I. Introduction

Recently, tension between the US and Iran has risen again. Immediately following remarks by U.S. President Donald Trump suggesting the possibility of ending the unstable ceasefire agreement between the two nations after Iran’s attack on ships in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. military announced that it had conducted airstrikes on approximately 90 targets across Iran on Wednesday, July 8, 2026. In retaliation, Iran attacked U.S. allies throughout the Middle East. A series of attack alerts were issued for Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and, a few hours later, Jordan, with both sides accusing each other of violating the terms of the ceasefire agreement. Moreover, Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed on Sunday, July 12, 2026, citing “hostile actions” and fresh strikes by the United States. [1]

President Donald Trump officially notified the U.S. Congress that U.S. “military action” against Iran had resumed on July 7, 2026,

Subsequently, the U.S. military officially announced on Tuesday, July 14, 2026, that it had resumed a blockade of Iranian ports in response to Iran’s attack on merchant ships in the Strait of Hormuz. This is a measure taken by the United States amid growing concerns over the resumption of all-out war following the near collapse of the ceasefire agreement.

The U.S. began a blockade of Iranian ports for the first time in mid-April 2026, but lifted it in mid-June, the day after the signing of an interim ceasefire agreement aimed at ending the war. This ceasefire agreement stipulated that negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program be completed within 60 days, but negotiations stalled as fighting between the two nations intensified over the Strait of Hormuz. On Monday, July 13, President Donald Trump announced the resumption of the blockade on Iranian ports and stated that he would impose a 20% toll on ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. However, just hours before announcing the resumption of the blockade, President Trump withdrew the toll collection plan, citing requests from Gulf allies. [2]

These recent clashes between the two nations in early to mid-July have cast uncertainty over the fate of the peace agreement aimed at ending the war. Nearly half of the 60-day ceasefire period, during which the negotiating teams of both countries set a final agreement, has passed.

Under the ceasefire agreement, Iran agreed to waive transit fees for the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days, but it did not specify the situation thereafter. Iran claims the authority to manage transit and impose tolls, but the United States strongly opposes this.

Under this situation where war between the U.S. and Iran has resumed, the Houthis in Yemen, which had been quiet for some time, launched a missile attack on Abha Airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia on July 13, 2026. This was a retaliatory measure against Saudi Arabia’s airstrike on Sana’a Airport in Yemen. [3]

As Figure 1 shows, the Iran-backed Houthis, which control northwestern Yemen, condemned Saudi Arabia’s attack on the Sana’a Airport runway as a “blatant act of aggression.”

1
Figure 1: Map of Yemen (source: CFR)

These exchange of attacks can be seen as the most significant escalation in the conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, which had been largely dormant since an unofficial ceasefire took effect four years ago.

Yemen has been devastated by a civil war that began in 2014 when the Houthis ousted the ruling government from the capital, Sanaa. The conflict intensified further in 2015 when a Saudi-led Arab coalition intervened in the Yemeni civil war to restore and reinstate the ousted government.

The Houthis rapidly transformed from a local insurgent militant group within Yemen into a state-level armed force possessing a powerful and continuously growing military power. [4] Supported by training, intelligence, and weapons from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah, the Houthis seized control of key Yemeni infrastructure, such as the port of Hodeidah in Sanaa on the Red Sea coast. Leveraging this influence, the Houthis launched attacks on the Red Sea region, including assaults on merchant ships passing through the waters between 2023 and 2025, and have endured retaliatory attacks from the United States and the United Kingdom in response.

The Houthis threatened to participate in the US/Israel-Iran War that broke out on February 28, 2026, implying that they had the capability to deploy the necessary resources for the conflict. In fact, the Houthi rebels officially intervened in the war on March 28 by launching ballistic missiles toward Israel. However, since then, they have remained quiet, refraining from attacks against Israel.

With the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz back in place by the resumption of fighting between the US and Iran, the exchange of fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis raised concerns that the Houthi rebels could open another front in the US/Israel-Iran War by attempting to blockade the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (32 km wide), which they once targeted during the 2023 Israel-Hamas War. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s busiest maritime routes along with the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz, is the only gateway from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea.

Indeed, the British Telegraph reported on July 15, 2026, that Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis are coordinating with the Somali militant group al-Shabaab to lay the groundwork for a blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. [5] And finally, on Monday, July 20, 2026, the Houthi leadership declared that they would immediately implement a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia.

