I. Introduction

As Figure 1 shows, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan signed a Joint Defense Pact as tensions in the Middle East continue to escalate with the US and Israel’s war on Iran.

The defense agreement, called the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, was signed in the Saudi holy city of Mecca on August 7, 2026, by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

Figure 1: Map of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan (source: Shankar IAS Parliament)

The new Mecca Joint Defense Agreement sees three of the world’s most powerful Muslim nations come together to offer mutual defense guarantees.

The parties have not released an official text, but reports show that the three countries have in essence agreed to a NATO Article 5-like clause — an attack on one signatory would be considered an attack on all of them. That security guarantee is significant as it enjoins Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to come to Pakistan’s defense in the event of a war in South Asia, and presumably Saudi and Pakistani forces would join the fight if Türkiye and Israel come to blows in Syria or the Eastern Mediterranean.

In a statement of its own, the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the joint defense deal signed was “guided by the longstanding historical ties among the three nations, based on the enduring bonds of brotherhood and Islamic solidarity that unite them, and building upon their shared strategic interests and longstanding defense cooperation.” [1]

With this information, this paper will analyze why Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Defense Pact. The paper will then explain what the reactions of Iran, Israel, and the US to the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement are, and how these countries view the defense pact.

II. Why has this defense pact been made now?

The defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan has been in the making for some time. Negotiations began soon after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the onset of the subsequent Israeli invasion of Gaza, and gained pace amid the US and Israel’s ongoing war on Iran.

While Türkiye and Pakistan have not been directly impacted by tensions in the region so far, Saudi Arabia, which hosts US military assets and infrastructure, has come under attack from Iran and its ally, the Houthis in Yemen. Iran has also attacked other Gulf nations and Jordan, which also host US military assets. Meanwhile, Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq have been accused of carrying out drone attacks in Saudi Arabia and have, themselves, come under fire from US and Israeli attacks.

But the three nations have been particularly concerned about the impact of Iran’s war and Israel’s growing influence – and attacks – on the Middle East. Israel has occupied roughly one-fifth of Lebanon as it allegedly targets strongholds of the Lebanese armed group, Hezbollah, which is also backed by Iran.

Reporting from Ankara, Türkiye, Al Jazeera’s Resul Serdar said that, according to officials there, the escalating regional tensions have indeed forced these three countries to come together.

“Post-October 7 has changed the region dramatically, with the Israeli actions and expansionism. And now there is the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and ongoing attacks on Iran, as well as Iran’s response to the regional countries,” he said. [2] “So there have been several layers of necessity converging, and forcing these three big countries to come together and sign this binding agreement,” he added.

On March 19, 2026, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan met in Riyadh during an Islamic summit, in which they discussed what a joint security agreement could look like.

Before this meeting, in September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement. The agreement came in the wake of an Israeli attack on the Qatari capital, Doha, on September 9, 2025.

Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, the managing director of the German Marshall Fund of the US’ South and Wider Europe office and the regional director for Türkiye, told Al Jazeera that this defense deal reflects a growing desire for greater regional strategic autonomy at a time when confidence in the existing security order provided by the US has eroded.

In such context, Andreas Krieg, a security analyst and political risk consultant specializing in the Middle East and North Africa, added that the US remains highly important, particularly for intelligence, advanced missile defense, and high-end military technology – but said that regional actors in the Middle East want to convert their own resources into usable power rather than purchasing advanced weapons and technology from the US.

“The old model was overwhelmingly hub-and-spokes, with the US at the center and individual states looking primarily to the US for security. What is emerging now is horizontal connectivity between regional powers,” said Krieg.

“The three countries also share a broadly state-centric view of regional stability. Despite their differences, they tend to view strong central governments, territorial integrity, and functioning state institutions as the foundation of order, while seeing state fragmentation, civil conflict, and the empowerment of non-state actors as sources of long-term instability,” he said.

Above all, according to an analysis by the BBC, the reason the trilateral defense agreement was concluded is that Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan each have benefits they wish to gain through this agreement. [3]

For the Saudi Arabia, this defense agreement gives an extra level of security in a region whose security architecture has been upended by the US and Israel’s war with Iran.

