I. Introduction

The 2026 US-Iran War, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, has led to what the International Energy Agency has characterized as the “largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market.” [1] Following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on 4 March 2026, as Figure 1 shows, oil and LNG exports were stranded, causing Brent Crude to surge past $120 per barrel and forcing Qatar and Kuwait to declare force majeure on oil exports.

Figure 1: Map of the Strait of Hormuz (source: http://www.drishticuet.com)

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has dropped following US-Israeli attacks on Iran on February 28, 2026. Since the outbreak of the Iran War, Iran has effectively blockaded and controlled the Strait of Hormuz, a key passage for global energy trade. Under this situation, the US began a naval blockade of Iranian ports on April 13, 2026. As a result, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has dropped to near zero, as Figure 2 shows.

In particular, the passage of oil tankers (light blue) transporting crude oil has almost ceased in March and April 2026 compared to February.

Figure 2: Traffic through Strait of Hormuz, February, March, April 2026 (source: IMF Portwatch & Statista)

As a result, this disruption to oil flows from the Gulf countries through the Strait of Hormuz made global oil price skyrocket as Figure 3 shows. Brent crude oil price has hovered around $100 per barrel on March and April 2026, following the Iran War on February 28, 2026.

Figure 3: Brent crude oil price (source: Trading Economics)

The disruption to oil flows from the Gulf region through the Strait of Hormuz would have huge consequences for the world as well as Gulf states.

Consequently, Middle Eastern oil producers are still scrambling to find and expand alternative routes for their oil exports, almost two months after the critical Strait of Hormuz was effectively shut to commercial traffic.

Against this backdrop, this paper explains the alternative transport routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz and evaluates the effectiveness of these alternative routes. First, each of the alternative routes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz is described, and then the roles and issues associated with these alternative routes are examined.

II. The importance of Strait of Hormuz

The world’s most important strategic chokepoints by volume of oil transit are the Strait of Hormuz, leading out of the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca, which links the Indian and Pacific Oceans (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: The world’s most important maritime oil chokepoints (source: EIA)

In the first half of 2025 (1H25), total world petroleum and other liquids supply was about 104.4 million barrels per day (b/d). It is estimated that about 76% of that amount (79.8 million b/d) traveled via seaborne trade. [2]

As Table 1 shows, in the first half of 2025, 20.9 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum liquids passed through the Strait of Hormuz – nearly 25% of seaborne-traded oil worldwide, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). Only the Strait of Malacca, with 23.2 million barrels per day, moved more crude oil and petroleum liquids in the first half of 2025 than the Strait of Hormuz.

Table 1: Volume of crude oil and petroleum liquids transported through world chokepoints, 2020-first half 2025(1H25)

Among those 20.9 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum liquids that passed through the Strait of Hormuz in the half of 2025, 14.7 million barrels per day were crude oil and condensates, while 6.1 million barrels per day were petroleum products, as Table 2 shows.

Table 2: Volume of crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products transported through the Strait of Hormuz, 2020–1H25

As Table 3 shows, Saudi Arabia moved more crude oil and oil products through the Strait of Hormuz than any other country in 2025. In 2025, Saudi Arabia exported 6.23 million barrels per day of crude and condensate through the Strait of Hormuz. Iraq, UAE, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain followed Saudi Arabia.

Table 3: Volumes of crude oil and oil products per day exported via the Strait in 2025 (Source: IEA and Kpler)

Most of the trade (by value) moving through the Strait of Hormuz is tied to a handful of countries. Gulf states depend on the Strait of Hormuz to move the bulk of their oil and gas, while major Asian nations rely on it for energy imports. Many of the most exposed countries are key US security partners.