Based on this background, this paper aims to analyze, first, how the Iranian-backed Houthis were formed; second, what influences the Houthis have exercised both within and outside Yemen; and third, whether the Houthis will carry out a complete blockade the Bab el-Mandeb Strait this time in alignment with Iran.

II. How were the Houthis created?

The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah (‘Supporters of God’ in Arabic), are an Iran-backed armed group that controls a considerable area in the north and west of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa.

The Houthis have been a central player in the ongoing Yemeni Civil War, drawing widespread international condemnation for its human rights abuses, including targeting civilians and using child soldiers. The Houthi movement is designated as a terrorist organization by some countries, including the US. The Houthis are backed by Iran, and they are widely considered part of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance”.

The Houthis are a Zaydi revivalist and Shia Islamist political and military organization that emerged from Yemen in the 1990s. The Houthi movement is predominantly made up of Zaydis, whose namesake leadership is drawn largely from the al-Houthi family. [6]

Under the leadership of Zaydi religious leader Hussein al-Houthi, the Houthis emerged as an opposition movement to Yemen president Ali Abdullah Saleh, whom they accused of corruption and being backed by Saudi Arabia and the United States. In 2003, influenced by the Lebanese Shia political and military organization Hezbollah, the Houthis adopted their official slogan against the United States, Israel, and the Jews. Al-Houthi resisted Saleh’s order for his arrest, and was afterwards killed by the Yemeni military in Saada in 2004, sparking the Houthi insurgency. Since then, the Houthi movement has been mostly led by his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. [7]

The Houthis entered the Yemeni Revolution of 2011 by participating in street protests and coordinating with other Yemeni opposition groups. They joined Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference but later rejected the 2011 reconciliation deal. In late 2014, the Houthis repaired their relationship with former president Saleh, and with his help they took control of the capital city. The takeover by the Houthis prompted a Saudi-led military intervention to restore the internationally recognized Yemeni government, leading to an ongoing civil war that included the Houthis’ missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and its ally the United Arab Emirates. [8]

Following the outbreak of Israel-Gaza War in 2023, the Houthis began to fire missiles at Israel and to attack ships off Yemen’s coast in the Red Sea, which they say was in solidarity with the Palestinians and aiming to facilitate entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. [9]

The Houthi movement attracts followers in Yemen by portraying themselves as fighting for economic development and the end of the political marginalization of Zaydi Shias, as well as by promoting regional political-religious issues in its media. The Houthis have a complex relationship with Yemen’s Sunnis; the movement has discriminated against Sunnis but has also allied with and recruited them.

The Houthis aim to govern all of Yemen and support external movements against the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Because of the Houthis’ ideological background, the conflict in Yemen is widely seen as a front of the Shia Iran–Sunni Saudi Arabia proxy war. [10]

III. The domestic power and influence of the Houthis

1. Overview

Originally a political movement, the Houthis militarized in the late 2000s, fighting wars against Yemen’s government. Estimates of the group’s size vary widely, from 20,000 core militants – composed of tribal forces and former government troops – to up to 350,000 fighters. [11]

The Houthis revolted against the internationally recognized Yemen’s government in 2011 and overthrew it in 2014. Then Yemen’s civil war broke out and continues today, with its front lines largely frozen until the Houthis attacked the Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia on July 13, 2026.

The Houthis currently rules a third of Yemen’s territory and two-thirds of its population. The Houthis’ government, based in Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, is recognized only by Iran and is influenced by strict readings of Islamic law and local caste-based traditions.

According to Al Jazeera, as Figure 2 shows, there are three main groups fighting for control in Yemen: The Saudi-backed PLC, the Emirati-backed STC and the Iranian-backed Houthis. [12]

Figure 2: Yemen’s Three Key Actors (source: Aljazeera)

a. Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)

The PLC is the executive body of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, formed on 7 April 2022, based in Aden.

The PLC has been led by Rashad al-Alimi since 2022, after former President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi formally transferred his powers to the new eight-member body, which was established to unify the various factions fighting the Houthis.

