Abstract
This paper examines Russia’s geopolitical identity and strategic orientations in Eurasian geopolitics, focusing on the contrasting perspectives of Aleksandr Dugin and Sergey Karaganov. It begins by contextualising Russia’s dual European and Asian identity, highlighting its demographic, cultural, and historical ties to Europe alongside its vast Asian territory and Eurasian heritage.
The analysis then explores Dugin’s radical neo-Eurasianism, advocating for Russia as a Eurasian empire destined to lead a multipolar world opposing Western liberalism, emphasising a confrontational approach toward Europe and NATO. In contrast, Karaganov adopts a pragmatic realist stance, promoting Russia’s civilizational sovereignty and a strategic pivot eastward toward Asia, advocating de – Westernisation and multipolarity while prioritising nuclear deterrence.
The paper situates these intellectual currents within contemporary geopolitical developments, including Western security concerns about Russian aggression in Europe, and underscores their influence on Kremlin policymaking. Ultimately, the study highlights the divergent pathways Russia may pursue between continued European engagement and Asian reorientation.
Key Words: Russia, Eurasianism, Geopolitics, Europe, Security Strategy
Introduction
Since the beginning of the ongoing war in Ukraine, legacy media in the West abound with all sorts of experts and even political leaders claiming that Russia is not going to stop with Ukraine in terms of its “offensive and imperial acts”. The most recent explicit warning of this kind, as of February 20, 2026, came on February 19 from Major General Wolf-Jürgen Stahl, president of Germany’s Federal Academy for Security Policy (a senior German security and military policy figure).[1] Speaking at an event hosted by the German-British Society, Stahl stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is “on a mission against the West” and warned: “When I see how Putin has acted up to now, and the way that he is in my assessment on a mission against the West, then there is no question of whether he will use military means. If he gets the opportunity, he will use them.” He added that if Putin seizes such an opportunity, Europe will suffer “things we cannot even imagine right now,” in the context of Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare (including cyberattacks already targeting Germany and Europe), potentially escalating to direct military action, such as occupying NATO territory. He expressed concern about how European leaders would respond to a Russian incursion and stressed the need to strengthen the EU, NATO, and domestic resilience to deter it.[2]
This is the freshest, high-profile public statement from a Western European security official, directly asserting Putin’s intent and willingness to attack if the opportunity arises. It aligns with Germany’s broader pattern of vocal warnings (e.g., former Defence Minister Boris Pistorius in late 2025), but stands out for its timing and stark language about “unimaginable” consequences.
European leaders and officials have issued similar alerts repeatedly since late 2025, often framing the threat as possible within 3 – 5 years rather than immediate, and tying it to Russia’s reconstitution of forces post-Ukraine. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer (mid-February 2026) warned that Russia “could” or “will” be positioned to attack NATO/Europe by 2030 if defence spending lags, calling Europe a “sleeping giant” that must rearm.[3]
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte (Dutch) and others at the Munich Security Conference (around February 14, 2026) and in December 2025 repeatedly said Russia could attack a NATO country within five years and urged preparation for large-scale war. [4] Earlier 2025 statements from German, Polish, Danish, and Baltic leaders echoed timelines of 2028–2030 for potential Russian readiness.
The remarks of Stahl of February 19 are the latest and among the most dire in phrasing (“will use military means” if opportunity arises, “things we cannot even imagine”). These warnings allegedly reflect intelligence assessments of Russian hybrid aggression and military rebuilding, not an imminent invasion forecast for 2026.
Source: Grok. Prompt: Prepare a list of European political leaders who, in the last 2 years, claimed that, after Ukraine, Russia will attack other European countries.
Russia: European or Asian?
The two-headed eagle first emerged as a state symbol in Russia, then known as Moscovia, during the 15th century. This emblem was introduced from Byzantium by Sophia Paleolog, a member of the last Byzantine imperial dynasty, who became the wife of Ivan III, the Grand Duke of Moscow. The two-headed eagle served as the emblem of the Russian Monarchy and the Russian State for over four centuries, until the October Revolution of 1917. It was reinstated as a state symbol in 1993, following an order by President Boris Yeltsin on November 30, 1993.
Various interpretations of this symbol exist. The most prevalent interpretation suggests that the two heads of the eagle represent Russia’s dual composition, encompassing both European and Asian territories, which are of equal significance to the nation.[5]
– What makes Russia European?