Figure 5: Trade values passing through the Strait of Hormuz (Source: Jasper Verschuur, Lumma, and Hall & CSIS)

III. Alternative routes to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and their assessment

Alternative routes for bypassing the Strait of Hormuz

Since the outbreak of the US-Iran war on February 28, 2026, Iran has effectively blockaded and controlled the Strait of Hormuz, a key passage for global energy trade. Under this situation, US Central Command (CENTCOM) responded: “the blockade order would apply to all Iranian ports, both inside and outside the Strait from 10 am ET (Eastern Time) on April 13, 2026”. As a result, a dual blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has been carried out by Iran as well as the US. Consequently, Middle Eastern oil producers are scrambling to find and expand alternative routes for their oil exports.

As Figure 6, 7, 8 show, there are some known alternative routes for bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Pipelines in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran provide these alternatives.

Saudi Aramco’s East-West crude oil pipeline and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi pipeline together could provide about 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day of capacity to bypass the Strait in the event of a supply disruption. By 2027, the UAE plans to build another 1.5 million barrels per day pipeline circumventing the Strait, from the Jebel Dhanna export terminal to Fujairah. Iran inaugurated the Goreh-Jask oil pipeline and the Jask Oil Export Terminal on the Gulf of Oman with a single export cargo in 2021, and it sent a few small loadings in late 2024. The pipeline’s effective capacity remains around 0.3 million barrels per day. [3]

Figure 6. Map of the Strait of Hormuz and its alternative routes (source: EIA)

First, Saudi Arabia – the Abqaiq-Yanbu pipeline system (East-West Crude Pipeline or Petroline) crosses Saudi Arabia, connecting Abqaiq to Yanbu on the Red Sea. As Table 4 shows, the system is composed of two lines with a total design capacity of 5 million barrels per day of crude oil. In March 2025, Aramco reported that it had increased capacity to 7 million barrels per day, but sustainable flows have not been tested at this level. As of early 2026, it is estimated that about 2 million barrels per day of the pipeline’s capacity is used, leaving between 3 and 5 million barrels per day of spare capacity, depending on operational conditions and available export capacity on the Saudi West Coast.

Figure 7: Saudi Aramco’s East-West crude oil pipeline (source: http://www.X.com)

Figure 8: UAE ADCOP pipeline (source: Energy news beat)

Second, UAE – the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) runs 400 km from onshore oil facilities at Habshan to Fujairah. As Table 4 shows, the original nameplate capacity of the line is 1.5 million barrels per day with a reported current capacity of close to 1.8 million barrels per day. The UAE exports around 1.1 million barrels per day of domestic crude via this route, leaving room for up to 700, 000 barrels per day of additional volumes in the case of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

However, oil export routes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz can handle only a small fraction of the Gulf region’s daily crude oil exports. As shown in Figure 7, Saudi Arabia Aramco’s East-West Pipeline connects the oil production hubs of eastern Saudi Arabia with the Port of Yanbu on the Red Sea coast. While this pipeline allows for the diversion of some oil from the Gulf region to the Red Sea region, the transport volume will be significantly cut. Although the pipeline’s transport capacity reportedly is 5 million barrels per day, approximately 800,000 barrels of export oil are already being supplied to the Port of Yanbu daily through this pipeline, and about 1.8 million barrels per day are also being supplied to six Saudi Aramco refineries located in central-western Saudi Arabia. Thus, the spare capacity of this East-West Pipeline is only approximately 2.4 million barrels per day, which is significantly less than the 6 million barrels per day that Saudi Arabia typically handles at terminals in the Gulf region. As a result, it is expected that less than half (50%) of the Gulf region’s export volume will be diverted.[4]

On the other hand, the UAE can bypass the Strait of Hormuz by transporting approximately half (50%) of its Gulf region exports, amounting to 2 million barrels per day, through a pipeline to the port of Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman. Since the port of Fujairah already accounts for around one-third of the UAE’s total crude oil exports of 3.2 million barrels per day, the supply of the remaining one-third (1 million barrels) would be disrupted if the Strait of Hormuz were blocked.