The council is composed of a mix of southern and northern political and military leaders. While it included the STC at its founding in 2022 to unite anti-Houthi forces, that alliance collapsed on January 7, 2026, when the PLC expelled the STC leadership following their attempt to seize the country’s eastern oil provinces. [13]

The PLC’s mandate is to manage Yemen’s political, security and military affairs during a transitional period and to steer negotiations towards a permanent ceasefire.

b. Southern Transitional Council (STC)

The UAE-backed STC has undergone major changes, leaving its future uncertain. The group, which initially supported Yemen’s internationally recognized government against the Houthi rebels in northern Yemen, seeks an independent state in southern Yemen, much like South Yemen before the unification of the country in 1990 under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

On January 7, 2026, Yemen’s internationally recognized government announced that the STC’s leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, had committed treason and was dismissed from the Presidential Leadership Council. [14]

Instead of attending a meeting in Riyadh, al-Zubaidi dramatically fled the country on January 8, reportedly heading to the UAE through Somaliland. On January 9, a delegation of STC members in Riyadh announced the group’s disbandment. However, an STC official in Yemen rejected this announcement, telling Al Jazeera that the delegation members in Riyadh were “coerced” into making the statement.

Since the loss of its controlled territories and dissolution, members of the organization who are based in the UAE have continued to issue statements and calls for protest.

c. Houthis

The Houthis are an armed group trained and backed by Iran who control a considerable area in the north and west of the country, including the capital, Sanaa. The Houthis emerged in the 1990s but rose to international prominence in 2014, when the group rebelled against Yemen’s government, forcing it to step down.

The group then spent years fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The fighting has largely been frozen since an UN-brokered truce in April 2022.

As Figure 3 shows, the Houthis control several strategic locations along the Red Sea, including the key Port of Hodeidah, giving them leverage over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which is vital to global shipping. [15]

Figure 3: As of January 2026, controlled areas of Yemen (source: Aljazeera)

The Houthis act as the de facto government in northwestern Yemen, controlling the capital, Sanaa, and over two-thirds of the country’s population. Their domestic role encompasses governing, consolidating a theocratic state, enforcing strict social controls, and utilizing the Palestinian cause to bolster their internal legitimacy and distract from governance failures.

• Governance and civil control: The Houthis exert authoritarian control over civil servants, local institutions, and the judiciary. They extract taxes and resources from local businesses while frequently being accused of diverting international food aid to their fighters and supporters.
• Ideological indoctrination: The Houthi movement shapes the domestic populace through strict religious curricula and extensive summer camps. An estimated 65% of children in Houthi-controlled territories attend these camps, which are used to indoctrinate youth and recruit child soldiers.
• Societal restrictions: The Houthis impose severe theocratic restrictions, including gender segregation in public spaces, limitations on women’s rights, and crackdowns on journalists, civil society actors, and political dissidents.
• Distraction and legitimacy: Yemen has suffered one of the worst humanitarian emergencies in the world, with acute malnutrition, food shortages, and infrastructure collapse affecting millions.

A decade of civil war, economic crisis and lack of social services and ability to work has pushed millions of Yemeni children into acute malnutrition and scores of diseases, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). According to the UN, at least 17 million people, about half of Yemen’s population of 42 million, face acute food shortages.

In May 2025, the UN reported that 4.95 million citizens are facing Phase 3, crisis-level food insecurity, which includes 1.5 million people facing emergency-level food insecurity, Phase 4.

There are about 11 million children in need of humanitarian assistance, and nearly 20 million people in desperate need of help, along with nearly 4.8 million people displaced from their homes since 2015.

Facing heavy criticism for this economic devastation in Yemen, the Houthis use their military campaigns — such as strikes in the Red Sea and on Israel — as a propaganda tool. They use these actions to rally domestic, pan-Arab sentiment, positioning themselves as defenders of the oppressed while they suppress internal dissent.

2. Military power of the Houthis

According to the SIPRI-2023 report, the Houthis became the third largest recipient of Iranian arms and military platforms, accounting for 7.4% of Iran’s overall arms export. The rise of Houthis, the only non-state actor, to the list of the top 25 global suppliers and their recipients indicates an alarming situation in the Gulf region, mainly over the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. [16]

The Houthi movement emerged as a local insurgent armed group in northern Yemen in the 1990s. However, over the years, the group has gained power and prominence, evolving into a significant non-state military actor that influences regional geopolitics. After capturing Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, the Houthi movement became a major power faction in the regional politics.

