China currently stands as a preeminent actor in the global power structure. The significant progress it has made in recent years has positioned it in this place, but it does not satisfy it. In Mearsheimer’s terms [1], China will seek the necessary power until it consolidates itself as a regional hegemon, if it has not already done so. However, amid the whirlwind of current events, we do not only see a China more focused on trade—without falling into the analytical error of conceiving it as disconnected from global developments—but rather one whose focus may not lie in the immediate sphere; it projects, it has an idea, a concept that drives it forward and toward which it intends to move.
This is why, for example, we do not find it as a key military actor in the midst of the conflict in the Middle East. Although some may view China as an ally of Iran, it remains primarily a commercial relationship. This explains, therefore, the country’s non-intervention in scenarios where the costs of military involvement would far outweigh the benefits gained. From the perspective of offensive realism, this corresponds to a strategy of buck-passing [2], allowing the United States to exhaust its hegemonic power in the region while Beijing capitalizes on the resulting gaps. This new, more diplomatic approach, if you will, led China — together with Pakistan — to present a proposal aimed at bringing the parties together and ending a conflict that, while harmful to it, is not damaging enough to justify military involvement. In any case, the final proposal was presented by Pakistan, but China’s influence on it should not be overlooked. China’s reserves are sufficient to sustain itself for a long time while the crisis persists, to the point that Iran allows Chinese vessels to navigate through the Strait of Hormuz. Its new Silk Road and its foreign policies over recent decades have fostered a network of complex interdependence that shields China from turbulent international contexts, such as the Middle East issue (which, at first glance, does not appear to have a quick resolution).
This new Chinese posture toward conflicts serves as a prelude to the issue I invite you to reflect upon: China’s position regarding Taiwan. In recent weeks, interactions have taken place that suggest a definitive consolidation of the “One China” principle. In recent days, Beijing reportedly proposed energy protection to Taiwan in exchange for revisiting the possibility of discussing unification through diplomatic means. This offer demonstrates how the Asian giant seeks to mitigate the deterrence of Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” (its semiconductor network) by leveraging economic interdependence. On the other hand, the leader of the Taiwanese opposition, belonging to the Kuomintang (KMT) party, visited China, marking the first official visit between political figures of these actors after several years of tension.
Given this possibility, it is highly interesting how China, which possesses the material capacity to attempt to enforce reunification, chooses instead to pursue alternatives from a diplomatic perspective. From a structural calculation, an amphibious assault would entail catastrophic risks that would severely undermine its accumulation of power. Understanding this, Beijing opts for a path that would be far more beneficial—not only for achieving its objective swiftly, but also for legitimizing its international position. In this way, it manages to expand its influence and power globally through Soft Power—understood by Joseph Nye (2004) as “the ability to shape the preferences of others”—avoiding the controversial methods of wartime devastation that, for example, Russia employs in its periphery.
From this perspective, one author whose ontological categories allow us to reveal the deeper essence of this phenomenon is Hegel. His ideas will help us understand this Chinese spirit (‘Geist’), conceived in the terms of the German philosopher as ‘Volksgeist’ (spirit of the people), while also observing a particular ‘Zeitgeist’ (spirit of the age) amid a constant dialectical becoming.
The objective of these lines is not to explain Hegelian philosophy in the abstract, but to situate it within the international sphere alongside structural theories, in order to analyze a reality that can be understood through these concepts. Xi Jinping’s own doctrine of the “Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation” already empirically frames annexation not as a whim, but as an inalienable imperative of the national soul. Therefore, I invite, through these words, reflection on the following: Is the idea of “One China” an expression of the actor’s own ‘Volksgeist’? Is Taiwan, then, an unrecognized actor that functions ontologically as the moment-for-itself of China, whose unavoidable dialectical synthesis (‘Aufheben’) will resolve this historical fracture? Can we ultimately speak of a dialectic of reunification?
China in itself: the thesis that opens thought
When we speak of the Asian nation, we are not only referring to the one that currently acts as one of the most important regional hegemons, with the capacity to determine and influence the fundamental issues of the international system (even if it does not always resort to direct coercion to do so). China expands its influence through the New Silk Road and diplomatic assertiveness, which has recently been evident in the systematic use of its vetoes in the UN Security Council, and it is historically shielded by Resolution 2758 of 1971, a foundational milestone in the denial of the island’s international recognition.