Third, Iran – the Jask Oil Terminal was officially inaugurated in 2021 to transport crude oil from the Goreh-Jask pipeline to Jask on the Gulf of Oman. This pipeline reportedly has a capacity of 1 million barrels per day. However, the pipeline and port effectively remain non-operational. A test load was exported from Jask in late 2024, but no further oil has been exported from Jask since then. The terminal is currently not considered a viable crude export option for Iranian crude oil.

Fourth, as Table 4 & Figure 9 show, there is the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, known as the Iraq–Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline. This pipeline is 600 miles long (970 km). It runs from Kirkuk in Iraq to Ceyhan in Turkey. It is Iraq’s largest crude oil export line.

On March 19, 2026, Iraq announced that it had begun exporting oil via a pipeline running from Kirkuk in northern Iraq to Turkey’s Mediterranean Ceyhan port, with an initial capacity of 250,000 barrels per day. However, in early May, 2026, exports via this route amounted to about 200,000 barrels per day. Iraq hopes to increase exports through this route to 650,000 barrels per day, with 250,000 barrels per day coming from northern fields in federal Iraq — the term for areas under Baghdad’s direct control — and 400,000 barrels per day coming from fields in Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region. This total would still be well below Iraq’s average daily export volume of 3.45 million barrels in 2025. In March 2026, Iraq announced it was exporting 250,000 barrels per day through the pipeline.

Table 4: Structural inadequacy of existing alternatives (Source: https://discoveryalert.com.au/Strait-hormuz-closure-us-iran-talks-oil-supply-crisis/)

Figure 9: Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline

The pipeline contract with Turkey expires in July 2026.

The problem with the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline is that, while theoretically it could serve as a crucial northern export route transporting Iraqi crude oil from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan to completely bypass the Gulf region, in reality, operations have been repeatedly suspended due to disputes over transport rights and revenue sharing between Iraq and the Kurdistan regional government. Although an agreement to resume oil transport was reached in March 2026 and the pipeline was restarted, the initial transport volume is only a small fraction of the pipeline’s capacity, thereby showing that political instability in the region can hinder project progress just as much as the pipeline’s physical deterioration.

Fifth, in addition, Iraq has been adapting to the Hormuz crisis by exporting crude oil via tanker trucks that travel through Syria. On April 1, 2026, 299 trucks entered Syrian territory via the al-Tanf/al-Waleed border crossing from Iraq’s western Anbar province and traveled to the Port of Baniyas on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. The initial overland exports are about 10,000-15,000 barrels per day. Emad Masha’al, the district manager of Anbar’s al-Rutba district, told Rudaw Medi that approximately 500-700 tankers per day were crossing through al-Tanf/al-Waleed in mid-April. However, Syria’s Baniyas port can only process 300 tankers — just under 60,000 barrels per day. The opening of the Yarubiyah/Rabia crossing between Iraq and Syria in northern Iraq’s Nineveh province on April 20 added an additional export route. [5]

Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) agreed to export 650,000 metric tons of oil per month from April to June via Syria. This total equates to approximately 4.2 million barrels per month, roughly what Iraq produced in just a single day pre-conflict. A first tanker, the Greek-flagged Asahi Princess, started loading Iraqi oil at Baniyas on April 15 and is expected to carry about 85,000 metric tons, roughly 500,000 barrels. [6] However, AIS data shows that the ship is still in port. Exporting oil via Syria faces administrative and logistical delays at both ports and border crossings, as well as the need to address security concerns during transit. For instance, Islamic State terrorists attacked a non-Iraqi tanker truck transiting Syria in mid-April.

Sixth, Iraq is reportedly nearing the repair and reactivation of an additional segment of the ITP that bypasses the Kurdish-managed route. Iraq’s revitalized alternative pipeline runs from Baiji in Iraq’s northern Salahaddin province to the town of Fishkhabour in the Kurdistan Regional Government, where it meets up with the Turkish segment of the ITP. IS (Islamic State) terrorists damaged the Baiji-Fishkhabour pipeline in 2014, and it has been inoperable since then. When the pipeline is reactivated, it is intended to start by exporting 600,000 barrels per day and is designed to have a capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day.

