The trajectories of US–Israeli aggression against Iran, and the prospective outcomes of the war, remain characterized by a high degree of ambiguity and “uncertainty.” On balance, available indicators point away from a rapid resolution and instead suggest a shift toward a protracted war of attrition. Nonetheless, the underlying US strategic objectives, together with the political disposition of Donald Trump, are likely to play a decisive role in either shortening or prolonging the conflict. Equally, the cohesion of Iran’s regime, its resilience and its capacity to sustain the war with efficiency, effectiveness and strategic impact will be critical in shaping its overall trajectory.

Factors Likely to Prolong the War:

1. The ability of Israel and the US to achieve their strategic objectives, primarily undermining Iran’s nuclear program, imposing their terms, and curbing Iran’s regional influence and support for the axis of resistance.
Conversely, Iran is unlikely to end the war unless it can effectively deter its adversaries, preserve its regime, and secure guarantees against future attacks.
The significant gap between these objectives makes a prolonged war more probable.
2. The “achievement of deterrence” serves as a central benchmark for all parties. Any perceived failure or weakness may be interpreted as a loss of credibility… encouraging the continuation of hostilities to preserve their “image,” unless mutually acceptable, face-saving exit options are available.
3. Domestic dynamics in Israel, the US and Iran, including the use of the war to strengthen political “legitimacy” or deflect attention from internal crises, may prolong the war, unless rising popular pressure forces a halt as the costs of war begin to outweigh anticipated gains.
4. The risk of regional or global escalation, whether direct or indirect, further increases the likelihood of a protracted war. Involvement by affected or opportunistic actors, including Gulf states, China, Russia and European countries, whether to contain Iran, exhaust US and Israeli resources, secure the Strait of Hormuz, or safeguard the flow of oil, gas and goods…. could push the conflict beyond control, effectively extending its duration.
5. Iran conditions the war’s outcome on the Lebanese track, including the incorporation of Hezbollah into any future arrangements. This is intended to ensure the preservation of its arsenal, the return of displaced persons, and an end to Israeli violations of Lebanese territory and airspace. By contrast, the US and Israel insist on disarming the group and making Israeli security guarantees and standards the foundation of any future settlement with Lebanon. This fundamental divergence is likely to prolong the conflict until a mutually acceptable formula is reached.

Factors Likely to Shorten the War:

1. The rising human, economic and military costs of the war, particularly for Israel and the US.
2. The continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with its severe repercussions for the global economy, especially oil and gas supplies, alongside the inability of the US and its allies to secure control over the passage.
3. The exposure of vulnerabilities in Israel’s Iron Dome, coupled with the declining effectiveness of interceptor missiles and US defense systems in the region, may enhance Iran’s capacity to exert pressure and compel both Israel and the US to lower their demands.
4. Intensifying international pressure to halt the war, particularly from China, Russia, the European Union and BRICS.
5. The reestablishment of deterrence equilibrium, whereby both sides recognize the limits of achieving decisive victory or imposing their terms.
6. Iran’s insistence on maintaining its nuclear program, coupled with an accelerated approach to the “nuclear threshold,” could impose new strategic realities that compel the parties to reassess and potentially shorten the war.
7. The US stepping back from the true objectives of the war, abandoning the pursuit of regime change and adopting a more pragmatic stance toward Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, could help shorten the conflict. This may also involve distancing itself from Israel regarding the continuation of hostilities or reducing its role as a vehicle for advancing Israeli war aims.
8. The cohesion of Iran’s regime, its resilience and its capacity to carry out precise, high-impact strikes against US and Israeli forces, coupled with its openness to regional agreements, particularly with Gulf states, that aim to safeguard regional security, maintain stability, and protect the region’s strategic resources and interests.
9. The increasing desire among regional actors, especially Gulf states, to end the war, reach accommodations with Iran within a broader Arab–Islamic framework, and press the US to cease hostilities and stop using their territories and airspace for military operations.

Potential Trajectories:

Regime change in Iran appears neither realistic nor feasible in the foreseeable future. Despite US and Israeli propaganda and the repeated clichés about achieving major victories, a pragmatic assessment suggests that Iran remains capable of maintaining internal cohesion, organizing its affairs, and sustaining military effectiveness. The regime continues to command broad popular support, driven both by ideological and religious loyalty and by Persian-Iranian nationalism, which is heightened by external aggression. This enables the population to set aside internal divisions when facing the larger confrontation with the US and Israel, a pattern confirmed by historical experience. Moreover, Iran’s vast territory (1,648,000 km², more than 4,530 times the size of the Gaza Strip) combined with the difficulty of enforcing a blockade, highlights the extreme challenge of subduing the regime.

Consequently, because neither Israel nor the US is willing to accept defeat or overt humiliation, particularly given Benjamin Netanyahu and his government’s nationalist and ideologically extreme stance, the war is likely to be prolonged unless credible exit options are offered.

The factors outlined above will shape the duration of the war, yet the overall assessment continues to favor a prolonged war of attrition or a shift toward a cold regional conflict, with persistent tensions and the “edge of explosion” remaining intact.

While certain developments could potentially hasten the war’s end, they may simultaneously produce adverse effects or further complicate the situation, for example, the US and Israel employing more destructive measures, such as tactical nuclear weapons, or Iran formally joining the “nuclear club.”

Furthermore, the unpredictable nature of Donald Trump, including his narcissistic tendencies, deal-making inclination, and the pressures of the upcoming midterm elections, will shape US objectives. These could range from efforts to weaken Iran’s nuclear, missile and regional capabilities to attempts at decisively resolving the conflict. Nonetheless, available indicators point to a greater likelihood of pursuing “realistic,” negotiable objectives, reflecting a practical acknowledgment of the improbability of regime change. If Iran demonstrates strong military performance in the coming weeks, it will likely further encourage a pragmatic and measured US approach toward Iran.