I. Introduction

In July 2026, the Houthis declared a maritime blockade in the Red Sea targeting Saudi Arabia, effectively opening another front in the war between the US and Israel against Iran. Subsequently, the Houthis resumed their offensive against Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government forces.

On September 3rd, 2026, as Figure 1 shows, the Houthis launched an offensive against the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the internationally recognized government of Yemen, amid the ongoing Yemeni Civil War. Clashes began in Taiz Governorate, prompting a PLC counter-offensive against the Houthis in the Al-Jawf and Al-Bayda governorates.

Figure 1: Map of Yemen as of September 14, 2026 (Source: AlJazeera)

The fighting occurred amidst the ongoing 2026 US-Iran War and marked the fiercest fighting in Yemen since the 2022 ceasefire agreement between the two sides. The Houthi rebels have been engaged in armed conflict with Yemeni government forces and the Saudi-led Arab coalition since 2014. Although an UN-brokered ceasefire was declared in 2022, hostilities resumed after the Houthis seized control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast and the strategic Port of Mocha on September 10, followed by the capture of Perim Island (also known as Mayyun) — located in the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea — on September 11–12. Defeated by the Houthis in the battle for Mocha, the Yemeni government lost territory near the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the southwest; consequently, the entire western coast of Yemen (with the exception of the Midi district) fell under Houthi control. [1]

Furthermore, the Houthis have intensified their attacks on Saudi Arabia. On Thursday, September 24, 2026, Saudi authorities announced the interception of six ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis, targeting the western city of Taif and the port area of Yanbu on the Red Sea coast. In connection with this, the Houthis claimed to have attacked “sensitive targets” in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, as well as Saudi Aramco oil facilities located at the Port of Yanbu. Yahya Saree, the military spokesman for the Houthi rebels, stated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones were deployed in these two military operations.

In response to this Houthi offensive, Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government forces reportedly launched a large-scale counterattack on October 5, recapturing Red Sea coastal areas previously held by the Houthi rebels. Yemeni government forces and the Saudi-led coalition claimed to have secured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and recaptured key strongholds such as Dhubab, while also advancing into or entering the outskirts and certain areas of the port city of Mocha. Conversely, Houthi leadership strongly refuted these claims, asserting that they maintained control over the Red Sea areas they had recently seized.

Responding to the offensive by Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government forces, the Houthis launched drone and missile attacks on October 10 targeting key locations within Saudi Arabia, including airports in Jazan, Najran, and Riyadh. At least 12 people were reportedly killed in the Houthi attacks, including a US national. On October 11, Houthi rebels also attacked Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid Airport, resulting in one fatality. Saudi authorities stated that Houthi rebels have launched 20 attacks on King Khalid International Airport since the beginning of October, resulting in 17 deaths and 333 injuries.

As hostilities between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels intensified in September and October 2026, Saudi Arabia-plagued by Houthi attacks on its territory-recently requested support from allies such as Pakistan and Türkiye, as well as from the US. In response, Saudi allies such as Pakistan and Türkiye have agreed to assist Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Defense Pact, and it has been reported that US President Trump will soon decide whether to launch an attack against the Houthi rebels, although the US will not attack the Houthis until the Midterm election in November 2026.

With this information, this paper aims to analyze why the Houthis and Saudi Arabia are at war.

II. Relationship between Houthis and Saudi Arabia

The relationship between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia is deeply rooted in the dynamics of the Middle East, a region characterized by religious and political tensions. Historically, the Houthis have been marginalized by the Yemeni government, which maintains close ties with Saudi Arabia. In particular, Saudi concerns regarding Iran’s expansion of influence in Yemen through its support for the Houthis have heightened tensions between the two sides.

When the Houthis seized control of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, in 2014, Saudi Arabia viewed the move as part of Iran’s broader ambitions for regional hegemony and launched a military intervention in 2015 to restore the Yemeni government.