Source: https://eurasiangeopolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/russian-physical-map.gif
The question of Russia’s European identity has been a subject of scholarly debate for centuries, encompassing geographical, historical, cultural, and political dimensions. Admittedly, Russia’s relationship with Europe represents one of the most enduring questions in international relations and identity studies. As Catherine II declared in 1767, “Russia is a European State,” making a political and cultural statement that continues to resonate in contemporary scholarship.
Russia is the world’s largest transcontinental state, spanning Europe and Asia across the Ural Mountains. Yet it is widely regarded as a European country due to its demographic core, historical identity, cultural heritage, and longstanding political engagement with the continent.
Geographically, European Russia (west of the Ural Mountains) covers approximately 3.97 million km² — about 23% of Russia’s total territory but 40% of Europe’s landmass — and hosts roughly 80% of the population, or nearly 110 million people out of Russia’s total of around 143 million. The capital, Moscow; the cultural heartland, St. Petersburg; and most major cities and economic centres lie firmly in this European portion, making Russia Europe’s most populous and largest country by area when considering only its European territory.[6] Russia’s central and most representative territories lie within Europe. The Ural Mountains, established in the 1730s as the conventional boundary between European and Asiatic Russia, place Russia’s political, economic, and cultural heartland firmly within European territory. Despite Russia’s expansion eastward to the Pacific, its demographic and administrative centre has remained in the European portion, reinforcing its geographical claim to European status.[7]
Historically, Russia’s European roots run deep – Kievan Rus (the first East Slavic state and later an amalgam of principalities from the 9th to the 13th centuries) formed part of medieval Christian Europe, while Peter the Great’s 18th-century reforms deliberately “Europeanised” the state by adopting Western institutions, technology, and even relocating the capital to the Baltic. Empress Catherine the Great explicitly declared in her 1767 Nakaz (order) that “Russia is a European state.” Russia has since played central roles in European events—from the Napoleonic Wars and Congress of Vienna to the World Wars and Cold War balance of power.[8]
Culturally, Russia belongs unequivocally to the European tradition. Its literature (Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Pushkin), classical music (Tchaikovsky, Rachmaninoff), ballet, and Orthodox Christianity align with the broader European canon. Russian is an Indo-European language, and ethnic Russians form a Slavic people with shared linguistic and religious ties to Eastern Europe. The cultural values expressed in Russian writings were closer to “Europe” than often acknowledged, though identity debates centered on defining Russia in opposition to Western European culture while leading a separate “Slavic” cultural sphere.[9]
Politically, Russia was a member of the Council of Europe from 28 February 1996 until its expulsion on 16 March 2022 and remains active in the OSCE, underscoring institutional links. Despite its vast Asian territories and periodic “Eurasian” rhetoric, Russia’s demographic, historical, and cultural centre of gravity has consistently placed it within the European sphere.[10]
– What makes Russia Asian?
Russia’s Asian dimension is not peripheral but foundational, rooted in geography, history, political culture, and civilizational self-understanding. Scholars consistently highlight these elements as making Russia an authentically Asian power alongside its European facets.[11]
Geographically, three-quarters of Russia’s territory lies in Asia, encompassing Siberia and the Far East — vast spaces populated by Asian peoples since ancient times. This territorial reality alone positions Russia as a major Asian actor by landmass and resources, integrating regions long inhabited by diverse Asian ethnic groups.[12]
Historically, Russia’s Asian character was forged through centuries of expansion, conquest, and colonisation of Asian-inhabited frontiers, from the Volga region to Siberia and Central Asia. The Mongol invasion (13th century) proved decisive: Russia absorbed key features of the Mongol Empire in its expansionist drive, military worldview, and state structure. As one analysis notes, “Russia was the natural heir of the Mongolian Empire of Genghis Khan and remained its ulus (province) in territory, in aim (expansion), in military world-view and in the nature of its statehood.” Russia emerged from “Mongolian captivity” having “digested and absorbed too many Asian features” it has never fully shed.[13]
Culturally and politically, an “Asian imprint” permeates Russian mentality and governance. Personalities matter more than institutions; unwritten tradition outweighs written law; collectivist and authoritarian values prevail over liberal ones; and power is often treated as sacred and absolute rather than instrumental.[14] The Russian saying “Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar” and Dostoevsky’s admission “I am as much a Tartar as I am a Russian” capture this hybrid psyche. Russia’s multi-national empire by 1914 further embedded Asian elements through the incorporation of Muslim and Buddhist populations of Asian origin.[15]
Intellectually, Eurasianism has long justified Russia’s Asian role, portraying it not as a mistaken European country but as a unique civilizational synthesis with strong Eastern roots — spirituality, state cohesion, and a bridge between continents. Neo-Eurasian thought continues to emphasise “Asianness” in opposition to pure Western models, advocating state-led stability inspired by Asian examples.[16]
The subsequent section of this paper will analyse two paradigmatic approaches to Russian foreign and security policy towards Europe, articulated by Aleksandr Dugin and Sergey Karaganov. Both individuals are relatively well-known for their writings. Their works are widely read, rendering them not only representative but also influential in shaping Kremlin policymaking circles.