The Houthis have received extensive material and ideological support from Iran. The assistance from Iran, both legitimate and illegitimate, has helped the Houthis possess a diverse range of weapons and equipment that enable armed operations far beyond Yemen’s borders. Since 2020, Houthis’ armed operations have increased significantly in the nearby region; however, there has been a notable shift in the Houthis’ scope of operations after late 2023. The trend has indicated an increase in their engagements and armed campaigns against international shipping lanes, and US & Israeli military assets over land and sea, positioning them as a proactive destabilizing force in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea regions.

a. Houthis’ military capabilities and major components of their arsenal

Because the Houthi are not a regular army of a nation, they lacked advanced capabilities such as missile and air defense systems, aircraft, submarines, and related equipment and attachments. In addition, Houthi lacked network-centric warfare capabilities that enable them to respond to attacks and external airstrikes, as well as sophisticated weapon interception. Consequently, as they cannot respond to continuous airstrikes by powerful nations such as the US and Israel, the Houthi employed guerrilla strategies relying on mobile launchers, hard-to-detect bases, and dispersed tactics to withstand bombing. [17] As a result, despite receiving repeated airstrikes on their bases and launch facilities from the US, the UK, and others, Houthi have still maintained significant offensive power thanks to their mobility, concealment capabilities, and self -production capabilities.

Over the past decade, the Houthi movement has significantly increased its offensive capabilities with Iranian assistance. In addition to small arms and rocket systems, the Houthis’ modern arsenal and operational capabilities primarily consist of three key components: missile capabilities, modern armed drones, and maritime capabilities. Their arsenal includes both foreign-supplied and locally manufactured military equipment developed with assistance from Iran. In addition to manufacturing, the Houthis have engaged in assembling equipment, parts of which are sourced from different origins.

i) Ballistic and cruise missiles capability

Houthis’ modern inventory includes ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, encompassing an array of short-range to long-range missile systems, against land, air and sea-based targets. All the current ballistic missiles in Houthis’ inventory are of a tactical nature only. Reports based on the IISS and the Wilson Center indicate that the Houthi movement have missiles based on Soviet models, such as the Tochka missile series and at least three variants of SCUD missiles, as well as Iranian models, including the Zelzal-3 and Burkan series, among others. They also possess advanced Iranian systems such as Quds-series land-attack cruise missiles and have missiles with up to 2,000 km range. These long-range missiles enable the Houthi movement to strike deep into regional theatre areas, including large parts of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This missile capability allows Houthi forces to target far from their base, creating leverage in regional conflicts. [18]

In the maritime domain, anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles are a critical component of the Houthis’ warfare capability. The Houthis have been documented to fire anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) like ‘Tankeel’ and ‘Asef’. These missiles are believed to stem from Iranian ‘Fateh’ and ‘Raad’ missile designs, with a range of hundreds of miles. The Houthis also operate Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship missiles. These missile systems are configured to target vessels in strategic waterways, such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea. Besides land, this maritime capability allows the Houthis to use the sea as a launchpad for their rockets and missiles. [19] Figure 4 highlights some of the modern ballistic and cruise missiles in the Houthis’ inventory, inducted during the last half-decade, since 2019.

Figure 4: Some major missile systems in Houthis’ arsenal (source: Wilson Center)

In addition to the above-mentioned missiles, Houthis also have various other potent missiles in their inventory, such as Badr series, Mion, Obedient, Saeer, Qaher series, Falaq, Julfiqar, Mirjal, Fater, Saqr series and others. [20]

ii) Unmanned aerial system (drones) capabilities

Drones are perhaps the Houthis’ most operationally viable and easy-to-access weapons. The Houthis have been using reportedly drones since 2015, in particular in the Yemen Civil War. Although the Houthis launched most of the drone attacks against the Yemeni adversaries, since late 2023, they have also carried out long-range drone attacks on international waters and Israeli territory, such as Eilat and Tel Aviv. The Houthis’ drones even penetrated advanced Israeli air defenses to inflict damage. Like other arms, Iran is said to be the primary supplier of ready-to-use drones and its technology to the Houthis. With the assistance from Iran, the Houthis has also developed the capability for local engineering, manufacturing, and assembling drones, such as DIY models. [21]