The conflict evolved into a proxy war, with Saudi Arabia backing the Yemeni government and Iran supporting the Houthis (an allegation widely made) (Darwich, Amiri, & Mirzaei, 2015). The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has been fundamentally hostile, as Saudi Arabia sought to eliminate Houthi influence and reinstate a friendly government in Yemen. Despite numerous peace talks, the conflict has dragged on, and both sides continue to engage in military action. This complex relationship exemplifies the broader Sunni-Shia conflict dynamics within the region. [2]

An UN-brokered informal truce between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis began in March 2022, but that long-standing quiet has unraveled amid a renewed escalation of fighting. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthi movement have sharply deteriorated into renewed active conflict following the collapse of a multi-year ceasefire

III. Current situation in the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis

1. Resumption of Full-Scale War and Territorial Clashes

a. Houthi Offensive in Yemen: As shown in Figure 2, following attacks on Saudi oil facilities and airports, the Houthi rebels launched a full-scale offensive. Between September 10 and 12, 2026, they seized control of key locations — including the strategic Port of Mocha on the Red Sea coast and Perim Island in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait — thereby securing control over Red Sea maritime routes

Figure 2: Mocha Port and Perim Island (Source: MARINO PH)

b. In response to the Houthi offensive, Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government forces have formed a coalition with allied nations and are mounting military and diplomatic countermeasures. Notably, on October 4, 2026, Rashad al-Alimi — Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council and head of the Yemeni government — announced the launch of a comprehensive military operation to retake all territory held by the Houthis and restore state authority. Consequently, as illustrated in Figures 3-1 and 3-2, Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces engaged in fierce battles with the Houthis in the southwestern mountainous regions of Al-Wazi’iyah, Al-Madaribah, and Al-Ara.

In particular, on October 5, Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government forces reportedly launched massive airstrikes and ground assaults, recapturing Red Sea coastal areas previously held by the rebels. The Yemeni government forces and the Saudi-led coalition secured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and recaptured key strongholds such as Dhubab, while claiming to have advanced into or reached the outskirts and certain sectors of the port city of Mocha.

Figure 3-1: Areas targeted by Saudi Arabia (green) vs. areas targeted by Houthi rebels (red) (Source: The Independent)

Figure 3-2: Combat zones between Saudi Arabia and Houthi rebels (Source: Sheba Intelligence)

2. Red Sea Maritime Blockade and Threats to Energy Security

In July of this year, Houthi rebels declared a maritime blockade in the Red Sea targeting Saudi Arabia and have since launched missile and drone attacks against Saudi territory and oil facilities. However, it is unlikely that the Houthis will be able to completely block the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Unlike the Strait of Hormuz — the sole maritime outlet from the Persian Gulf to the open sea — vessels entering the Red Sea via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have the option of exiting through the Suez Canal to the north. Nevertheless, data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicates that a prolonged simultaneous disruption to shipping in both straits could affect routes transporting approximately 24% of the global oil supply, further limiting the alternatives available to nations for transporting oil through the region.

For instance, as shown in Figure 4, if global shipping companies reroute oil tankers to avoid the Red Sea, it results in significantly longer transit times (increasing from 26 days for a standard route to 36 days for a detour), higher costs, and a sharp rise in insurance premiums.

Figure 4: Red Sea detour route (Source: Reuters & CFR)

The issue is that while the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait served as key alternative routes for Saudi crude oil exports — particularly in the event of disruptions at the Strait of Hormuz — recent Houthi control over the area has posed a significant threat to global energy supply chains and oil price stability.

Fortunately, on October 5, it was reported that Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched a major offensive against Houthi rebels and recaptured key areas around the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. However, the Houthis claim to still control these areas, raising doubts about the actual extent of the government’s forces control.

3. Houthi retaliatory strikes on the Saudi Mainland and Saudi Arabia’s counterattack

In response to the airstrikes and offensives launched by Saudi and Yemeni government forces on October 5, the Houthis have been targeting locations such as the Saudi capital, Riyadh. As shown in Figure 5, tensions have reached a peak as the Houthis have attempted ballistic missile and drone attacks against critical energy infrastructure — including Riyadh and the Port of Yanbu — which Saudi air defense systems have intercepted.