Alexander Dugin: radical traditionalist and neo-Eurasianist strategist.
Alexander Gelyevich Dugin (b. 1962) is a Russian philosopher, political theorist, and activist whose neo-Eurasianist thought has allegedly profoundly shaped post-Soviet nationalist discourse. In the late Soviet and early post-Soviet eras, he moved through ultra-nationalist circles (Pamiat’), co-founded the National Bolshevik Party with Eduard Limonov (1993–1998), and established the Arctogaia publishing house and Eurasian Movement (2001, later International Eurasian Movement). He served as professor and head of the Department of Sociology of International Relations at Moscow State University (2008–2014) and remains a prolific author of over 60 books, media commentator, and advisor influencing elite and military circles.[17]
According to Western authors, Dugin’s life position embodies radical traditionalism, anti-liberalism, and eschatological geopolitics. He positions himself as a Heideggerian thinker rejecting modernity’s individualism, secularism, and universalism in favour of Dasein rooted in ethnos, tradition, and civilizational sovereignty. Influenced by Guénon, Evola, Schmitt, and interwar Eurasianists (Savitsky, Trubetskoi), he advocates “montage fascism” — a synthesis of fascist aesthetics, conservative revolution, and Eurasian holism — without endorsing Nazism’s racial biologism outright.[18]
His worldview is Manichean: tellurocratic (land-based, authoritarian, spiritual) civilizations versus thalassocratic (sea-based, liberal, materialist) Atlanticism led by the United States and Britain. Russia, for Dugin, is the eternal Heartland, bearer of a sacred imperial mission against global homogenization.[19]
His most important books articulate this vision. “Foundations of Geopolitics” (1997) is his seminal geopolitical manifesto, used as a textbook in Russian military academies. It calls for Russia to rebuild a “Eurasian Empire” from Dublin to Vladivostok through alliances, annexations, and subversion of Atlanticist influence, emphasising a Moscow-Berlin axis and the principle of a “common enemy” (U.S.). Dugin argues ethnic Russians must hold a privileged status in a supranational state, with Ukraine’s sovereignty deemed “a monstrous blow” to Russian security.[20]
The Fourth Political Theory (2012) transcends liberalism (first), communism (second), and fascism (third) by centering the people (narod) and Dasein (existence) over the individual or class. It rejects modernity’s progress narrative, advocating ethnocentrism, multipolarity, and a return to tradition as liberation: “Freedom is the greatest value… going beyond the limits of the individual”.[21] Complementary works include Eurasian Mission (2014), which outlines neo-Eurasianism’s global revolutionary alliance, and The Theory of a Multipolar World (2021), which envisions large civilizational blocs replacing liberal unipolarity.
Regarding Russia and Europe, Dugin sees Russia as Eurasia’s civilizational core — an organic synthesis of Slavic, Turkic, and Orthodox elements — destined to lead a continental bloc against Western decadence. Europe, in his view, is artificially divided: a potential tellurocratic partner (via Germany) if freed from Atlanticist/NATO control, but currently a liberal outpost promoting individualism and globalisation. He advocates the “Finlandization” of Europe, the dismantling of the EU’s Atlanticist orientation, and the integration of Orthodox and Central European spaces into Russia’s sphere, while rejecting liberal universalism. Russia’s mission is eschatological: defending multipolar traditionalism against the “end of history” imposed by the West.
Consequently, Dugin’s ideas blend scholarly depth with radical activism, influencing Russian strategic thinking even as he operates from the “radical center.” His thought endures as a coherent anti-Western alternative, framing Russia not as European but as Eurasian redeemer.
