomatic triumph was Beijing’s de facto tacit recognition of its nuclear status. The official communiqués of both sides following the talks completely omitted the words “nuclear program” and the term “denuclearization,” a taboo term for North Korea, even though China had previously consistently included them in its statements.
Nothing was said about the prospects for any negotiations between North Korea and the United States or the Republic of Korea, despite the fact that in May 2026, during the Beijing summit, Donald Trump raised the topic of denuclearization and explicitly asked Xi Jinping to act as a mediator to initiate direct dialogue with the DPRK. At the same time, official Seoul persistently urged the Chinese side at all levels to help establish contacts with the North. Before the Chinese leader’s visit, Kim Jong-un demonstratively visited key facilities of the country’s nuclear missile complex, emphasizing the power of its nuclear potential. Thus, Beijing tacitly followed Russia, which declared back in late 2023 that North Korea’s denuclearization was no longer on the agenda.
In response, North Korea reiterated its support for China’s position on Taiwan and the “one China” principle. This rhetoric itself is nothing new, so it’s unclear how valuable such support is to Beijing. However, in the context of the military assistance North Korea provided to Russia in operations against Ukrainian aggressors in the Kursk region, such assurances, when applied to a hypothetical conflict over Taiwan, could be quite significant. For South Korea, this is a serious concern should Washington demand direct involvement in a potential Taiwan crisis.
Xi Jinping’s visit is, of course, also significant for Chinese-North Korean relations. After a period of cooling in the early 2020s, the summit became a clear demonstration of the restoration and strengthening of practical cooperation. This process was launched back in September 2025, when Kim Jong-un visited Beijing to participate in celebrations marking the end of World War II. The photographs of the “troika” of leaders of China, North Korea, and Russia that emerged at the time became a visual symbol of strengthening trilateral understanding, giving rise to speculation among Western observers about the formation of an “aggressive triangle”.
In the economic sphere, China has predictably cemented its status as North Korea’s main partner. A comparison of information statements published in the two countries reveals that Beijing is clearly interested in expanding practical cooperation in logistics, tourism, and construction infrastructure, while Pyongyang is hesitant to commit to any specific commitments, particularly those related to a greater “opening” of the country and access for foreigners. No major financial packages or specific investment projects have been announced yet, although this does not mean that this topic has not been discussed behind closed doors. Specifically, China is interested in implementing a trilateral project at the mouth of the Tumen River to gain direct access to the Sea of Japan. Beijing is actively promoting this issue in its high-level bilateral contacts with Moscow, but North Korea’s conservative position has, until recently, remained the main obstacle to the practical implementation of these plans.
Russia’s interests?
For Moscow, North Korea’s intensified cooperation with its largest economic partner presents both challenges and opportunities. There is no real competition between Russia and China on the Korean front: China’s previous latent concerns regarding burgeoning Russian-Korean military cooperation have long since been allayed. This is symbolized by regular summits between the three countries’ leaders in Beijing, as well as the ongoing mechanism of official Russian-Chinese consultations on Korean issues. This involves regular coordination of the three countries’ policies, which is critically important both for regional security and for jointly countering international sanctions pressure.
At the same time, Moscow and Beijing possess different comparative advantages. China is stronger in trade, investment, industrial cooperation, and ensuring the ongoing stability of the North Korean economy. Russia has advantages in energy, transportation, military technology, natural resource development, and North Korea’s integration into Eurasian logistics projects. Even after the end of the Second World War and the reduced need for Korean military capabilities, these interests will remain unchanged. They will be reinforced by mutual alliance commitments and most-favored-nation status in the relationship.
Thus, the three bordering states can discuss coordinating infrastructure projects: developing transport corridors, integrating railway networks, and creating a unified energy “ring” linking the Russian Far East, Northeast China, and the DPRK. Our slogan is not to compete with Beijing for Pyongyang, but to jointly participate in shaping a new regional order while maintaining our own strategic presence on the Korean Peninsula.