Last month, Iran-backed Houthi rebels – who control much of the north-west of Yemen – announced a “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia and targeted Saudi airports, oil facilities and tankers in the Red Sea.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia will be keenly aware of last year’s Israeli strikes on Doha, targeting senior Hamas officials. According to a 2025 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “across the Gulf, states recalibrated their defense strategies”. This pact is one of Saudi Arabia’s responses. That is, following Israel’s airstrike on Doha on September 9, 2025, Saudi Arabia has now concluded this trilateral defense agreement after signing a bilateral mutual defense agreement with Pakistan on September 17, 2025.

For Saudi Arabia, the Mecca Defense Pact diversifies its defense partnerships beyond the US, adding Türkiye’s advanced military capabilities and Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, amid growing threats to vital maritime corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb.

David Des Roches, a former director of Arabian Peninsula affairs in the US Department of Defense, told Al Jazeera that the defense deal also serves Saudi arms diversification amid Western export unpredictability, since Türkiye and Pakistan can supply items like 155mm artillery shells at scale. [4]

For Pakistan, the defense pact offers different but complementary benefits. In May 2025 its long-standing tensions with India boiled over into open conflict. While an all-out war was avoided, having the economic muscle of Saudi Arabia and the military and industrial might of Türkiye in their corner will be viewed as increasingly valuable.

As for Türkiye, the benefits are different. According to Burcu Ozcelik from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, the defense deal offers opportunities for the country’s significant defense industries through “joint production, technology partnerships, procurement and greater military interoperability”. [5]

III. What does this defense pact do?

The trilateral defense deal is understood to build on a pact already in place between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It will harness the military and financial strengths of each country, analysts say. While Türkiye has NATO’s second-largest military, Saudi Arabia is the world’s top oil exporter, and Pakistan is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons.

Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, the managing director of the German Marshall Fund in the US, said the three partners bring complementary strengths, “including Türkiye’s defense-industrial capabilities, Saudi financial muscle and influence, and Pakistan’s military experience and strategic deterrent.” [6]

“It should be noted that this is a framework for closer strategic, military, and defense-industrial coordination among three big regional powers and not a mutual defense pact that can be compared to NATO,” he added.

Murat Aslan, a professor of international politics at Hasan Kalyoncu University in Gaziantep, Türkiye, told Al Jazeera that the defense pact can also be expected to cover “capacity building.”

“We know that Saudi Arabia is dependent on importing their defense products, weapons or equipment, especially from the US for decades, and we know that it’s not cost-effective and they need to build their own defense sector inside Saudi Arabia,” Aslan said.

“Saudi Arabia and Türkiye share different issues: First of all, Iran, and you can add Pakistan to that… have shared borders and there is a great sense of threat in the minds of Saudis that Iran might have an impact on their security, so this defense pact will somehow expand their security,” he added.

Reporting from Doha, Al Jazeera’s Osama bin Javaid said the defense deal essentially puts three of the largest Muslim populations together on the roadmap for joint peace, to deter any act of aggression against them, to ensure they are “in tune” with each other when it comes to intelligence sharing, and to enhance cooperation in other areas including energy, defense expenditure, and manufacturing.

“The three of them combined now present a force that will take this region towards a different security architecture than the one in place over the past few decades, especially in the wake of the Iran war,” he said.

IV. What are Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan’s joint military capabilities?

1. Joint military capabilities

As Figure 2 shows, the Mecca Defense Pact combines a top oil exporter (Saudi Arabia), NATO’s second-largest army (Türkiye) and the only nuclear-armed Muslim nation (Pakistan).

Combined, these three countries form a sizeable military bloc. As Figure 2 shows, together, the three countries combine nearly 1.4 million active military personnel, 3,400 aircraft, 6,000 tanks and more than 340 naval assets according to the 2026 Global Firepower Index, which examines the defense capabilities of 145 countries. [7]