China today perceives itself as a nation whose horizon, far from closing, continues to expand. It is here that Taiwan comes into play, not as something separate from what China is, but as an immanent part of it, within the configuration of a unified entity that would confirm the undeniable position of the Asian giant.
Beyond the fact that China does not vitally “need” Taiwan in terms of immediate material survival, and aside from analyses that emphasize the importance of the island of Formosa in global semiconductor production, the root of the Chinese state’s nature must be sought in a dialectical process still underway. Even before the victory of the Chinese Communist Party at the end of the civil war in 1949, the “father” of modern China, Sun Yat-sen — a figure claimed by both sides of the Strait — never conceived China as separated from Taiwan; rather, it was understood as a constitutive and indivisible part. The subsequent fracture lies empirically in the civil conflicts that reconfigured the political geography of the time, operating as the dialectical split of an original territory. In fact, to this day, the Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) still formally claims sovereignty over the mainland, reinforcing the premise of a shared national imperative.
Taking China from this standpoint, it becomes evident how its spirit is formed. First appears the subjective spirit, the nation’s self-consciousness that seeks its freedom and self-realization. This ‘Geist’ should not be confused with isolated bureaucratic wills; rather, it operates as ‘Volksgeist’, or the spirit of the nation, which is born, expands, undergoes constant contradictions, and seeks its absolute realization. In simpler terms, this means that deep identity, millennia-old history, and cultural matrix act as an unavoidable unifying force linking Beijing and Taipei, transcending temporary political divisions. It is a unique particularity, and it binds both China and Taiwan because, in their genesis, they share it. It is the very soul of the State seeking to express and objectify itself in the historical process.
Here lies the reason why we affirm that China is in the moment-in-itself (‘Ansichsein’): it is the labor and latency of an original stage that, propelled by dialectical processes, emerges as the material substance that will be contested in order to achieve full self-consciousness. In other words, the premise implies that the Asian giant is still undergoing a phase of internal consolidation and capability accumulation, maturing the necessary conditions before confronting externality in order to affirm its definitive identity. China’s position in the world and its progress in the maximization of power—its “latent power” in Mearsheimer’s terms, gradually transmuting into real projection—is the manifestation of this spirit. The ultimate interest, beyond securing material regional hegemony, will lead China to the philosophical resolution of its own being. Power thus operates as an inescapable instrumental tool for the realization of the spirit’s self-consciousness.
In the pure conceptualization of Hegelian dialectics, we observe China seeking to position itself as the Master. However, Taiwan does not docilely assume the role of the Slave (or Bondsman). In its relation with international alterity, the island has been stripped of its natural status as the Republic of China, conventionally reduced to “Taiwan” [3]. China emerges and asserts itself against this resistance, attempting to ensure that the unitary ‘Volksgeist’ prevails over the particularities arising from the civil war. In Hegel, the Master demands recognition and the Slave yields out of fear of death (the disappearance of its own spirit). However, in the contemporary dynamics of complex interdependence, the Taiwanese actor uses asymmetries in its technological sector to dramatically raise the costs of such submission. To illustrate this concept, one need only observe the island’s hegemony in the global manufacturing of cutting-edge semiconductors, which turns any coercive absorption into a risk of global economic paralysis, granting the “Slave” a material shield that challenges and contains the supremacy of the “Master.”
Consequently, the accumulation of power by the Asian giant seeks to establish the necessary superiority to achieve this synthesis. As Hegel himself states in the Phenomenology of Spirit, “self-consciousness exists only in being acknowledged.” Without absorbing Taiwan, China’s imperial self-consciousness and its recognition within the system remain incomplete. Nevertheless, China seeks to apply diplomatic and commercial channels over strictly military ones, given the structural rationality that governs revisionist powers. A premature military advance — especially in the face of Washington’s deterrent factor of “strategic ambiguity” — would be tragic for its long-term relative power accumulation. Therefore, it prioritizes diplomacy and offers commercial co-optation (such as recent energy protection proposals) to open less risky pathways toward reunification.
As Taiwan is not a fully ‘de jure’ recognized actor but functions ‘de facto’ as a modern state embedded in global value chains, the axis of international theory is altered. Taiwan stands at the margins of the institutional system, yet operates as a tectonic piece within it. In this complex scenario, it emerges as the necessary otherness for the dialectical becoming of China: two dimensions of a single system in dispute over achieving the definitive self-consciousness of a unitary ‘Volksgeist’.