Figure 5: Riyadh and the Port of Yanbu (source: VOA)

Furthermore, recent attacks on several airports, including the one in Riyadh, have caused significant casualties; the Houthis have also issued a stern warning against using Saudi airspace and airports. Saudi authorities stated that Houthi rebels have launched 20 attacks on King Khalid International Airport since the beginning of October, resulting in 17 deaths and 333 injuries.

According to the Houthi-affiliated Saba News Agency, Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree issued a statement on the 11th (local time) reiterating a warning to “all airlines, experts, staff, and travelers using Saudi airports and airspace.” He escalated the threat by declaring, “All Saudi airports — with the exception of those serving the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina — are potential targets and could become operational zones for our forces.” [3] On the 15th, Houthi rebels struck the presidential palace in Aden — the interim capital of the Yemeni government — with a missile, leaving approximately 20 people dead or wounded.

In response to this offensive by the Houthis, Saudi Arabia launched retaliatory airstrikes against the group in Yemen on October 13 (local time). The strikes targeted oil facilities in major cities — including the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital, Sanaa — on a massive scale. According to the Arab News, the Saudi-led Arab coalition conducted airstrikes on key cities held by the Houthis, such as Sanaa, Hodeidah, and Dhamar. Coalition spokesman Turki Al-Maliki stated, “We confirmed that the Houthis were misusing critical civilian infrastructure for military purposes, so we carried out precision military operations to neutralize these assets.” He added that primary targets included the Al-Sabaha central base in Sanaa, underground reserve fuel depots, and fuel transport and offloading storage tanks and piers in Hodeidah and Dhamar. [4]

4. International Repercussions and Diplomatic/Military Moves

a. Iran’s Role Behind the Houthi Rebels and International Reaction: Western nations, including the G7, have criticized Iran for supplying advanced weapon components and technology to the Houthi rebels and have urged an end to such arms support.

b. Saudi Arabia’s Pursuit of Security Cooperation: Saudi leadership is discussing security countermeasures in coordination with the US and regional allies; meanwhile, major nations like France are closely monitoring the situation, with some deploying troops to the vicinity to help protect key Saudi energy facilities.

c. Under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed with Türkiye and Pakistan in August 2026, Saudi Arabia convened an emergency meeting in Riyadh involving the three nations’ chiefs of joint staff and foreign ministers to discuss measures for defending Saudi Arabia and supporting its exercise of the right to self-defense. Consequently, Türkiye and Pakistan agreed to deploy their troops to Saudi Arabia. According to reports from Al Jazeera and others, the foreign and defense ministers of the three countries emphasized their commitment to “immediately commencing the practical implementation of collective defense pledges, providing agreed-upon military forces and capabilities, and taking necessary measures to ensure their rapid deployment to Saudi Arabia.”

However, the three nations did not disclose specific details regarding the size or role of the collective defense forces. They did, however, emphasize the rapid deployment of troops within Saudi Arabia, suggesting that the forces would initially focus on the country’s defense.

Nevertheless, there remains a significant possibility of clashes erupting between the Houthis and the Turkish and Pakistani forces during the course of these defense operations. If the Houthis face military pressure, Iran could step in to provide support. This raises the possibility that the conflict could escalate into a war between Sunni powers (such as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan) and the Shiite power (Iran). Al Jazeera predicted that “Saudi Arabia and Sunni nations will likely attempt to push the Houthis away from the Red Sea coast to secure alternative oil supply routes,” while noting that “advancing into northwestern Yemen — the Houthis’ stronghold — could provoke Iran.”

d. Seeking to improve relations with the UAE: Saudi Arabia is resuming high-level contacts with the UAE — with whom it had previously clashed over issues such as support for Southern Separatist Forces (STC) in Yemen and differing perspectives on how to respond to Iran — and is exploring the formation of a united front to counter the Houthi rebels.

