On September 18, 2026, the ‘Giuseppe Garibaldi’, a through-deck aviation cruiser donated by Italy, arrived at Tanjung Priok after a journey from Taranto (Putrinda, 2026). This makes Indonesia the second country in ASEAN to possess an aircraft carrier. In studies of maritime power, aircraft carriers are strategically significant because they enable a country to extend its aviation and military operations beyond the limitations of land bases (Williams, 2017). Therefore, Garibaldi’s presence has the potential to create consequences that go beyond modernization on a single platform.
The context is important. Indonesia is developing a new defense posture through the Optimum Essential Force framework (Indonesia Defense, 2025), while the Indo-Pacific security environment is increasingly shaped by great-power competition and the growing importance of maritime security. A previous RSIS analysis found that Garibaldi is likely at an early stage, more oriented toward helicopter operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief than toward traditional power projection (Lim, 2026). Thus, the significance of Garibaldi lies less in its designation as an aircraft carrier than in the capabilities it provides and how Indonesia integrates them into its doctrine, operations, and maritime diplomacy. Its regional significance will therefore emerge not simply from the acquisition of the platform, but from the roles Indonesia assigns to it within the wider Indo-Pacific security environment.
Why is Indonesia Operating an Aircraft Carrier?
The presence of Giuseppe Garibaldi as Indonesia’s first aircraft carrier needs to be placed in the context of Indonesia’s defense modernization. Since the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) program (Purwoto, 2014), Indonesia has been striving to enhance the quality and readiness of the TNI. Entering the Optimum Essential Force (OEF) 2025–2044 period, the modernization of defense equipment, strengthening of technology, and self-reliance in the defense industry are part of the long-term force development (Indonesia Defense, 2025). For the Indonesian Navy, this process includes developing combat ships and submarines, as well as supporting infrastructure. However, this modernization still faces budget constraints and a gap between the ambition of a green-water navy and the operational capabilities available.
This gap is important considering Indonesia’s geographical position. As an archipelagic country, Indonesia must secure vast maritime areas and the strategic shipping routes connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Strait of Malacca, Singapore, Sunda, and Lombok are of great importance to regional and global trade (Ali et al., 2026). Those conditions demand the capability of maritime domain awareness, protection of national interests, and rapid response to crises in areas far from land bases. In this context, the presence of the Indonesian aircraft carrier offers capabilities distinct from those of conventional combat ships. Garibaldi can serve as a mobile platform that carries helicopters, supports sea-based air operations, and functions as a command center.
However, the possession of an aircraft carrier does not automatically make Indonesia a blue-water power. The operational value of Garibaldi is better understood through four functions: supporting sea control and sea denial through surveillance and fleet operations; enabling limited power projection where aircraft integration and sustainment permit; supporting HADR through the deployment of personnel, helicopters, and logistics; and expanding Indonesia’s maritime signaling and operational options.
Aircraft Carriers in the Indo-Pacific Security Landscape
The presence of the Giuseppe Garibaldi emerged as maritime power became increasingly important in the strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. The United States maintains aircraft carriers and carrier strike groups as part of its regional power projection, while China continues to expand its aircraft carrier capabilities. In 2026, for example, the Liaoning operated alongside escort ships in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific (Mahadzir, 2026). India also used INS Vikrant in the multilateral MILAN 2026 exercise, while Japan continues to develop F-35B operational capabilities from Izumo-class ships (Borah, 2026). Australia itself routinely deploys warships in regional presence deployments and operates alongside the United States and partners in the Indo-Pacific (Australian Defence, 2026). These dynamics indicate that naval power is increasingly linked to maritime domain awareness capabilities, interoperability, and military presence in the region.
Indonesia should not be understood as a participant in that aircraft carrier race. The scale, doctrine, and strategic objectives of Indonesia differ from those of the major powers in the Indo-Pacific (Lin, 2024). Nevertheless, their expanding maritime presence shapes the environment in which Indonesia will operate. For Jakarta, the growing importance of maritime domain awareness, persistent presence, and rapid response increases the value of platforms that can support operations beyond the immediate reach of land-based facilities. The ship can enhance Indonesia’s ability to deploy helicopters, personnel, and logistical support for operations that require maritime mobility (Sulistiyandari, 2026). Its immediate strategic value therefore lies in expanding Indonesia’s ability to conduct maritime operations across a wider geographic area. This includes helicopter deployment, personnel movement, logistical support, and maritime surveillance. Such capabilities are particularly relevant to Indonesia’s responsibilities across key sea lanes and to its ability to respond to maritime contingencies without relying exclusively on land-based infrastructure.
What Does It Mean for the ASEAN Security Architecture?
For the ASEAN security architecture, the significance of Giuseppe Garibaldi for Indonesia lies in how the enhancement of Indonesia’s maritime capabilities can interact with the security mechanisms that ASEAN has built. The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) places maritime security, defense cooperation, conflict prevention, and confidence-building as part of efforts to build a peaceful and stable region (ASEAN, 2025). Mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), ADMM-Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Maritime Forum provide channels for member states to build transparency, interoperability, and cooperation without forming a formal defense alliance.
In that framework, Garibaldi has the potential to strengthen Indonesia’s capacity to contribute to regional security provision. The ability to transport helicopters, personnel, and logistics can be used for HADR, search and rescue, evacuation, as well as joint operations with ASEAN countries. This is in line with the ADMM-Plus orientation, which includes maritime security and HADR as areas of practical cooperation (ASEAN, n.d.-b). Thus, the regional value of this ship does not have to be realized through combat operations; its contribution can also emerge through Indonesia’s ability to provide responses to cross-border and non-traditional crises.
However, the enhancement of military capabilities still has a dimension of perception. ASEAN was not built as a collective defense system, so the modernization of one country does not automatically trigger a collective military response from the other countries. On the contrary, ASEAN relies on dialogue, transparency, confidence-building measures, and norms to manage differences in capabilities and interests (ASEAN, n.d.-a). ASEAN Regional Forum, for example, explicitly emphasizes transparency, confidence building, conflict prevention, and respect for international law as part of the regional security architecture (ARF, n.d.). Therefore, Indonesia’s explanation of the objectives, deployment patterns, and functions of Garibaldi will influence how other ASEAN countries interpret these capabilities.
The implications are becoming increasingly significant as ASEAN enters a new phase with the ASEAN Community Vision 2045. The APSC strategic document places ASEAN centrality as an important element in facing an increasingly complex geopolitical environment (ASEAN, 2025). At the same time, the ASEAN Maritime Outlook places the Strait of Malacca, the Singapore Strait, the Lombok Strait, and the South China Sea as important parts of the maritime network that supports trade, energy, and regional connectivity (ASEAN, 2023). In this context, enhancing Indonesia’s maritime capabilities can strengthen national capacity and is also relevant to the collective interests of ASEAN.
The relevant question for ASEAN is therefore not simply whether Indonesia possesses an aircraft carrier, but how its deployment is communicated and embedded within regional security practices. Operations centered on HADR, search and rescue, maritime security, multilateral exercises, and transparent cooperation would provide observable signals of a cooperative role. Conversely, deployments conducted primarily through unilateral military operations could generate different interpretations among regional states.
Indonesia’s strategic challenge is therefore to translate Garibaldi’s new capabilities into credible regional contributions. Integrating the platform into HADR, maritime security, search and rescue, multilateral exercises, and other ASEAN-led mechanisms would allow Indonesia to demonstrate its expanded maritime capacity while reinforcing transparency and ASEAN centrality. Garibaldi’s significance for the regional security landscape will ultimately be measured not by the platform itself, but by the operational roles and regional practices that develop around it.
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