The Houthis have deployed both short-range and long-range unmanned systems that carry explosive payloads for combat and suicidal purposes (kamikaze drones). For example, the Samad-2 and Samad-3 drones utilize Iran’s low-end technology in their one-way attack. Other advanced UAVs in the Houthis’ arsenal include the long-range Yaffa, Shahed-136, and Shahed-131 drones. These long-range drones allow the Houthis to launch strikes on urban centers and military facilities outside Yemen’s boundaries. [22]

Although many components of these drones are believed to originate from Iran, the Houthis assemble them locally using commercially available parts and imported navigation systems, enhancing adaptability and scale of deployment. For example, Houthis have also assembled drones, parts of which were of US origin and transferred illegally by China. In October 2025, the US added 15 Chinese firms to the trade restriction list for facilitating the purchase of US electronic items found in Houthis’ drones. Figure 5 lists several modern drones in Houthis’ arsenal based on Iranian designs.

Figure 5: Some major drone systems in Houthis’ arsenal (source: Wilson Center)

In addition to the major drone system mentioned in the above list, Houthis have an ample number of drones, such as the Mersad series, Raqib, and Shihab.

Figure 6 illustrates the role of Iranian assistance in the development of the Houthis’ modern missile and drone capabilities.

Figure 6: The role of Iran in Houthis’ missile and drone Development (source: IISS)

According to Figure 6, Iran has had the greatest influence on the development of sophisticated long-range one-way attack drones, medium-range ballistic missiles, and land-attack & anti-ship cruise missiles.

iii) Marine Weapon Systems

In addition to UAVs and missile systems, Houthis have also developed several maritime warfare capabilities. It includes unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and sea mines. USVs are remote explosive boats disguised as fishing vessels and are used against commercial and military shipping. These combat boats, such as Asif, Mallah and Nazir, have the capability of carrying medium and light weapons, as well as anti-aircraft guns and rockets. They also have self-driving boats for combat and maritime reconnaissance purposes. [23]

Moreover, the Houthis have a strong sea denial capability, including sea mines, booby traps, manned or remotely guided torpedoes, and underwater drone systems. Displayed at a military parade at Sana’a in September 2023, Houthis’ sea mines are of various types, such as Masjoor, Mujahid, Saqib, and Karar, and others. Installed at various depths in the waters, these sea mines are a self-contained explosive device placed to damage or destroy surface boats, vessels and submarines. These threats further complicate naval operations and trade in narrow shipping corridors and strategic chokepoints, such as the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal. These maritime capabilities multiply threat vectors, particularly against undefended or lightly defended vessels. [24]

IV. The foreign policy role or foreign influence of the Houthis

Iran is the Houthis’ primary benefactor, providing them with security assistance, such as weapons transfers, training, and intelligence support.

Iran facilitates a supply of more sophisticated weaponry than the Houthis could acquire on their own, particularly missiles and drones. Iranian support has helped the Houthis gain and maintain military superiority within Yemen.

Experts say that Iran’s supports for the Houthis has had greater effect elsewhere. As a key militant component of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” the Houthis have expanded their role from a domestic Yemeni insurgency to an international disruptor. [25]

Their international footprint centers upon maritime disruption, regional conflict involvement, and strategic alliances are:

• Red Sea and global shipping disruption:

Following the start of the Israel-Hamas War in October 2023, Houthis attacked U.S. – and Israel-linked targets in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandab Strait – in what they called a show of support for Palestinians and Hamas. These attacks effectively blocked ships and vessels and had ruinous effects on international shipping. By forcing international shipping companies to divert around the Cape of Good Hope, they significantly slowed global supply chains and raised international shipping and insurance costs.

• Conflict with Israel and the West:

The Houthis have considered themselves part of an active front against Israel, launching barrages of drones and ballistic missiles toward Israeli territory, in particular targeting the port city of Eilat.

Acting in solidarity with Palestinian militant groups during the Israel-Hamas War, the Houthis frequently launched drones and ballistic missiles at Israel, prompting retaliatory strikes from both Israel and the US.

Even Hezbollah and the Houthis launched coordinated, multi-front attacks on Israel and international shipping lanes to distract and pressure Israel.

Moreover, the Houthis threatened to get involved in the U.S.-Israeli War against Iran from its first week of March 2026, indicating they were capable of putting resources toward the conflict. The Houthis entered the conflict on March 28 when they fired ballistic missiles at Israel.