e. Reactions from Israel and the US: Following Saudi Arabia‘s massive airstrikes on oil facilities in Houthi-controlled Yemeni cities — including the capital, Sana’a — on October 13, Israel expressed its intention to support Saudi Arabia, raising the possibility that the Yemeni Civil War could escalate into a conflict spanning the entire Middle East.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump hinted on October 13 (local time) at the possibility of retaliation following the US midterm elections against the pro-Iran Houthi rebels responsible for attacking Saudi Arabia. President Trump made these remarks on the social media platform Truth Social, stating that “the Houthis are behaving very badly.” He noted, “We bombed them severely a year ago, and when we stopped at their request, I thought they had learned their lesson.” He added, “They remained quiet for a long time, but now they have resurfaced and are attacking Saudi Arabia in a very vicious manner.” [5]

President Trump has previously declared that he would not attack Iran at any point prior to the midterm elections (scheduled for November 3). The New York Times (NYT) reported that he has rejected plans for large-scale military operations against Iran or the Houthis five times in recent months.

While it appears, President Trump intends to avoid direct US intervention against the Houthis before the election, he has left open the possibility of requesting military support from other Middle Eastern nations, such as Türkiye.

Speaking to reporters at the White House that day, Trump was asked if he would request Türkiye to join in countering the Houthi attacks. He replied, ”That is a possibility,“ adding, ”Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a very good friend of mine.“

IV. Why are the Houthis at war with Saudi Arabia?

While the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis stems from various factors, the most direct cause is the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War and Saudi Arabia’s subsequent intervention in that conflict. In 2014, the Houthi rebels seized control of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, by force and ousted the Saudi-backed Yemeni government.

Saudi Arabia viewed the establishment of a hostile, pro-Iran force in neighboring Yemen as a direct threat to its own national security. Consequently, a full-scale war erupted in 2015 when a Saudi-led coalition was formed to launch airstrikes and military interventions against the Houthis.

Furthermore, the conflict between the Houthi rebels and Saudi Arabia is intensifying as part of rising regional tensions, fueled by Iran’s strategic influence and recent hostile actions across the Middle East.

The Houthis have established themselves as a key ally within Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” benefiting from the supply of weaponry, military technology, and political support. Amid the struggle for regional hegemony between Saudi Arabia (the leader of the Sunni world) and Iran (the leader of the Shia world), Yemen has become a primary theater for a proxy war between these two Middle Eastern powers. [6]

In recent months, the Houthis have once again begun targeting Riyadh, reigniting the long-standing conflict dynamic between Saudi Arabia and Iran. There was a period — following the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran — when the Houthis scaled back their military activities and shifted their focus to a completely different front. However, they have now adopted a new strategy of striking Saudi infrastructure, energy facilities, and crude oil export routes.

Working closely with Iran, the Houthi rebels aim to elevate their regional standing within the “Axis of Resistance” and expand Iran’s influence on the global economy — particularly by exploiting the situation where regional energy transport routes are threatened by the conflict involving the US, Israel, and Iran. The Houthis believe that seizing strategic positions along the Red Sea coast and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would allow them to threaten or blockade key maritime routes used by Saudi Arabia, thereby disrupting global energy supplies and pressuring the crude oil export routes Saudi Arabia relies on to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.

This is because the strategic importance of the Red Sea route has surged as Saudi Arabia has become increasingly dependent on it for exports, given Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. Between March and mid-July 2026, the volume of Saudi crude oil exports via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait increased eightfold compared to the same period the previous year.

Consequently, the Houthis have launched ballistic missile and drone attacks into Saudi territory, striking key oil facilities — such as those belonging to Aramco — and pipelines, thereby inflicting economic damage. Furthermore, they are intensifying pressure by seizing key locations near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, such as the Port of Mocha and Perim Island, while maintaining a maritime blockade and continuing attacks on Saudi vessels.

As a result, the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has evolved into a struggle over energy security centered on territory within Yemen and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

However, the expansion of the Houthi rebels’ military capabilities has played a significant role in their decision to engage in full-scale warfare against Saudi Arabia following the outbreak of the Iran War in February 2026. For the Houthi rebels, one of the most significant changes is the replenishment of their military capabilities — specifically their stockpiles of missiles and drones.