Sergey Karaganov: pragmatic great-power realist and civilizational sovereigntist
Sergey Alexandrovich Karaganov (b. 1952) is one of Russia’s most influential political scientists, foreign-policy strategists, and long-time Kremlin advisors. Born in Moscow on 12 September 1952, he graduated from Moscow State University’s Department of Economics in 1974, defended a Candidate of Sciences dissertation (1979) on transnational corporations in U.S. foreign policy, and a Doctor of Sciences (1989) on Western Europe’s role in U.S. strategy toward the USSR. His career began at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies (1978–1988), followed by his service as Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe RAS (1989–2010). Since 2006, he has served as Academic Supervisor (formerly Dean) of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the Higher School of Economics (HSE). He advised the Presidential Administration on foreign policy (2001–2013), co-founded the Valdai Discussion Club (2004–2013), and is Honorary Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy. Author or editor of 28 books/brochures and over 500 articles, Karaganov ranks among the world’s top foreign-policy intellectuals.[22]
Karaganov’s life position is that of a pragmatic great-power realist and civilizational sovereignist. He rejects Western liberal universalism as decadent and hegemonic, advocating multipolarity, strategic autonomy for the “World Majority,” and Russia’s role as an independent North-Eurasian/Siberian civilisation-state. Influenced by classical realism and Soviet strategic culture, he promotes “leadership democracy” with autocratic features, a state-sponsored “living idea-dream” emphasising sobornost (conciliarity), traditional values, and resistance to consumerism.
Nuclear weapons are sacred instruments of deterrence and, if necessary, compellence to restore fear and break adversarial will. He calls for ideological consolidation, Siberization (shifting Russia’s demographic and economic gravity eastward), and active nuclear posture to defend sovereignty amid the decline of the West.[23]
His most important works crystallize these ideas. Early co-edited volumes such as “Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World” (1990s) addressed post-Soviet security. The seminal journal article “The new Cold War and the emerging Greater Eurasia” (2018) framed the return of great-power rivalry and Russia’s pivot to a continental bloc.[24] The provocative “A difficult but necessary decision” (2023) argued that Russia must lower its nuclear threshold and consider limited strikes to sober the West, break its will in Ukraine, and save humanity from global catastrophe. The co-authored monograph “From Restraining to Deterring: Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Coalition Strategy” (2024, with Trenin and Avakyants) systematizes the shift from defensive restraint to offensive intimidation.
Recent programmatic pieces — “Europe: A Bitter Parting” (2025), “Middlegame and a Strategy for the Day after Tomorrow,” and reports on “Turn to the East 2.0/Siberization of Russia” and “Russia’s Living Idea-Dream” (2025) — outline civilizational reorientation and state ideology.[25]
On Russia and Europe, Karaganov views Russia as a self-sufficient civilisation whose 300-year European “journey” has ended. Europe, once a source of modernisation, has become the root of historical ills — colonialism, world wars, liberal totalitarianism —and is now in moral-political decay, gripped by Russophobia and remilitarization via Ukraine. Russia must defeat Europe politically (without extreme measures if possible), demilitarise and change the Kyiv regime, then pursue maximal disengagement and harsh deterrence while preserving selective European cultural heritage. The future lies eastward: Greater Eurasia, North-South corridors, and integration with the World Majority. Siberia, not the European heartland, is Russia’s new civilizational core — “daring, perseverance, sobornost, striving beyond the horizon”.[26]
In essence, Karaganov’s thought provides the intellectual architecture for Russia’s assertive multipolarity, nuclear activism, and de-Westernisation. As a bridge between the academy and power, he continues to shape strategic discourse even amid geopolitical turbulence.[27]
Conclusion
In contemporary geopolitical discourse, two prominent intellectual figures, Alexandr Dugin and Sergey Karaganov, represent divergent strategic orientations available to President Putin and his administration. Dugin, through his extensive writings, advocates for Russian engagement in European political affairs. Conversely, Karaganov emphasises a strategic pivot towards Asia, suggesting that Russian foreign and economic policies should prioritise this region.
The recent United States National Security and National Defence Strategies appear to be predicated on the notion that, given the United States’ diminishing strategic influence in Europe, it is imperative to cede to Russia in Europe to secure Russia’s neutrality in the ongoing geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China. However, Western foreign policymakers, particularly those in Washington, seem to seldom entertain the fundamental question of Russia’s reliability in honouring such agreements. In essence, the realm of politics is fundamentally concerned with effectiveness as its primary measure of success, not with wishful thinking or ‘deals’ based on an abstract notion of fairness.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, it seems strategically prudent to engage with both China and the United States, thereby hedging its geopolitical position. Consequently, it is rational for Kremlin policymakers to navigate both geopolitical fronts, thereby securing their strategic interests vis-à-vis both China and the United States. The perspectives of Dugin and Karaganov serve as valuable reference points for those seeking to comprehend Russia’s options in contemporary geopolitics.
References