However, Turkey will exit the existing treaty with Iraq that governs the ITP in July 2026 upon the expiration of the Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement, which has allowed Iraqi oil exports via Turkey since 1973. Among other concerns, Turkey has cited Iraq’s consistent failure to deliver at least 1.5 million barrels per day under the agreement. Iraq is unlikely to meet this number in the coming months, as its realistic export capacity via the ITP is much lower. Without a new lasting deal between Iraq and Turkey, the sole Iraqi pipeline providing an alternative to Strait of Hormuz would be closed.

Regardless of the need to renew the treaty, another Iraqi proposal is to establish a pipeline to move oil from Iraq’s southern fields through Haditha to Baiji in the north, and then on to the Fishkhabour connection to Turkey. [7] In April 2026, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani approved the allocation of $1.5 billion to develop this infrastructure, an effort to be carried out in partnership with Chinese companies. The project’s goal is also to expand export options from the Haditha juncture, possibly to Baniyas in Syria or Aqaba in Jordan. The only existing pipeline along these routes, which runs between Kirkuk and Baniyas, stopped operations in 2003 after being severely damaged during the US invasion of Iraq. This infrastructure would take years to rehabilitate, and Iraqi government officials said that repairs are stalled or abandoned due to security concerns in Syria.

Seventh, Iraqi Ministry of Oil spokesperson Sahib Bazoun said on April 14, 2026, that the ministry was also exploring “agreements to reactivate the Saudi pipeline, which has been inactive since 1991.” Bazoun was referring to the Iraqi Pipeline in Saudi Arabia (IPSA) that runs from southern Iraq to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast in Yanbu. However, the revival of IPSA, which was closed following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and has a designed capacity of about 1.6 million barrels per day, remains unlikely, as Saudi Arabia and Iraq would have to overcome disagreements over the pipeline’s control and settle other political differences. It recently came to light that Iraqi militias were behind drone and missile attacks on Yanbu, amongst other Saudi targets, during the recent Iran War. Furthermore, the fact that the Iraq-to-Saudi Arabia section of the pipeline has been unused for 30 years presents significant logistical hurdles to its reactivation.

Eighth, there are some additional options for bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. One of them is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), as Figure 10 shows.

Figure 10: India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) (source: Atlantic Council)

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) features three pillars that integrate existing and future infrastructure: a transportation pillar — the corridor’s backbone — integrating rail and maritime networks, an energy pillar with interconnected energy and electricity infrastructure across continents, and a digital pillar providing new fiber-optic cables and cross-border digital infrastructure. [8]

This strategic corridor spans India, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE, Israel, and Europe, creating a multi-modal network of railways, ports, and highways that boosts trade efficiency and regional collaboration.

Announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023 by India, the US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, European Union, Italy, France, Germany, IMEC is essentially a 21st-century silk road designed with 21st-century geopolitical goals. It proposes an eastern corridor linking India with the Gulf via existing shipping lanes, and a northern corridor running overland from the Gulf through Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel to the Mediterranean port of Haifa, with onward links to Europe. It also promises to save time, which means saving money.

Unloading goods and products in the Gulf and moving them by rail through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to European countries could save 5-7 days compared with shipping routes. More importantly, the corridor offers an overland route for containerised trade that does not depend on either Strait of Hormuz or Bab al-Mandeb stright, the Red Sea chokepoint that became dangerous throughout 2024.

IMEC builds on the long-delayed GCC Railway, a project conceived in 2008 to link all six states of Gulf Cooperation Council through a network of national and transnational lines. Originally estimated at $250bn for 2,117km of track, it has missed multiple deadlines, stalled by the 2017-21 Qatar blockade, Covid-19 pandemic, and the logistics of coordinating six sovereign rail systems. Current estimates point toward 2030 for completion of all lines. IMEC’s proposed first segment – between Fujairah and the UAE-Saudi border at Ghuwaifat – can be seen as an acceleration of the same underlying connectivity logic, now backed by G20 support.