When the US first struck Iran in June 2025, it had just concluded a conflict with the Houthis following “Operation Rough Rider” (conducted from March to May 2025). Both sides had expended substantial amounts of ammunition during the conflict; notably, the US had carried out over 1,100 strikes, a significant number of which targeted Houthi weapons depots. [7]

By early May 2025, the Houthi rebels were battered and in a state of disarray, while the US was rapidly realizing that airstrikes alone could not subdue them. As both sides sought an exit strategy, the US and the Houthis agreed to a ceasefire; the US halted its bombing campaign, and the Houthis stopped targeting US-flagged vessels. This meant that when the US decided to join Israel in attacking Iran a few weeks later, the Houthis were in no position to come to Iran’s aid.

At the time, the Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities were insufficient for a military conflict with another nation. The situation remained largely unchanged when the US went to war with Iran again in February 2026. However, in recent months — as the US and Iran alternated between hostilities and ceasefires — the Houthis have steadily bolstered their military strength. According to Reuters, Iran has transferred significant numbers of troops and equipment to Yemen over the past few weeks. This military reinforcement from Iran has instilled confidence in the Houthis, leading them to believe they now possess the military capability to wage conflict.

Furthermore, the Houthis have observed Iran effectively blockading the Strait of Hormuz, thereby dealing a blow to the global economy and Middle Eastern oil exports. In many respects, this mirrored the Houthi rebels’ attempts to attack commercial vessels in the Red Sea during 2024 and 2025; however, Iran’s 2026 strategy proved far more successful, thereby presenting the Houthis with a fresh opportunity to strike the Bab el-Mandeb Strait — a vital artery utilized by Saudi Arabia.

When Iran blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia shifted its oil export routes from its eastern coast to its western coast. Consequently, oil tankers began docking at the Saudi port city of Yanbu before traveling south through the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to reach global markets — a move that played a significant role in stabilizing international oil prices. Currently, Saudi Arabia exports approximately 4.6 million barrels of oil per day, with more than 80 percent of that volume passing through the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

The Houthis are exploiting two key factors to their advantage: their possession of missiles and drones capable of blockading strategic chokepoints in the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability stemming from its reliance on a single primary route to market. The convergence of these factors led the Houthis to conclude that the time for action had arrived, prompting them to launch a massive offensive aimed at seizing control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and targeting energy facilities within Saudi Arabia. When considering the Houthi rebels’ restored military capabilities, Iran’s strategic vision for the Strait of Hormuz, and Saudi Arabia’s sense of vulnerability, the Houthis find themselves in a favorable position to pursue two objectives simultaneously. By blockading the Red Sea, they can demonstrate their loyalty to Iran and prove their own strategic value, while simultaneously pressuring an anxious Saudi Arabia to extract greater concessions and financial gains — both domestically and internationally.

To this end, the Houthis are acting with caution. They have announced that they are not closing the Red Sea to all maritime traffic, but are restricting passage solely for Saudi vessels. This distinction reflects their intention to escalate the conflict with Saudi Arabia while keeping the US and Israel out of the fray, thereby limiting the scope of the conflict to a localized level.

V. Potential Escalation of the Saudi-Houthi Conflict

The war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels is increasingly likely to escalate as the rebels expand their territory along the Red Sea coast and launch retaliatory missile strikes against major Saudi cities — including Riyadh — and oil facilities, while Pakistan and Türkiye show signs of moving to support Saudi Arabia.

As the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels extends to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait — Saudi Arabia’s economic lifelines — the importance of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan in August 2026, is growing. In early September, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif stated that the Mecca Agreement would be invoked if Saudi Arabia came under attack or if the fighting in Yemen spilled over into Saudi territory.

However, on September 15, Defense Minister Asif declared that “all available means” would be mobilized to defend Saudi Arabia against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. This was the clearest signal to date suggesting that Pakistan might directly intervene in the escalating conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels. [8]

Amidst the spread of the war into Saudi territory, Saudi Arabia convened an urgent meeting to discuss the implementation of the Mecca Defense Agreement, prompting Türkiye and Pakistan to hastily dispatch their military leadership to Riyadh. This meeting took place after Saudi Arabia requested a gathering of military leadership from Türkiye and Pakistan, following weeks of missile and drone attacks launched by Houthi rebels against Saudi territory.