• Manpower: Together, the three nations include about 1.4 million active personnel, backed by large paramilitary and reserve forces. Pakistan provides the largest pool of active personnel at 660,000, followed by Türkiye at 481,000 and Saudi Arabia at 247,000.
• Air power: Together they operate 3,415 military aircraft including fighter jets, helicopters, transporters and training military aircraft. Pakistan possesses some 1,397 aircraft, followed by Türkiye at 1,101 and Saudi Arabia with 917.
• Land forces: The three countries field some 6,046 tanks and more than 179,000 armored vehicles, alongside thousands of artillery systems and multiple-launch rocket systems. Pakistan has the highest number of tanks at 2,677, Türkiye has 2,284 and Saudi Arabia, 1,085.
• Naval power: Their combined fleets include 344 naval assets, including 22 submarines, 33 frigates, and 24 corvettes. Türkiye comes out top here with 192 naval assets, followed by Pakistan’s 120 and Saudi Arabia’s 32.
• Defense spending: Their combined defense budgets amount to approximately $124.4bn annually. Saudi Arabia has the largest military budget of the three at $63.9bn in 2026, while Türkiye set aside $51.4bn and Pakistan $9.1bn according to Global Firepower index.

Figure 2: Military capabilities of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan (source: Global Firepower & Al Jazeera)

2. Complementary military powers

Andreas Krieg, a security analyst and political risk consultant specializing in the Middle East and North Africa, said the defense pact’s significance lies in how the three countries’ different capabilities could complement one another.

“Saudi Arabia contributes geography, capital, infrastructure and political convening power. Türkiye contributes an increasingly sophisticated defense-industrial base, missiles, drones, sensors, electronic warfare, naval systems and NATO-derived military expertise,” he said. Meanwhile, Pakistan contributes manpower, a large professional military establishment, operational experience, defense production and nuclear capability.

V. What are the reactions of Iran, Israel, and the US to the Mecca Defense Pact, and how do these countries view the defense pact?

1. Overview

The fact that Türkiye has joined in a Mecca Defense Pact with fellow Sunni states Saudi Arabia and Pakistan has significant implications, not only for Shiite Iran but also for Israel and the US.

On its face, Iran is the most obvious target of the Mecca Defense Pact, although Türkiye denies that is the case. Although Iran and Türkiye have maintained proper (if not always cordial) relationships since the two countries signed a border treaty in 1639, Saudi Arabia and Iran have long been rivals for domination of the Gulf region. Iran has continually attacked Saudi sites in the course of its war with Israel and the US. [8]

As for Pakistan, though its relations with Iran have been relatively stable, there are serious points of contention. In January 2024, the two countries exchanged strikes, which Iran initiated in retaliation against Baluch insurgents operating out of western Pakistan. The crisis has left a residue of suspicion in Pakistan that might not yet have disappeared.

Israel, too, has reason for concern. Its relations with Türkiye, until recently a major military and trading partner, plummeted soon after Israel blockaded Gaza and especially since its war with Hamas, which has long received supports from Türkiye. Saudi Arabia, though covertly cooperating with Israel in intelligence matters, has yet to establish relations openly. And it is unlikely to do so until Israel is prepared to live alongside a Palestinian state.

Of the three new defense partners, Pakistan is the most hostile toward Israel, which it still refuses even to recognize Israel. And because Pakistan is a nuclear power, it has long posed a serious threat to Israel’s security. In fact, Pakistani pilots flew Arab aircraft and exchanged fire with the Israelis during the Six-Day War of 1967. Perhaps for domestic political reasons, Israel has not highlighted that threat as it has the Iranian nuclear program.

The new Mecca Defense Agreement could mean that a flare-up involving any one of the three partners could result in military support from the other two. For example, should there be an exchange of fire between Israeli and Turkish forces in Syria — parts of which both still occupy — the new defense agreement might bring Saudi Arabia and Pakistan into the conflict.

Finally, the Mecca Defense Pact is not only a hedge against a reduced American regional presence. It is also a warning. If the U.S. significantly downsize its forces in the region, and were Iran to produce a nuclear weapon, Pakistan would spare no effort to enable its new partners to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

2. What is the reaction of Iran to the Mecca Defense Pact, and how does Iran view the defense pact?

Key factors behind the Mecca Defense Pact signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan include Iran’s attacks on Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, and attacks on Saudi Arabia by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

However, most local Iranian commentators do not view the Mecca Defense Pact as a powerful military alliance against Iran or an “Islamic NATO” capable of shifting the regional balance of power. These commentators tend to downplay the fact that the defense agreement poses a threat to Iran. They do so by emphasizing the differences between the three nations, the uncertainty of their military commitments, and the fact that Türkiye and Pakistan are unlikely to rush into a direct confrontation with Iran. [9]

On the other hand, some Iranian experts view Saudi Arabia’s strengthening of security cooperation with Iran’s two major neighbors — particularly with NATO member Türkiye and nuclear-armed Pakistan — as a danger signal that Iran cannot ignore.