Yet politics presents a bottleneck. The northern corridor passes through Israel, which, before October 2023, seemed possible under the logic of Abraham Accords normalization; however, since the Gaza war broke out, Saudi-Israeli normalization has been frozen. The segment that gives IMEC its edge cannot be built without Saudi’s agreement, and that agreement depends on a regional political settlement that remains elusive. [9]

Key challenges and problems facing IMEC include:

 Lack of financing and binding commitments: Almost two years after its 2023 launching, IMEC lacks a clear funding structure and depends on non-binding Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) rather than concrete financial allocations.
 Security risks: The widening conflict, including potential escalation with Iran and instability in Syria and Iraq, poses serious risks to the physical security of the proposed rail and port infrastructure.
 Regional exclusion and competition: The project excludes major players such as Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, leading to potential sabotage or competitive alternative routes (for example, Turkey’s focus on its own initiatives).
 Technical and operational mismatches: Differences in regulations – specifically European strict emission standards versus India’s standards – and the high cost of, and difficulty with, multi-modal transport (rail-sea-rail) pose operational challenges.
 Competition with existing Routes: While designed to be faster, the overland component of IMEC faces high costs compared to traditional & efficient sea routes such as the Suez Canal.

Ninth, a new US-backed proposal to build a network of overland energy pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz gains attention as tensions in the region expose a critical vulnerability in the global energy system.

A policy memo reviewed by Fox News Digital outlines the concept, known as “ARAM Express,” a proposed consortium between the US and Gulf partners to develop a multi-directional overland network for oil, gas and petrochemicals, originating with Richard Goldberg of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

The ARAM Express proposal outlines a US-Gulf consortium to build a multidirectional overland pipeline network carrying gas, oil, and petrochemicals to the Red Sea, Mediterranean, and Arabian Sea. The goal is to reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway through which around one-third of the world’s seaborne oil passes, amid repeated threats from Iran. Richard Goldberg of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies emphasized that both European and Asian markets are vulnerable to disruptions, making the diversification of export routes urgent. [10]

The plan envisions pipelines extending westward to the Red Sea and Mediterranean, as well as southern routes toward the Arabian Sea, creating multiple export pathways that would reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.

The proposal would depend on broad international participation, with Asian and European buyers investing in infrastructure and securing long-term supply agreements.

“European countries are desperate for long-term supply resilience, and Asian customers are equally exposed,” Goldberg said. “Even China cannot tolerate the risk of a sustained disruption.” [11]

However, there are three problems with the ARAM Express plan:

1. The first problem is geopolitical risk: The project involves complex negotiations with several countries, including potential security risks in the region.
2. The second problem is operational Risk: Relying on pipelines rather than traditional shipping creates new logistical risks for Gulf countries such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
3. The third problem is financial/security constraints: The project from time to time faces difficult political realities regarding regional cooperation.

Tenth, some global shipping firms such as MSC (Mediterranean Shipping Co) turns to Saudi land-bridge as Hormuz disruption pushes containers onto trucks

Supply chains are entering another reshuffle, and geopolitics are increasingly dictating not just routes, but also transport modes. MSC, the world’s largest container carrier, has been preparing a new Europe–Middle East service that leans heavily on road freight. [12]

This is not a standard all-sea loop. At the heart of the plan is a multimodal land-bridge across Saudi Arabia, moving part of the container flow off ships and vessels and onto trucks.

The shift is driven by constraints on energy traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which makes traditional sea routes less reliable and, in some cases, effectively unavailable. Carriers are being pushed toward sea-land alternatives to keep cargo moving – even if that means longer transit times and higher operating costs.

MSC says that the new service is due to launch from Antwerp in May 2026. The rotation includes European ports in Italy, Germany, Lithuania and Spain, before heading via the Suez Canal into the Red Sea. Two Saudi ports – King Abdullah Port and Jeddah – are positioned as the key handover points where containers are transferred to trucks.