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7th, stipulates that an attack on any one of the three nations — Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, or Pakistan — is considered an attack on all three. The sequence of events leading up to this meeting of the three nations’ army chiefs clearly illustrates the urgency with which Riyadh views the current crisis.

News of the meeting between the chiefs of staff of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan was first announced following a gathering in New York on September 24th involving Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.

A statement issued after the meeting condemned attacks targeting Mecca and civilian and economic facilities within Saudi Arabia, and acknowledged Saudi Arabia’s right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, the Pakistani side struck a somewhat cautious tone.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Dar stated on X, “We reviewed progress on establishing institutional mechanisms under the framework of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement and exchanged views on regional and international security issues.” The Turkish Foreign Ministry also adopted a similarly cautious stance regarding the New York talks. Turkish state media described the meeting as an opportunity to review ongoing “technical negotiations” aimed at institutionalizing the Mecca Defense Agreement ahead of a future meeting of the “Strategic Political and Defense Committee.” [9]

However, following an intensification of the Houthi offensive, representatives from Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan held an emergency meeting of the “Mecca Alliance Strategic Political and Defense Committee” in Riyadh on October 5th (local time). They reaffirmed their position of “firmly rejecting any attack that threatens Saudi Arabia’s security and territorial integrity.”

They further announced a decision to “immediately begin the substantive implementation of collective defense commitments, provide agreed-upon military forces and capabilities, and take necessary measures to ensure their rapid deployment to Saudi Arabia.” However, the trilateral statement did not disclose specific details regarding the size of the troops to be deployed or the roles they would undertake. [10]

This marks the first time both Türkiye and Pakistan have officially announced plans to provide military support. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether Türkiye and Pakistan will actually engage in combat on the Red Sea front. Reflecting this uncertainty, the three nations did not provide specific details that day regarding the scale of military forces, the composition of the troops, or their specific missions. They also added that “defense commitments would be implemented in accordance with the trilateral agreement and the laws of each respective country.” Given that Türkiye and Pakistan act as intermediaries in negotiations between the US and Iran, both nations likely have a strong desire to avoid an all-out conflict with the Houthis, a group known to have ties to the Iranian regime.

Analysts suggest that this cautious stance may be linked to direct warnings the Houthi rebels have issued to both countries. While launching missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, the Houthi rebels have also threatened Saudi allies.

Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthi political bureau, warned during an appearance on an Iraqi television program that Pakistan and Türkiye would face an “iron fist” — meaning severe retaliation — if they intervened in the war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. Tughral Yamin, a retired brigadier and senior research fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, told Al Jazeera that both Pakistan and Türkiye are currently grappling with significant challenges. [11]

He pointed out that deploying troops to fight the Houthis would be difficult for Pakistan, as its military is already stretched thin by internal and external threats — including ongoing border clashes with Afghanistan, persistent tensions with India, and a rise in attacks by domestic militant groups. He added, “It is also uncertain whether Türkiye would be willing to send troops to Saudi Arabia. Türkiye has obligations to NATO, and its border with Syria is not entirely secure.” Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is moving with urgency; the country’s religious establishment has raised its voice with a tone far more urgent than that of the Foreign Ministry. [12]

Grand Mufti Sheikh Saleh Al-Fawzan, Saudi top religious authority, urged unity against the Houthi rebels, describing them as a “misguided sect and a deviant group.” He defined the defense of the Saudi kingdom’s borders as a duty requiring the sacrifice of one’s “life and soul.”

King Salman of Saudi Arabia had previously expressed a similar stance in an unusual message. Accusing the Houthis of attempting to attack Mecca again, he stated during a cabinet meeting in Jeddah that such an attempt constituted a violation of Islam’s holiest site.

Gokhan Ereli, an international relations expert at Ibn Haldun University in Istanbul, told Al Jazeera that while the Grand Mufti’s message might have limited practical impact on countries like Pakistan or Türkiye, it holds significant weight domestically within Saudi Arabia.