The argument is that if the confrontation between Iran and the US persists and Arab nations feel increasingly threatened by Iran and its allies, this regional security network could become increasingly solidified, thereby posing an even greater threat to Iran.

However, some interpret this defense agreement as signifying a broader shift in the regional security structure — specifically, a transition from near-total dependence on the US to a more diversified regional security network.

While the Mecca Defense Agreement has sparked extensive discussion in Iran, official reactions so far have been limited and cautious. The highest-level Iranian response to the Mecca Defense Agreement so far came from Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi; instead of directly criticizing the agreement, he urged in a post on his X account that “Muslim nations must be self-reliant and act with a true spirit of brotherhood.” Minister Abbas Aragchi emphasized that Muslims can stand against any challenge posed by hostile foreign forces when they unite.

Initial reactions from some political circles were largely skeptical about whether this new defense alliance could guarantee Saudi Arabia’s security. Two hardline lawmakers on the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee downplayed the significance of the defense agreement. Ebrahim Rezai criticized the defense agreement as a “paper agreement” and an “act of begging for security,” claiming that just as Saudi Arabia failed to secure its own security despite relying on the US for years, the same would be true for agreements with Türkiye and Pakistan. Mahmoud Nababian took a similar stance, criticizing that since US military bases failed to guarantee Saudi Arabia’s security, its security would not be secured by “clinging to Türkiye and Pakistan that are henchmen of the US.” [10]

Reactions to the Mecca Defense Agreement reflect political divisions within Iran. Hardliners interpret the signing of the Mecca Defense Pact as evidence of the failure of US deterrence in the Middle East and Iran’s success in dismantling the existing regional order. Conversely, pragmatists warn of the strategic costs that could arise if Iran continues its current policies and express concern that the defense agreement could encourage the formation of a regional security regime that would have a negative effect on Iran.

Commentaries published in the Iranian media also showed a complex pattern. Iranian media outlets are generally debating whether to view the Mecca Defense Pact as evidence of weaknesses in Iran’s rivals, or as an early sign of a new regional security organization that could work against Iran in the long run.

The conservative Alef website presented this defense agreement as further evidence of Saudi Arabia’s strategic failure. While claiming that Saudi Arabia seeks to secure its own security through this defense deal amid concerns over retaliatory actions by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, the website questioned whether Pakistan and Türkiye could provide what the US failed to offer. In particular, it pointed out that these countries also face serious economic, security, and governance issues. Alef website even mocked Saudi Arabia for continuing to rely on external forces despite having a defense budget exceeding $70 billion, noting that Iran, with a much smaller defense budget, has secured strategic advantages against the US and Israel, particularly control of the Strait of Hormuz. [11]

Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of the hardline newspaper Kayhan, criticized the signing of the trilateral defense agreement, describing it as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan cooperating with Israel and the US to counter the “axis of resistance,” particularly the Houthi rebels. His primary criticism was directed at Pakistan, arguing that the country is attempting to play two contradictory roles: acting as a mediator between Iran and the US while simultaneously participating in a framework that serves the interests of the U.S. and Israel.

On the other hand, the pragmatic Asr-e Iran website presented a different perspective. This website analyzed the Mecca defense alliance as a form of “Islamic NATO” and the first step toward establishing a new regional security structure centered on Türkiye and Pakistan. It also explained that the purpose of the defense agreement stems from Saudi Arabia’s need to secure deterrence against future Iranian attacks, based on its war experience. According to this interpretation, Saudi Arabia is not seeking a direct war with Iran, but rather intends to contain Iran and reduce the risk of another conflict by having Türkiye and Pakistan maintain relatively friendly relations with Iran.

The Khabar Online website analyzed this defense agreement as part of a structural shift in the regional security landscape following the US/Israel-Iran War. According to the website, this trilateral alliance consists of three complementary elements: Saudi Arabia, which possesses economic power and energy resources; Pakistan, the only Islamic country to possess nuclear weapons; and Türkiye, which boasts the second-largest military force in NATO and an advanced defense industry. The report suggests that this trilateral combination aims to build an umbrella of regional deterrence centered on “Saudi Arabia’s financial power, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and Türkiye’s drones.”