Taiwan, the moment-for-itself: the unity that confronts and forms the spirit of China
The island actor cannot be understood through classical conceptions of power, because it does not possess the capacity to engage in that struggle in terms of maximization, nor in a dialectical contest on equal footing. Taiwan is not a major revisionist power; it is a survival state that prioritizes deterrence. That is why it has recently employed asymmetric diplomatic and economic means, such as “semiconductor diplomacy” and the structural weight of companies like TSMC [4], in order to forge its own conception and ensure its survival in the face of overwhelming military asymmetry from the mainland.
However, the recent visit of the Kuomintang (KMT) president, Cheng Li-wun, to mainland China generates the confirmation of an Other that, in addition to affirming its own existence, triggers the dynamization of this dialectical process, shaping the becoming of the China question. Under the lens of the Master–Slave dialectic, Taiwan can no longer challenge supremacy on the formal international plane, since the institutional system — led by the UN — has granted Beijing the official status as the recognized holder of that position. Nevertheless, the Republic of China (Taiwan) still functions as the ontological counterbalance to the People’s Republic of China. Its mere presence generates mutual existence, thus constituting the principal and indivisible parts of this dialectical process.
This is why we situate it as the Chinese moment-for-itself (‘Für-sich-sein’); it is the materialization of a differentiated objective spirit (with its own institutions and legal order) that enters into dispute with the mainland’s institutional framework, producing the necessary contradictions for China to determine its own existence and self-consciousness. In other words, the premise implies that Taiwan is not simply a split territorial remnant, but rather a mature political manifestation which, by possessing its own organizational and democratic model, functions as the indispensable otherness against which Beijing must confront itself in order to calibrate and define its true magnitude. This logical opposition by nature generates conflict, because differentiated ideas of the same originating ‘Volksgeist’ are confronted in order to transcend themselves. On the factual level, this translates into an existential struggle where two opposing governance systems claim for themselves the historical legitimacy to embody and lead Chinese civilization, making friction a structural imperative rather than a mere geopolitical accident. For this reason, interstate diplomacy (such as KMT political rapprochements) represents an attempt to channel this confrontation toward a logical synthesis, avoiding the use of brute force, a tactic that is coherent both from the structural power calculus and from the dialectical framework outlined.
The new diplomacy employed by both sides suggests that the process is traversing contradictions that do not inevitably lead to open military conflict, but rather interact through dialogue or economic co-optation in order to approach that absolute spirit or realization of the sought self-consciousness. We recall that we referred to Taiwan as a particular objective spirit: by not constituting a fully internationally recognized state, it functions as the institutional manifestation of Chinese contradiction, historically erected to challenge the initial moment-in-itself of the mainland.
Unlike conventional dialectics between distinct nation-states, in the Chinese case there is the particularity that civil war generated a territorial and systemic manifestation of this opposition. If we understand Taiwan as the moment-for-itself, the incessant pursuit by Beijing of the inalienable goal of “one China” becomes philosophically justified. The pursuit of Spirit’s self-consciousness shapes Taiwan in the historical process as the manifest counter-position that, over decades, generated new dialectical moments until crystallizing into the complex current status quo.
Once both sides assimilate their position in this historical chessboard, Taiwan will move from the position of technological “Slave” or servant that legitimizes China’s existence through opposition, to being integrated through the ‘Aufhebung’ (Hegelian sublation/sublimation) and forming a single spirit. In simpler terms, this means that the resolution of the conflict would not entail the mere annihilation or destructive absorption of the island’s identity, but rather an integrative synthesis in which Taiwan’s strategic capabilities and particularities are preserved and elevated as they are organically fused with the mainland matrix. This new unified actor, interacting with other powers, will generate new global dialectics, but now on the basis of the realization of an absolute and self-conscious spirit, translated geopolitically into an undisputed regional hegemony. On the factual level, this translates into the idea that a unified China, having definitively resolved its main existential contradiction and secured its immediate maritime periphery, will be able to project all its latent power into the international system without the territorial vulnerabilities that today limit its rise, finally operating without constraints as the dominant power pole in the Asia-Pacific region.