“The Mufti’s authority carries real weight inside Saudi Arabia,” he explained. “This statement serves primarily to rally soldiers on the front lines, lending spiritual and religious justification to a long, painful war and making it easier for them to bear the sacrifices involved.” Erelli added, “For Pakistan and Türkiye, this is more a matter of stance than a binding obligation. Both governments are already cooperating with Riyadh through existing security agreements, and the religious framing merely serves to reinforce a message of solidarity without altering the formal terms of those existing commitments.” [13]

A regional diplomat speaking on condition of anonymity said, “Saudi citizens are increasingly feeling the threat posed by Houthi rebels and frequently hear air-raid sirens triggered by Houthi missile attacks targeting civilian facilities.” He added, “However, this speech represents a broader approach aimed at raising public awareness and reflects the recognition that the situation is more likely to deteriorate than improve.”

Meanwhile, Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan stated that the procedures for ratifying the joint defense treaty with Saudi Arabia in the Turkish parliament had been reported to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Fidan said, “We have decided to submit it to parliament as soon as possible, and the practical preparations are virtually complete.” Türkiye’s move to expedite parliamentary ratification is seen as a preparatory step to establish a clear legal basis for providing military support to Saudi Arabia. [14]

In this context, the Middle East-focused outlet the Middle East Eye reported on October 6th, citing a high-ranking Turkish source, that Türkiye could deploy special forces troops, military aircraft, and pilots to Saudi Arabia within weeks, with their mission limited to defensive support. Regarding the issue of support for Saudi Arabia from Türkiye and Pakistan, Tughral Yamin, a researcher at Islamabad’s Institute of Policy Studies, noted that “Pakistan has already deployed advisors, training instructors, and logistics and technical personnel to Saudi Arabia under past bilateral agreements.” [15]

Last April, Saudi Arabia confirmed the arrival of Pakistani military forces — including fighter jets and support aircraft — at the King Abdulaziz Air Base in the country’s eastern region. This troop deployment, carried out under a “strategic mutual defense agreement,” took place amidst ongoing attacks on Saudi Arabia by Iran.

Pakistan has been training thousands of Saudi military personnel since 1967 and has maintained a troop presence in the country since the 1970s to help protect assets such as oil facilities in the eastern region.

Meanwhile, Ereli of Istanbul’s Ibn Haldun University pointed out that the difficulties Saudi Arabia faces do not stem from a lack of resources. “Saudi Arabia possesses the necessary resources, air power, and has secured years of external support,” he said. “The real challenge lies in the fact that the Saudi-led coalition forces on the ground in Yemen are fragmented into various factions. With limited US military involvement, Saudi Arabia is shouldering the bulk of the operational burden alone, which is placing an excessive strain on its air defense capabilities.” [16]

Amidst this situation, France and the UK have stepped forward to offer defensive support. The UK recently agreed to provide aerial refueling for Saudi fighter jets engaged in defensive missions. France has confirmed it is deploying troops to guard a key oil terminal in Yanbu — a Red Sea port city that Saudi Arabia has used as an alternative route to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Despite expressions of support from nations such as Pakistan, Türkiye, France, and the UK, the Houthi rebels show no signs of easing their offensive against Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed forces within Yemen.

The hostilities between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels are serving as a proving ground not only for the Mecca defense alliance but also for the decades-old US-Saudi alliance.

“Saudi Arabia has a long-standing relationship with the US, and frankly, I don’t think the US can simply stand by and watch from a distance,” said Baraa Shiban, a political analyst and researcher specializing in Yemen and the Gulf region at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in the UK. “Ultimately, the US will find itself in a position where it must provide at least logistical, intelligence, and tactical support to Saudi Arabia,” he added. [17]

However, even if such a scenario arises, it appears highly unlikely that the US would engage in direct combat with the Houthi rebels — at least not before the US midterm elections on November 3rd. According to a report by the US media outlet Axios, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman twice called US President Trump to urge military action against the Houthi rebels, but President Trump refused both times.