3. What is the reaction of Israel to the Mecca Defense Pact, and how does Israel view the defense pact?

To date, neither the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor the Israeli Foreign Ministry has made any comments regarding the new Mecca Defense Agreement.

A Turkish official told Reuters that the defense agreement between the three countries is defensive in nature and is not aimed at any specific group. The official added that joining this defense agreement is also open to other countries in the region.

However, these three countries are known to have expressed concern, particularly regarding Israel’s expanding influence in the Middle East and the recent increase in Israeli attacks in the region. This is the main background behind the signing of this trilateral defense agreement.

During a meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif in Istanbul in early July 2026, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emphasized that Middle East peace efforts cannot succeed without regional support and stated that Israel must not be allowed to “destroy” the agreement between the US and Iran.

Erdogan said that “we are closely watching the Israeli government’s attempts to derail the US-Iran agreement. We must not allow the current war-addicted Israeli government to once again cover our region in the smell of gunpowder and blood.” Erdogan also repeatedly condemned Israel’s attacks on the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Syria.

Pakistan has also condemned Israel’s attacks on the Gaza Strip. Since the Israel-Hamas War began in October 2023, more than 71,000 people have died in Israeli attacks in the Gaza Strip, and more than 1,000 additional people have died since a ceasefire brokered by the US was announced in 2025. Pakistan has also strongly condemned the so-called “Greater Israel” initiative.

However, on the other hand, Pakistan has positioned itself as a mediator in the war between the US/Israel and Iran, striving to prevent the outbreak of regional war.

US President Donald Trump has long hoped that Saudi Arabia would sign the Abraham Accords to normalize relations between Israel and Islamic nations. However, Saudi Arabia has also repeatedly condemned Israel’s attacks in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, insisting that it would not sign the Abraham Accords until a clear path was presented for the establishment of a Palestinian state, which the current Israeli government strongly opposes.

Yasmine Farouk, head of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula project at the International Crisis Group, wrote in a report on July 20 that close defense cooperation among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt reflects a hard-won realization by these four nations: the understanding that “regional security can no longer be left to the competition between the US, Israel, and Iran.” [12]

“Many officials in these countries had already reached this conclusion before the US and Israel launched their attacks on Iran in late February 2026.” However, she said that the US/Israel-Iran War and the subsequent Iranian retaliation — namely, Iran’s missile and drone attacks on Gulf Arab states and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz — provided a new and urgent motivation for moves such as the signing of the Mecca Defense Pact.

She pointed out that some Israeli commentators and officials are misrepresenting the joint defense efforts of these countries as an “anti-Israel or anti-Israel/UAE Sunni bloc.”

However, Israel’s position on the Mecca Defense Pact is different. At a conference held in Jerusalem this February, former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett referred to Türkiye as the “new Iran,” claiming that Türkiye has been trying to incite Saudi Arabia against Israel and draw in Pakistan to jointly build a “Sunni axis” hostile to Israel.

On August 8, 2026, the day after the announcement of the Mecca Defense Pact, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif characterized Israel as a “threat to Islamic nations worldwide” and called for the establishment of a “joint military front against Israel.”

On August 9, Daniel Grayman-Kennard of the Washington Post reported that Minister Asif linked this call to the unresolved Palestinian issue, emphasizing that the Islamic world must unite against Israel.

Dr. Yoel Guzhanski, Director of the Gulf Studies Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), told Grayman-Kennard that the agreement on the Mecca Defense Pact does not completely block the possibility of normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

“Every country needs stability. Saudi Arabia also needs stability,” said Dr. Guzhanski, describing Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Mecca Defense Pact as a “risk avoidance strategy.” [13]

Jacob Nagel, former Chairman of the Israeli National Security Council, offered a similar explanation in a 103FM radio interview reported by the Washington Post on Friday. Nagel assessed the signing of the Mecca Defense Pact as “a move that goes beyond Saudi Arabia‘s diplomatic ploy to pressure the US administration,” arguing that Saudi Arabia is seeking alternatives other than the US as it feels increasingly vulnerable in terms of security.