• Regional projecting:

Houthis operate beyond Yemen by providing logistical and tactical support to other non-state actors, including forming ties with armed groups in the Horn of Africa.

Houthis have expanded their influence by trading weapons with al-Shabaab, a Somali armed organization linked to al-Qaeda. It has been confirmed through UN reports and other sources that military weapons possessed by the Houthi rebels, such as precision bombs and drones, have been transferred to armed groups in Somalia, and that related tactical training has also been conducted. [26]

According to the British Telegraph, Houthis have recently been found to be coordinating blockade operations of the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in conjunction with armed groups in the Horn of Africa, including the Somali armed group al-Shabaab.

• Cross-border strikes:

While a fragile truce has generally held in Yemen, the Houthis routinely threaten and conduct cross-border drone and missile strikes into neighboring Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

For example, on 17 January 2022, the Houthi movement in Yemen conducted an attack using drones and ballistic missiles on the UAE, targeting three oil tanker trucks and under-construction airport extension infrastructure in Abu Dhabi.

During the civil war in Yemen, Houthis attacked Saudi Arabia several times, including an drone attack on the Saudi East–West crude oil pipeline on 14 May 2019 and an attack on an oil and gas field in Shaybah, Saudi Arabia on 17 August 2019.

• Protecting Iran’s interests:

Houthis’ role abroad is to assist Iran by menacing Saudi Arabia’s border and protecting Iranian ships in the Red Sea, giving Iran room to evade sanctions on oil shipping by distracting its enemies and facilitating a shadow network, Iran expert Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar wrote for Foreign Affairs in 2024. [27]

At the same time, experts say Yemen offers a testing ground for Iranian weapons on its front lines and in the Red Sea. Like all axis of resistance members in Iran’s proxy network, the Houthis offer Iran plausible deniability: members routinely claim responsibility for attacks likely ordered or perpetrated by Iran. For instance, many experts blame Iran for attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities that the Houthis took responsibility for in September 2019.

V. Will the Houthis carry out the complete blockage of the Bab el-Mandab Strait?

With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed since the start of the US-Iran War in late February 2026, there have been talks about the closure of the Bab el-Mandab Strait by the Houthis.

Since the start of the US-Iran War, Iran has asked the Houthis to stand ready to close the Red Sea oil route if the United States strikes Iranian power infrastructure. However, the Houthis has not yet carried out the blockage of the Bab el-Mandab Strait.

The first constraint comes from the international system. Bab el-Mandeb is not merely a regional waterway but a global maritime artery. A significant share of global trade, container traffic, and energy shipments passes through the strait on the way to and from the Suez Canal. [28]

Any deliberate attempt to close the passage would therefore be viewed not simply as another episode in Yemen’s Civil War, but as a direct challenge to freedom of navigation and the global economy.

The US and the UK have already demonstrated their willingness to use force to protect the maritime traffic following repeated attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea during the Israel-Hamas War.

This is where the limits of the Iranian-Houthi strategy become clear. Harassment, disruption, and calibrated pressure might remain sustainable. A sustained closure of the Strait, however, would risk turning a manageable maritime security challenge into a direct international confrontation. [29]

Nonetheless, Houthi leaders in Yemen have declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia, effective immediately. The announcement on July 20, 2026, came days after the group threatened a “siege” on Saudi Arabia in retaliation for an attack on Sanaa International Airport last week.

The Houthis’ announcement of a blockade of Saudi Arabia can threaten to take millions more barrels per day of oil off the market at a time when global oil prices are already surging. The announcement puts the oil transiting the Bab el-Mandab Strait – which represents about 7 percent of global supply – at risk.

Saudi Arabia is currently exporting approximately four million barrels of oil per day from the Red Sea Port of Yanbu, up 400 percent from pre-Iran War levels. And the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has emerged as a much-needed alternative to the Strait of Hormuz for global oil flows, with more than seven million barrels per day transiting the Strait in June, up from roughly four million barrels before the US-Iran War.

Perhaps the biggest threat is whether the Houthis will and can carry out the complete blockage of the Bab el-Mandab Strait. The Houthis have not yet clarified which ships they will target, but they implied that any ship visiting Saudi ports and carrying Saudi oil would be in the crosshairs. This is because the Houthis warned shipping companies that their tankers risk being attacked if they use Saudi Arabian ports. [30]

However, it will not be easy for the Houthis to carry out the sustained complete blockage of the Bab el-Mandab Strait.