At present, Taiwan does not act in terms of power expansion, but rather seeks to survive within the harshness of structural reality and prolong the dialectical tension. At this point, Mearsheimer’s theory clashes with and complements the Hegelian one: powers such as the United States support the island without formal diplomatic recognition, operating under the logic of the “offshore balancer” [5]. Washington’s objective is not to resolve the dialectic, but to perpetuate the dispute in order to prevent China from securing its periphery and gaining more regional power than it already possesses, thereby frustrating its Hegelian synthesis and preventing it from challenging US global hegemony.
Taiwan is therefore a key piece within a chessboard in which major powers operate, yet it remains conditioned in one way or another by its inescapable role as the central dialectical dispute of China. Beijing does not rush the process militarily because it rationally understands that historical becoming is what generates the dispute and will lead it to its conclusion at the appropriate strategic moment. Diplomatic offers, in addition to increasing China’s soft power, confirm the central ontological premise: Taiwan cannot be Taiwan without China, and vice versa.
We are left to observe how, in this grand game of structural power, China will attempt to integrate Taiwan into its orbit, and how the island oscillates between systemic actors without being formally recognized. However, both shores intrinsically understand that within their dispute — and in its eventual synthesis — lies the crux of their historical existence: the definitive realization of their absolute spirit.
Aporetics of the ‘Aufheben’: the search for the in-and-for-itself moment
We then arrive at the definitive stage for thinking about the conclusion and ultimate realization of the in-and-for-itself moment (‘An-und-für-sich-sein’). Both China and Taiwan embody, as has already been shown, categories inherent to a clear dialectic; however, it is the extreme complexity of the ‘Aufheben’ (sublation or synthesis) that delays the realization of this historical process. In simpler terms, this means that achieving absolute unity does not consist of a mere territorial annexation, but rather the intricate challenge of harmoniously assembling two highly divergent political and economic realities without destroying the material and symbolic richness of either side.
In order to achieve full self-consciousness, China must resolve this dispute with its ontological counterposition, make the ‘Aufheben’ possible, and overcome the current fragmentation. In other words, the premise implies that Beijing will not be able to fully consolidate itself as the unquestionable hegemonic center of its civilization while an entity persists that, outside its normative control, embodies and projects an alternative version of the same Chinese identity. However, beyond the factual impossibility of forcing this moment immediately without catastrophic consequences, there is an unavoidable variable: the ‘Zeitgeist’ (spirit of the age) of the international system. The contemporary anarchic structure determines, in one way or another, the conditions of possibility under which these moments can occur. On the factual level, this translates into the idea that modern power dynamics, shaped by nuclear deterrence, strategic alliances of rival powers, and intricate supply chains, impose severe limits on unilateral military action, ruling out direct conquest as a viable path toward synthesis. While it is not the intention of this work to exhaust the analysis of the current ‘Zeitgeist’ — a task that would require a study in itself — it is imperative to consider it in order to understand that the manifestation of the Chinese Absolute Spirit is conditioned by an interdependent global chessboard.
Within the circularity of history, where various dialectics unfold linearly and drive universal history forward, I have chosen to isolate this case study. This selection does not stem from mere reductionism, but from the conviction that the Strait conflict transcends its own particularity and functions as a heuristic matrix applicable to other systemic analyses.
It is true that Hegel conceived his philosophy of the State with the Prussian monarchy of Frederick William III as its horizon (and justification); the author cannot be separated from the particularity of his epoch. However, beyond historical critiques, his famous ontological maxim — “all that is real is rational and all that is rational is real” — finds a striking echo in contemporary structural realism. This Hegelian premise is directly related to the proposition that states are strictly rational actors; a rationality oriented toward survival and power maximization that inevitably determines their behavior. The Hegelian framework provides such a robust philosophical foundation that, just as Karl Marx adapted it to relations of production, it becomes deeply revealing when extrapolated to the anarchy of the international sphere.
Even in relation to the theory presented, Hegel himself develops a conceptual account of imperialism that we can extrapolate to the contemporary actions of powers such as Russia, China, and the United States. Although the German author writes from an undeniably Eurocentric perspective, today it is these three poles of power that embody the intrinsic essence of his idea. In his famous Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Africa and America were conceived as immature geographies, incapable of transcending the immediacy of sensible existence, thereby legitimizing the colonial enterprise.