According to the carrier, containers will be trucked from Jeddah to Dammam on Saudi Arabia’s east coast. The corridor is about 1,300 kilometers long and runs via Riyadh. From Dammam, cargo will continue on feeder vessels to ports around the Persian Gulf, including Abu Dhabi and Jebel Ali in Dubai. In other words, MSC is replacing one sea leg with a combined port-road-port solution.

The route rethink follows restrictions affecting passage through the Strait of Hormuz – a corridor that, before the crisis escalated, carried around 20 percent of global oil and gas supplies.

As shipping in the area tightened, ocean carriers began rolling out workarounds, including:

Hapag-Lloyd AG launching overland options via Oman and Saudi Arabia, A.P. Moller–Maersk A/S expanding land-bridge-style concepts, ports in Oman and the UAE seeing rising volumes and stronger demand for trucking capacity. [13] The result is a Gulf region that increasingly functions as a network of connected sea-land corridors, not just a set of traditional transshipment ports.

In this model, trucks play a critical role, filling the gap when the usual sea leg cannot be operated as usual.

The roughly 1,300-kilometer Jeddah–Dammam corridor emerges as one of the region’s main container corridors, absorbing flows that previously moved directly through Hormuz. At the same time, feeder links are being developed to Bahrain, Iraq and Kuwait.

In practice, this builds a regional logistics mesh in which road transport acts as the connector between maritime segments.

MSC’s decision reflects a broader shift: global logistics players are no longer treating ocean transport as a closed system. Instead, they are increasingly building multi-modal sea-land corridors and regional transshipment centers that depend on road transport as a core component. In geopolitically unstable areas, trucks are no longer just a last-mile tool – they become a full-fledged part of global supply chains.

However, these projects are costlier and take longer time with a bigger carbon footprint.

In conclusion, in the near term, the most plausible path is likely to be incremental expansion of existing bypass systems, including expansion of the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia, upgrades to Yanbu terminal capacity, a second ADCOP pipe in the UAE, and the construction of additional storage and bunkering at Fujairah, rather than rapid construction of ambitious new cross-border corridors. [14]

These projects require only domestic decisions and could feasibly deliver results within 3-5 years. They would push the combined bypass ceiling toward 12-13 million barrels per day, a meaningful improvement on the current 8-8.5 million barrels per day, although still well short of the 20 million needed to fully substitute for a closed Strait of Hormuz. Even then, the 2026 attacks on Saudi Arabia and UAE infrastructure show that bypass routes are not immune, and while they can reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, they do not eliminate the vulnerability altogether.

The more ambitious multimodal corridors will remain contested and slow unless the political preconditions they require are achieved. The war has elevated their priority and made the cost of inaction unmistakable, but these proposed corridors will not confer immunity. Critical infrastructure remains a target for any hostile actor looking to impose fear, cost, and delay.

IV. Conclusion

This paper analyzed alternative transport routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz and evaluates their effectiveness. First, the paper explained Saudi Aramco’s East-West Crude Oil Pipeline, the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) in the United Arab Emirates, Iran’s Jask Oil Terminal, Iraq’s Kirkuk-Jayhan Pipeline, the Indo-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, and the “ARAM Express” as alternative routes, and pointed out their respective problems. The paper also explained the land transport plans utilizing trucks by some global shipping companies, such as MSC (Mediterranean Shipping Co).

However, this paper argued that various alternative transport routes have faced numerous challenges due to security concerns, financial constraints, and diplomatic and interest conflicts among the countries involved.

Therefore, this paper claimed that the most realistic short-term solution is to gradually expand existing alternative systems rather than constructing ambitious cross-border corridors such as the Indo-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This includes the expansion of Saudi Arabia’s east-west pipeline and the expansion of the Yanbu terminal’s capacity, as well as the construction of a second ADCOP pipeline in the UAE and additional storage and refueling facilities at the Port of Fujairah.