The first constraint comes from the international system. As explained above, a sustained and complete closure of the Strait, however, would risk turning a manageable maritime security challenge into a direct international confrontation. The US and Saudi Arabia will never tolerate such acts by the Houthis.

Indeed, Donald Trump on July 21, 2026, said that the US would “just have to take care of business” if the Houthis followed through on their threats. “You know, we’ve done that with the Houthis before, and we haven’t heard from them in a while since we did what we did originally,” he said at White House meeting with the Lebanese president, Joseph Aoun. [31]

The second constraint is rooted in Yemen itself, particularly in the strategic importance of Hodeidah and the western coastline, as Figure 7 shows.

According to Mohamed A. Qubaty, who is a Yemeni diplomat and former Minister of Information in Yemen, Houthis’ ability to threaten Bab el-Mandeb depends heavily on their control of this critical maritime corridor. [32]

In 2018, anti-Houthi forces came close to retaking Hodeidah before the Stockholm Agreement froze the battle and suspended the Western Front.

Any attempt to turn Bab el-Mandeb into an instrument of global coercion could reshape the political environment surrounding Hodeidah. The conclusion of the UN mission supporting the Hodeidah Agreement has also removed one of the main frameworks that helped preserve the status quo on the western coast.

Figure 7: Yemen, Bab el-Mandeb, Hodeidah Map (source: US energy Information Administration)

This does not mean that a decision to retake Hodeidah has been made or that a new military campaign is imminent. It means that the possibility itself has become a strategic factor.

The Houthis understand that maximum use of the Bab el-Mandeb card could trigger renewed debate over whether the western coastline should remain under their control. What is politically difficult today could become increasingly possible under conditions of major maritime escalation.

This is the central paradox: Hodeidah gives the Houthis the ability to threaten maritime traffic, but excessive use of that leverage could ultimately jeopardize their hold over Hodeidah itself. [33]

A serious attempt to close the Strait could therefore revive a military and political file that has remained frozen for years. It may create conditions in which internationally recognized Yemeni government forces could resume pressure on Hodeidah, supported by stronger regional backing and protected by international naval and air power acting in defense of maritime navigation.

No such consensus or military decision currently exists. Yet the possibility that extreme Houthi escalation could reopen the Western Front is itself an element of deterrence. The threat of losing Hodeidah may therefore impose limits on how far the Houthis are willing to weaponize the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb.

VI. Conclusion

This paper aimed to analyze, first, how the Iranian-backed Houthis were formed; second, what influences the Houthis have exercised both within and outside Yemen; and third, whether the Houthis will carry out the complete blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait this time in alignment with Iran.

Regarding the first question, this paper showed that the Houthis emerged from Yemen in the 1990s as a Zaydi revivalist and Shia Islamist political and military organization. The Houthi movement was predominantly made up of Zaydis and grew under the leadership of the al-Houthi family.

Regarding the second question, this paper argued that the Houthis revolted against the internationally recognized Yemen’s government in 2011 and overthrew it in 2014 and that then Yemen’s Civil War broke out and continues today.

The Houthis act as the de facto government in northwestern Yemen, controlling the capital, Sanaa, and over two-thirds of the country’s population. Their domestic role encompasses governing, consolidating a theocratic state, enforcing strict social controls, and utilizing the Palestinian cause to bolster their internal legitimacy and distract from governance failures.

Moreover, this paper claimed that the Houthis have received extensive material and ideological support from Iran. The assistance from Iran, both legitimate and illegitimate, has helped the Houthis possess a diverse range of weapons and equipment that has helped the Houthis gain and maintain military superiority within Yemen and enable them to carry out armed operations far beyond Yemen’s borders.

Regarding the third question, this paper claimed that although the Houthis’ announced a blockade of Saudi Arabia, it would not be easy for them to carry out complete blockage of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait due to two constraints they will face. The first constraint is US-led retaliation against the Houthis, while the second constraint is Yemen’s geopolitical situation in which Hodeidah under the control of the Houthis gives the Houthis the ability to threaten maritime traffic in the Red Sea, but excessive use of that leverage could ultimately jeopardize their hold over Hodeidah itself.