Saudi Arabia’s security vulnerability has been accumulating for years. Saudi Arabia has watched as Iran and its proxy militants demonstrated their offensive capabilities across the Middle East.

The 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais by Yemen’s Houthi rebels exposed the limitations of Saudi Arabia’s defense system, leading the country to question the support of external forces in such a crisis.

Therefore, experts in Israel claim that Israel must take these moves by Saudi Arabia seriously.

Saudi Arabia is pursuing national security, enhanced negotiating power, and strategic independence. The question Israel and the US must ask is precisely where Saudi Arabia’s ultimate direction lies.

Türkiye under President Erdogan is adopting an increasingly hostile attitude toward Israel. Pakistan has no diplomatic relations with Israel, and its Minister of Defense is already emphasizing an Islamic military alliance against the Jewish state.

With Pakistan already publicly declaring its intention to militarily unite the Islamic world against Israel, Israeli leaders cannot view this Mecca Defense Alliance merely as a technical alliance.

Nevertheless, experts in Israel claim that Israel must fully open its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Israel’s interest lies in accelerating efforts to incorporate Saudi Arabia into a U.S.-led regional security framework that includes Israel and moderate Arab nations.

The strategic value of normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel extends beyond the opening of embassies, tourism, and trade. It provides a lasting regional alliance capable of countering Iran, strengthening missile and air defense cooperation, protecting trade routes, and connecting Israel with the Arab world more closely.

The Abraham Accords demonstrated that normalizing relations with Israel can align with the economic and strategic interests of Arab nations. Saudi Arabia can add significant political and economic influence on this regional security framework.

Therefore, experts in Israel claim that the strategic goal of normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel has become even more urgent. The fact that Saudi Arabia, a longtime US partner, has sought additional security guarantees from Türkiye and nuclear-armed Pakistan serves as a warning that confidence in US guarantees is declining.

These experts insist that the US must ask itself why Saudi Arabia, one of its most important Arab partners, needs an alternative security system, and how to prevent such a system from taking on an overtly anti-Israel character.

Israel must pursue the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia can play a pivotal role in building a more stable Middle East. Israel has ample reason to strengthen its relationship with Saudi Arabia.

4. What is the reaction of the US to the Mecca Defense Pact, and how does the US view the defense pact?

For decades, the Gulf region has been protected under the umbrella of the US. However, the US/Israel-Iran War has raised questions “just how reliable is the US umbrella?” Specifically, US military bases in the Gulf failed to protect facilities in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from Iranian attacks, and furthermore, the US appeared hesitant about how to respond.

Today, Saudi Arabia is clearly expressing concerns about the credibility of the US and is exploring other options, such as the Mecca Defense Pact. The fact that Türkiye and Pakistan cannot mobilize military power on the same scale as the United States is not important. New security partners such as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan are seeking a new security order in which they, rather than the US, can lead and shape the Middle East. [14]

Pakistan and Türkiye are partners of the US but feel uncomfortable with the exercise of US influence. The Mecca Defense Pact is a means to strengthen their influence in the Gulf region at the expense of their respective adversaries, India and Israel. Given the ideological convictions of Turkish Islamists, who have long aspired to an “Islamic NATO,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan holds firm conviction regarding this new trilateral security agreement. Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have gone even further, proposing a change to the railway connection routes that are part of the IMEC (International Islamic Energy Coalition). Departing from the existing route from Jordan to Israel, and then through Cyprus and Greece to Europe, there is a possibility that goods will bypass Israel, travel from Saudi Arabia through Jordan, north through Syria to Türkiye, and then be transshipped to Europe. [15]

Steven Cook, a senior fellow at CFR, argues that the US-led order in the Middle East could now split into two camps: those adhering to the Abraham Accords and those supporting the alternative, the Mecca Defense Pact.

At one time, it appeared that the existing US-led order could be strengthened and developed. The Abraham Accords, a 2020 agreement to normalize relations between Israel, Bahrain, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), presented such a possibility. Through this agreement, a “mini-multilateral cooperation bloc” composed of the US, India, Israel, and the UAE was created, which led to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) initiative and the (unrealized) normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. These moves demonstrated the potential to institutionalize many policies that the US has encouraged its regional partners for the past 40 years. However, Hamas’s attack on Israel in 2023, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Israel, Sudan, and Yemen, and a US/Israel-Iran War in 2026 have divided the region.