Likewise, regarding the United States, Hegel foresaw in its territorial expansion — toward what he called “the land of the future” — a mechanism to alleviate the contradictions and tensions of civil society through the export of its own way of life. This philosophical imperialism, detailed in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, thus serves as a theoretical foundation for the power we observe in today’s regional hegemons.
Shifting the historical focus away from Europe, the supposed right to expand and dominate actors who “have not reached a rational level” or who “challenge unity” conceals, under its teleological premise, the crudest and realist of logics. As Mearsheimer rightly notes in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, states never admit in the international arena that they act driven by a predatory instinct; on the contrary, they always disguise their inescapable imperative of survival, power maximization, and regional hegemony behind liberal rhetoric, legal discourse, or, in this case, historical-philosophical inevitability.
The ultimate objective of these pages has not been to write a treatise on Hegelian philosophy, but to instrumentalize it in order to decode systemic facts, think beyond orthodox conventions, and reveal the deep logics that determine state behavior. Even when the decisions of great powers appear to defy common sense, grounding the analysis of power in a dialectical logic adds conceptual density to its use (or disuse). Giving meaning to these struggles and seeking the logos behind the sword forces us to debate, from the roots, the geopolitical questions that concern us daily.
Regarding our case of analysis, China, through recent strategies—such as the offer of energy protection in exchange for reopening diplomatic channels (even amid initial rejection) and the encouragement of the visit of the Kuomintang leader—clearly inaugurates a new panorama. These maneuvers increase the possibility of assimilating its counterpart through interdependence and co-optation, thereby consolidating its hegemony.
Taiwan, for its part, oscillates between the opposing interests of Washington and Beijing. In its effort to survive in a hostile environment lacking full formal recognition, it subordinates — intentionally or structurally — to the margins afforded by the great powers, seeking to preserve a level of autonomy that allows it to negotiate its own existence. Reopening the door to dialogue across the Strait is a controversial but strategically necessary maneuver, to which the United States, in its role as balancer, reacts by employing greater tools of deterrence to prevent the realization of a Hegelian synthesis that would expel its influence from the Western Pacific.
Beijing understands that the historical clock works in its favor. The recent turbulence and internal tensions of the American hegemon instill doubts in the international community; leadership vacuums where peripheral actors begin to perceive China as an exceptionally rational state, with expansive capabilities and a bearer of a systemic alternative.
Immersed in this dialectical process, we witness the latent dispute between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China. This constant conflict inevitably carries the necessary tension to force the ‘Aufheben’. In simpler terms, this means that perpetual friction and periodic crises in the Strait do not constitute anomalies of international politics, but rather indispensable historical catalysts that push both entities toward the inescapable resolution of their original contradictions. Today, that synthesis does not necessarily translate into immediate material reunification, but the overcoming of this stage may or may not occur. We will then observe how the dialectic develops, either crystallizing into a new regional order or reconverting into a renewed cycle of disputes between the in itself and the for itself, until it matures into the in and for itself.
The fundamental question remains: Will the in and for itself moment of China arrive? Will the dialectical dispute conclude in the longed-for reunification, allowing the fractured ‘Volksgeist’ to finally reach the self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit of the nation? In the contemporary whirlwind, where analytical immediacy prevails, it is vital to remember that these processes do not respond to the determining logics of the daily conjuncture, but to the long times of History.
We are talking about processes in permanent revolution; contradictions that allow nations not only to validate themselves against the Other, but to surpass themselves, reaching higher stages. In the anarchy of the international system, these moments are constantly gestated in the shadow of empirical power. The predominance of material calculation often prevents our analytical focus from including the philosophical dimension, but behind the crude exercise of power always lies a determining logos.
The logics that govern our world are the logics of survival and power — and China’s rise confirms this — but this essay has sought to transcend mere empirical impact to illuminate the ontological machinery that drives great powers. We will inevitably dwell amid these systemic contradictions, but opening the door to this reflection invites us to pose the following questions: Will the ‘Aufheben’ arrive at the Taiwan Strait? What other dialectical processes lie hidden in global geopolitics? And, ultimately, in analyzing the imperative of one China beyond the strict relation of power interests, can we dare to affirm the existence of a true dialectic of reunification?
Notes & Footnotes
References