On September 12, 2026, while visiting Dublin, President Trump told reporters that the Houthis had reached out first, assuring the US administration that they had no intention of fighting US forces. The following day, US Vice President JD Vance confirmed that the US was communicating not only with regional allies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) but also with the Houthi rebels.

However, on October 13th (local time), President Trump hinted at the possibility of retaliatory action after the US midterm elections against the pro-Iran Houthi rebels who were attacking Saudi Arabia.

President Trump made these remarks on the social media platform Truth Social, stating that the Houthis were “behaving very badly.” He noted, “We bombed them severely a year ago, and when we stopped at their request, I thought they had learned their lesson.” He added, “They stayed quiet for a long time, but now they have resurfaced and are attacking Saudi Arabia in a very vicious manner.” [18]

President Trump had previously declared that he would not attack Iran at any point prior to the midterm elections. The New York Times reported that President Trump has rejected plans for large-scale military operations against Iran or the Houthis five times in recent months. Consequently, it appears President Trump has signaled a policy of avoiding direct US intervention against Houthis prior to the midterm elections.

Overall, Saudi Arabia — unable to immediately count on support from the U.S., which is currently engaged in dialogue with the Houthis — is urgently seeking assistance from Pakistan and Türkiye, nations with which it has defense agreements regarding the protection of Mecca. However, rapid assistance seems unlikely due to complex international politics and the domestic situations of the respective countries. While intervention by Pakistan and Türkiye in the Saudi-Houthi conflict would drastically escalate the scale of hostilities, the likelihood of such intervention currently appears low. Even if Türkiye and Pakistan were to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia, the deployment would likely be limited to defensive purposes, making direct combat between their forces and the Houthi rebels improbable. Instead, Israel’s expression of willingness to support Saudi Arabia on October 13th suggests that its future actions could become a critical variable in determining whether the Saudi-Houthi conflict escalates into a region-wide Middle East War.

VI. Conclusion

This paper has sought to analyze the reasons behind the outbreak of war between the Houthi rebels and Saudi Arabia. This paper argues that while the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis stems from various factors, the most direct cause is the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War and Saudi Arabia’s subsequent intervention against the Houthis.

Furthermore, the paper contends that Yemen became a primary theater for a proxy war between Saudi Arabia — the leader of the Sunni world — and Iran — the leader of the Shiite world — amidst their struggle for regional hegemony. Consequently, the Houthis engaged in conflict with Saudi Arabia to elevate their regional standing within the “Axis of Resistance” through close cooperation with Iran and to help extend Iranian influence into the global economy. In particular, the Houthis sought to exploit the threat to regional energy transport routes caused by a potential US/Israel-Iran War; by seizing strategic positions along the Red Sea coast and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, they aimed to threaten or blockade the key maritime routes utilized by Saudi Arabia. Through these actions, they intended to disrupt global energy supplies and exert pressure on — or deal a blow to — the crude oil export routes Saudi Arabia relied upon to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.

Finally, the paper argued that the Houthis’ military buildup played a crucial role in their decision to launch an all-out war against Saudi Arabia following the outbreak of the Iran War in February 2026, a process in which Iran provided significant assistance. Regarding the potential escalation of the Saudi-Houthi conflict, this paper analyzes that Saudi Arabia is urgently seeking assistance from its Mecca Joint Defense Pact partners — Pakistan and Türkiye — given that immediate support is unlikely to be forthcoming from the United States, which is currently engaged in dialogue with the Houthi rebels.

However, although Saudi Arabia is urgently requesting aid from these partners, a swift response appears unlikely due to complex international politics and the respective domestic situations of each country. While an intervention by Pakistan and Türkiye would drastically expand the scale of the conflict, the likelihood of such an intervention remains low at present. Even if Türkiye and Pakistan were to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia, the deployment would likely be limited to defensive purposes, making direct combat between their forces and the Houthi rebels improbable. Instead, Israel’s expression of willingness to support Saudi Arabia on October 13th suggests that its future actions could become a critical variable in determining whether the Saudi-Houthi conflict escalates into a region-wide Middle East conflict.