Previously, regional competition and conflict could be contained because leaders in the Middle East prioritized their relationship with the US. However, as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan pursue a new vision that directly competes with the Abraham Accords, it appears this situation can no longer be sustained.

Steven Cook claims that this is a significant change, and its importance cannot be overemphasized. Now that 50 years have passed since the United States first intervened in the Middle East, it is no longer possible to speak of a US-led Middle East order.

VI. Conclusion

This paper aimed to analyze why Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Pact, as well as how Iran, Israel, and the US reacted to this defense pact and how they view it.

This paper argued that escalating tensions in the Middle East, including Iran’s attacks on Gulf states and Israel’s aggressive offensive compelled these three nations to unite. Furthermore, the paper asserted that Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan entered into this agreement because each had specific benefits they sought to gain from it.

First, for Saudi Arabia, this defense pact provides additional security guarantees for regional security that has been destabilized by the US/Israel-Iran conflict. For Saudi Arabia, the Mecca Defense Pact serves as an opportunity to diversify its defense partnerships beyond the US and enables it to take advantage of Türkiye’s advanced military capabilities and Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence amid heightened threats to key maritime passages such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

For Pakistan, the Mecca Defense Agreement offers mutually complementary benefits, though viewed from a different perspective. In May 2025, long-standing tensions between Pakistan and India escalated into an open clash. While an all-out war was avoided, securing Saudi Arabia’s formidable economic power and Türkiye’s strong military and industrial capabilities as allies will be invaluable assets for Pakistan going forward. In particular, for Pakistan — which possesses powerful weapon manufacturing capabilities but cannot receive sufficient financial support from its own economy — the signing of this Mecca Defense Agreement serves as an opportunity for Saudi Arabian finance to participate in its domestic defense industry, just as it has for Türkiye.

For Türkiye, the benefits of this defense agreement are different. According to Burku Özçelik of the London-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), this trilateral defense agreement will provide new opportunities for Türkiye’s key defense industries through “joint production, technological partnerships, procurement, and enhanced military interoperability.”

While the Mecca Defense Pact has sparked extensive discussion in Iran, official responses so far have been limited and cautious. Iran’s reaction to the defense agreement is complex and varied. Most local Iranian commentators do not view the Mecca Defense Pact as a powerful military alliance to counter Iran or as an “Islamic NATO” capable of shifting the regional balance of power. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s strengthening of security cooperation with Iran’s two major neighbors — particularly with NATO member Türkiye and nuclear-armed Pakistan — is perceived as a dangerous signal that Iran cannot ignore. The argument is that if the confrontation between Iran and the US persists and Arab nations feel increasingly threatened by Iran and its militant allies, this regional security network could become increasingly solidified, posing a greater threat to Iran. However, another segment interprets this defense pact as a sign of a broader shift in the regional security structure — specifically, a transition from near-total dependence on the US to a more diversified regional security network.

To date, neither the Office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor the Israeli Foreign Ministry has made any official comments regarding the Mecca Defense Agreement. However, former Israeli officials and experts are reacting negatively to the defense agreement. For example, former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett referred to Türkiye as the “new Iran,” claiming that Türkiye is trying to incite Saudi Arabia to oppose Israel and draw in Pakistan to jointly build a “Sunni axis” hostile to Israel. Former Israeli National Security Council Chairman Jakob Nagel assessed the signing of the Mecca Defense Agreement as “a measure that goes beyond Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic ploy to pressure the US administration.” Nagel argues that Saudi Arabia is seeking alternatives other than the US as it feels increasingly vulnerable in terms of security. Therefore, he argues that Israel must pursue its strategic goal of normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia more urgently.

The assessment of the Mecca Defense Agreement by Steven Cook, a senior fellow at CFR, is resolute. Previously, regional competition and conflict could be contained because leaders in the Middle East prioritized their relationship with the US. However, as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan push for a new vision — the Mecca Defense Pact — that directly competes with the Abraham Accords, it appears such situation can no longer be sustained.

This is a significant change, and its importance cannot be overstated. Now, 50 years after the US first intervened in the Middle East, it is no longer possible to speak of a U.S.-led Middle Eastern order.